Abstract

POSADA, Jorge Gregorio. ¿PRESUPONEN LOS ARGUMENTOS ESCÉPTICOS CARTESIANOS EL REALISMO INDIRECTO?. discus.filos [online]. 2007, vol.8, n.11, pp.283-291. ISSN 0124-6127.

In this paper I take issue with Hoyos' statement according to which typical Cartesian skeptical arguments presuppose a wrong theory of perception. In particular, I show that skepticism about the external World does not depend upon any theory of perception. You can embrace or not any theory of perception and the Cartesian arguments of the Dream and the Evil Genius will remain unharmed.

Keywords : Hoyos; Descartes; Stroud; Dancy; skepticism; indirect realism; direct realism; closure principle.

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