CUELLAR-JIMENEZ, Rodrigo. Kuhn, Incommensurability and Kantian a priori, a Challenge for the Referential Approach to Scientific Realism. []. , 24, 42, pp.97-120.   29--2024. ISSN 0124-6127.  https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2023.24.42.6.

Ontological change after a scientific revolution, the disturbing consequence of Kuhn’s incommensurability theory continues to gain interest, since the last decade of the previous century the non-realist interpretation of Hoyningen-Huene and Oberheim has represented a challenge to the scientific realism of Sankey, who postulates co-reference as a possibility for overlapping terms untranslatable by semantic incommensurability. Arguments in discussion about comparability, world and referential overlap seem incompatible between the two approaches (points 1, 2); Hoyningen-Huene’s Kantian interpretation of phenomenal world and world-in-itself, about the world that changes and the world that does not change by scientific revolutions, is unacceptable to Sankey (point 2.1); I postulate an analogy between Kant’s categories and external space with Kuhn’s lexicon and world-in-itself, respectively (point 3).

: Scientific incommensurability; Kantian a priori; scientific realism; world in itself; phenomenal world; Lexiconl.

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