Abstract

CAMELO RINCON, Milton Samuel. Analysis of Organizational Transparency and Economic Power Based on Game Theory. rev.univ.empresa [online]. 2020, vol.22, n.38, pp.257-278. ISSN 0124-4639.  https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/empresa/a.7086.

The objective of this article is to propose a theorical structure that links the concepts of organizational transparency and economic power in a way that sets a base for new empirical studies. Methodologically, the proposal starts from a literature review, where an extensive research agenda on the issues in question is evident, but also the absence of a theoretical reference that explicitly relates them. Based on the above, a hypothetical analysis is developed using the game theory as a tool, where different scenarios are assumed based on the available information and the agents' payment structure. The exercise shows that an excessive degree of economic power can lead to decisions that are contrary to organizational transparency, affecting the decision making of interest groups and social development. Additionally, it is inferred that the stronger the sanctioning measures by the state and society, the more the possibility of transparency, highlighting the need to generate institutional mechanisms that foster cooperation within organizations.

Keywords : Organizational transparency; economic power; game theory; agency theory.

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