Resumo

DUARTE-BARROSO, Juan José  e  CRUZ TORRES, Christian Enrique. Transparency and altruistic punishment in an experimental model of cooperation to corruption through economic games. Rev. colomb. psicol. [online]. 2024, vol.33, n.2, pp.43-62.  Epub 23-Set-2024. ISSN 0121-5469.  https://doi.org/10.15446/rcp.v33n2.103188.

This work integrates cooperation, punishment, treasury damage, and norms transgression in three variants of a single experimental model of corruption. Participants formed words with predetermined letters, receiving a reward for each word, besides an individual reward taken from the common fund if they reached the goal. A manipulation in the letters made it impossible to reach the goal, so reporting exceeding it implied cheating for a benefit. Three studies model the effects of signaling, descriptive norms, and the possibility of punishing or investigating corruption acts (transparency). 248 participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of each study. Significantly less cheating behavior was found in reports of words and earnings in Studies 1 and 3, but not in Study 2. The experimental model reveals the potential of transparency as an alternative to diminishing corruption with less social cost than altruistic punishment. The relevance of these results for implementing public policies was discussed.

Palavras-chave : Altruistic punishment; corruption; descriptive norms; signaling; transparency.

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