Objective/Context:

The present article develops a theoretical tool to explain drug policy decisions called the Psychoactive Politics Framework. It is built on the assumption that the design and implementation of drug policies affect several political goals, such as popularity, winning elections, material benefits, and international reputation. Therefore, the framework expects these policies to be the result of national and international incentives that will help policy makers achieve those goals. These are incentives related to public opinion, policy advocacy, crises, pressure, standing, and leadership.

Methodology:

The second part of the article applies the Psychoactive Politics Framework to explain Peru’s first legislation to eradicate illicit coca crops: the Decree Law 22095 of 1978. Through examining diplomatic cables, protocols of international meetings, and media sources, the analysis gathers evidence in favor and against each of the incentives outlined in the framework.

Conclusions:

While Peru’s drug policy reform took place in an increasingly prohibitionist international environment, its primary driver was the advocacy of national actors, such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Investigative Police, and the attorney general.

Originality:

The findings question the popular notion that prohibitionist drug policies in South America resulted exclusively from US pressure. Furthermore, the article presents a coherent tool to carry out theory-guided research about past and present drug policy decisions.