Resumen

MIRANDA-ROJAS, Rafael. Intuitionism and Cognitivism: On moral truths and the intuitive basis of moral judgment. discus.filos [online]. 2022, vol.23, n.40, pp.15-36.  Epub 22-Feb-2023. ISSN 0124-6127.  https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2022.23.40.2.

This paper argues that in the intuitionist proposal developed in Haidt (2001), an intuitionist proposal is not clearly distinguished from an emotivist proposal. This supposes an epistemic problem, since the first is understood from a cognitivist perspective while the second is understood from a non-cognitivist position in the moral sphere. Therefore, there is a tension in the presuppositions of the Haidtian intuitionist proposal that, inter alia, Huemer (2005) discusses from a moderate rationalist perspective. This paper argues that intuitionism does not imply a commitment to the discussion between moral objectivism and moral subjectivism, thus allowing an approach that permits a fruitful dialogue between emotivism, intuitionism and rationalism on the epistemic status of moral judgment. This makes it posible to approach the edge of the moral statute from a moderate rationalist position, open to interdisciplinary contributions and thus to non-reductionist naturalism. This analysis allows affirming that there are moral truths, being the focus of objectivism - subjectivism discussion on the access to them rather than on the questioning of their existence.

Palabras clave : Intuitionism; cognitivism; non-cognitivism; rationalism; moral judgement; moral truths.

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