Abstract

CARDENAS, Ernesto  and  CORREDOR, Federico. Constitutional judge and presidential reelection in Latin America. Rev.econ.inst. [online]. 2018, vol.20, n.38, pp.45-70. ISSN 0124-5996.  https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.v20n38.03.

Constitutional provisions regarding presidential re-election have been modified in several Latin American countries in recent years. In some countries, these changes put the existence of democracy at risk. This article uses the principal-agent approach to analyze the role of the constitutional judge in presidential re-election as an accountability mechanism. It finds that immediate reelection in democracies of strong presidentialism can be a perverse mechanism that sharpens the concentration of power and deteriorates the welfare of the citizens instead of making politicians accountable.

JEL: D72, K00.

Keywords : presidential reelection; constitutional judge; presidentialism; principal agent model.

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