Print version ISSN 0124-6127
KELLY, SEAN. EL CONTENIDO NO-CONCEPTUAL DE LA EXPERIENCIA PERCEPTUAL: SU FINEZA Y DETALLE Y LA DEPENDENCIA DE LA SITUACIÓN. discus.filos [online]. 2006, vol.7, n.10, pp. 77-87. ISSN 0124-6127.
In this paper I criticize the way in which Peacocke defends the thesis that experience has non-conceptual content. In particular, I argue that Peacocke's reliance on the idea that the experience's non-conceptual content is far more subtle than conceptual content, does not work. Lastly, I hold that the dependence of a perceived object from the perceptual context in which such an object is perceived, and the dependence of a received property from the object in which it is perceived are more relevant features for the thesis that the perceptual content of experience is non-conceptual.
Keywords : Perceptual Experience; Non-Conceptual Content; McDowell; Peacocke; Evans; Merleau-Ponty; Demonstrative Concepts.