Abstract

DE ROSAS-ANDREU, Jaime. Neither conventionalism nor naturalism. The epistemological justification of the truth in Donald Davidson. discus.filos [online]. 2020, vol.21, n.37, pp.37-55.  Epub June 14, 2021. ISSN 0124-6127.  https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.37.3.

In this paper I argue for the following hypotheses: The Davidsonian language thesis, which presupposes a set of beliefs and shared desires, is a quasi-rational phenomenon that weights the truths, and from them, is able to derive other objective thoughts in the domain of values. This view of Davidson conceives that thinking and language are prior to convention, and that necessarily implies the acknowledgement of humans as thinking beings; capable of understanding even when deprived of content, this is to say, negating naturalism or substance in beliefs and innate desires.

Keywords : Truth; conventionalism; naturalism; Donald Davidson; rationality.

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