Resumo

ENRIQUEZ CANTO, Yordanis. Personal Status in Intellectual Disability: Considering Cognitive Abilities. rev.latinoam.bioet. [online]. 2018, vol.18, n.2, pp.226-241. ISSN 1657-4702.  https://doi.org/10.18359/rlbi.3137.

Some bioethical approaches consider rationality as central to the notion of person. Jeff McMahan subordinates the personal condition to cognitive abilities; consequently, an individual having an intellectual disability is not considered a person. The notion of person is key to general bioethics and to upholding treaties and conventions. The model considered influences clinical bioethics because biomedical practice deduces rules from theoretical reflections. The article examines the cognitive abilities criterion to determine the personal status in intellectual disability using criticism to the ideal theory, based on which we identified problems in the idealization of abilities. Subsequently, we describe intellectual disability and how it is confirmed by Jeff McMahan's conceptualizations and analyze four main limitations of the cognitive abilities criterion to establish personal condition. Finally, it is argued that corporeality complements the models that describe the human person in bioethics. The cognitive abilities criterion should not be considered normative since corporeality determines the loss of our abilities and exposes us to disability itself.

Palavras-chave : cognition; cognitive abilities; human body; intellectual disability.

        · resumo em Português | Espanhol     · texto em Espanhol     · Espanhol ( pdf )