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Discusiones Filosóficas

Print version ISSN 0124-6127

Abstract

READ, Stephen. The liar and the new t-schema. discus.filos [online]. 2010, vol.11, n.17, pp.119-137. ISSN 0124-6127.

Since Tarski published his study of the concept of truth in the 1930s, it has been orthodox practice to suppose that every instance of the T-schema is true. However, some instances of the schema are false. These include the paradoxical instances exemplified by the Liar sentence. It is shown that a better schema allows a uniform treatment of truth in which the semantic paradoxes turn out to be simply false.

Keywords : Bradwardine; Carnap; Davidson; T-scheme; liar paradox; Tarski; truth-theory.

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