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Cuadernos de Economía

Print version ISSN 0121-4772


BELAUS, Anabel; REYNA, Cecilia  and  FREIDIN, Esteban. Measurement and manipulation of social norms in experimental corruption games. Cuad. Econ. [online]. 2016, vol.35, n.68, pp.353-377. ISSN 0121-4772.

Bribery experiments investigate the factors that modulate decisions in corrupt exchanges. To measure behaviours that are representative of decisions in the real world, it is necessary for the social norms that are typically transgressed in corruption to be adequately represented in the experiments. In this review, we critically present three techniques used to measure or generate social norms in economic experiments: Framing effects, the estimation of social norms through a coordination game, and third-party punishment. We discuss ways in which the complementarity and improvement of these techniques can contribute to the external validity of experimental studies on corruption.

Keywords : Bribe; conformity; punishment; coordination; cooperation; framing effect.

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