Abstract

PARDOW, DIEGO  and  VERDUGO, SERGIO. Stability, Professionalism and Politicization in the Appointment of the Heads of Independent Regulatory Agencies: Lessons from the Chilean Experience. Rev. Derecho Estado [online]. 2020, n.46, pp.223-252. ISSN 0122-9893.  https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n46.09.

The authors compare the appointments of the heads of regulatory agencies made with the participation of the Senate with those made either discretionally by the President, or through the system of High Public Directorship, i.e., an appointing procedure that seeks to reconcile the need to stimulate appointments of candidates with strong technical credentials, with the political interests of the incumbent government. The analysis of near 200 appointments made in Chile between 1990 and 2016, shows that the heads of regulatory agencies chosen with the involvement of the Senate have similar levels of political affiliation, but better overall professional credentials compared to the results achieved by other institutional models. Our evidence also suggests that the tenure of those officers is two times longer, and it is three times more likely that they remain in office after the installation of a new government. The article provides useful evidence to advance the discussion about the impact of the institutional appointing models on the autonomy of those institutions. There is a significant correlation between formal and material independence of Chilean regulatory agencies, as well as showing the importance of the Senate in the system of check and balances for appointing regulators.

Keywords : Regulatory agencies; Formal independence; Institutional design; Parliament control; Check and balances.

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