Resumen

RIASCOS CARABALI, Steven  y  CASTILLO VALENCIA, María del Pilar. Reckoning as a Mechanism to Correct Criminal Contracts. Rev.fac.cienc.econ. [online]. 2020, vol.28, n.1, pp.67-88.  Epub 24-Nov-2020. ISSN 0121-6805.  https://doi.org/doi.org/10.18359/rfce.4263.

This paper aims to model reckoning as the result of the interaction between the head of a criminal organization (principal) and his/her subordinate (agent) in a context of asymmetric information. Reckoning is shown to be a mechanism chosen by the principal to correct the agent's opportunistic behavior. This analysis allows understanding why fatal punishments are fundamental to maintaining order and obedience in the criminal world.

Palabras clave : reckoning; criminal alliances; criminal contract; agency theory; punishment; lethality.

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