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vol.8 issue11EL DISCURSO DE LOS DERECHOS COMO FORMA DE EMANCIPACIÓN POLÍTICA: ENTRE LA CRÍTICA DE MARX Y LA RESPUESTA DE HABERMASSOBRE LA HISTORIA DEL KOSMOS GRIEGO author indexsubject indexarticles search
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Discusiones Filosóficas

Print version ISSN 0124-6127

Abstract

PATINO ARANGO, Alejandro. EL SENTIMENTALISMO MORAL EN HUME Y EL DERECHO COMO HECHO EN OLIVECRONA. discus.filos [online]. 2007, vol.8, n.11, pp.149-171. ISSN 0124-6127.

In this paper I intend to show the autonomy of the moral that Hume developed in the third book of his Treatise of Human Nature. I ground this conception on Hume's own principle: moral conclusions are not derived from reason. This negative principle brings him to the affirmative principle: moral conclusions are derived from a feeling. Furthermore, I intend to develop the notion of juridical performative in Olivecrona (one of the main Scandinavian juridical realists) by showing how Austin's theory influences Olivecrona's views. Despite showing the sentimentalism in Hume's moral, I believe that his intention was to show the existence of a universalizable moral, which is going to appear in my analysis of the notion of convention and intention in acts of speech. From this, I hold that all daily relations are juridical. To this effect, I focus my analysis on Olivecrona's: Law as a Fact (1939) and The juridical language and reality (1962) in which he supports the view that the juridical language is substantially a part of the daily language.

Keywords : Hume; Austin; Olivecrona; Speech Acts; juridical performatives; promising; subjective right; "being"; "should"; juridical expressions; realizative expressions; moral autonomy.

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