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vol.8 issue11SUBSTITUTIVITYEL DISCURSO DE LOS DERECHOS COMO FORMA DE EMANCIPACIÓN POLÍTICA: ENTRE LA CRÍTICA DE MARX Y LA RESPUESTA DE HABERMAS author indexsubject indexarticles search
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Discusiones Filosóficas

Print version ISSN 0124-6127

Abstract

HOYOS VALDES, Diana. ÉTICA DE LA VIRTUD: ALCANCES Y LÍMITES. discus.filos [online]. 2007, vol.8, n.11, pp.109-127. ISSN 0124-6127.

This paper attempts at a critical presentation of virtue ethics. This trend is expounded as a consequence of the difficulties of the two more influential moral modern theories: Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. In discussing their contrast, I defend a classification for Act Ethics -for which the primary object of evaluation is constituted by actions-, and Agent Ethics -for which the primary object are moral agents. By discussing virtue ethics (following Alasdair MacIntyre's version), I intend to show the risk that this trend faces of going into an extreme relativism, and I discuss the way in which Martha Nussbaum tries to overcome this problem by appealing at her interpretation of Aristotle.

Keywords : Act Ethics; Agent Ethics; Utilitarianism; Kant; Mill; MacIntyre; Nussbaum; Aristotle; relativism.

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