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Revista de Economía Institucional
Print version ISSN 0124-5996
Abstract
RODRIGUEZ A., Sandra Milena. VOTING POWER IN THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY HEALTH SERVICE. Rev.econ.inst. [online]. 2007, vol.9, n.16, pp. 223-253. ISSN 0124-5996.
This paper presents a theoretical conceptualization of Colombia s National Council of Health Social Security (CNSSS). Using a simple framework of theory of games, it analyzes the voting power of its members, and estimates the indexes of Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and Coleman. It shows that the Councils decisions respond to a false consensus that reveals the interests of particular agents. It concludes that power indexes are sensitive to the election of the majority approval quota and that the proportion of votes does not clearly show the Council members power.
Keywords : agency relationships; power index; coalition; regulation.
