Objective/Context:

What consequences does intra-party conflict have on the redistributive reforms of left-wing governments? This article aims to analyze the effects of intra-party conflict on redistributive policy reforms, highlighting the character of the factions-their ideology and connection with social bases-and their role in negotiating the reforms.

Methodology:

It is a case study, which allows characterizing party actors and their performance in four reforms of the governments of the Broad Front of Uruguay, a fractionalized party.

Conclusion:

The internal conflict was relevant and had a radicalizing or moderating effect, depending on the role played by the left and center-left fractions in the reform processes. Tension arose from the imperative to coordinate the adoption of policies that would reduce inequality and ensure economic dynamism.

Originality:

It lies in showing that, in certain cases, party fractions seek to serve the interests of their social base regardless of-and in contradiction to-their ideological position. The resulting public policy was not strictly the one preferred by the main fraction but includes concessions to the consenting fraction when there is a certain balance of power between them.