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Discusiones Filosóficas
versión impresa ISSN 0124-6127
Resumen
PIEDRAHITA, Oscar A.. Epistemic relativism and circularity. discus.filos [online]. 2020, vol.21, n.36, pp.25-37. Epub 04-Dic-2020. ISSN 0124-6127. https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.3.
In this paper, I review Steven Bland’s recent attempt to refute epistemic relativism by means of a dialectical argument that proves non-circularly the objective reliability of naturalistic epistemic systems. Before addressing Bland’s argument, I present the incommensurability thesis and its relation to epistemic relativism. I conclude by arguing that Bland’s attempt to refute relativism must explain how and why the commitments to our epistemic systems should lead us to judge their reliability.
Palabras clave : Relativism; Circularity; Incommensurability; Justification.