SciELO - Scientific Electronic Library Online

 
vol.14 issue27FEDERALISM AND TAXATION IN THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF PANAMA, 1850-1886THE INCOME ELASTICITY OF CULTURE CONSUMPTION IN CALI author indexsubject indexarticles search
Home Pagealphabetic serial listing  

Services on Demand

Journal

Article

Indicators

Related links

  • On index processCited by Google
  • Have no similar articlesSimilars in SciELO
  • On index processSimilars in Google

Share


Revista de Economía Institucional

Print version ISSN 0124-5996

Abstract

CASTILLO V, María del Pilar  and  BALBINOTTO, Giácomo. FARC AND THE COSTS OF KIDNAPPING. Rev.econ.inst. [online]. 2012, vol.14, n.27, pp.147-164. ISSN 0124-5996.

This article analyzes, from an agency theory perspective, the effects produced on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) by both political kidnapping as a long-run political strategy, and its long duration caused by Álvaro Uribe's government decision to not accept prisoner exchanges. These elements led to a separation between the FARC leaders' objectives and the goals of its field commanders. In such a case, the connection between them reveals the existence of a moral hazard problem which has become stronger and more harmful over time.

Keywords : agency theory; kidnapping; contracts.

        · abstract in Spanish     · text in Spanish     · Spanish ( pdf )