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AD-minister

versão impressa ISSN 1692-0279

Resumo

JAVADI-YEGANEH, MOHAMMAD REZA. Behavioral Economy and Public State Aids: Why Iranians Refused to Give Up on Government Subsidy Receipt? (A Multiple Prisoner’s Dilemma Game). AD-minister [online]. 2019, n.34, pp.195-210. ISSN 1692-0279.  http://dx.doi.org/10.17230/ad-minister.34.10.

This article uses the game theory, more specifically multiple prisoner’s dilemma game, to analyze why Iranians refused to give up on receiving public subsidies in April 2014, in spite of frequent requests of the government. Sample of study consists of two main groups: the ones who were not dependent on government subsidy but were applying for it; and the ones who did not depend either but had fraudulently pretended to depend on government subsidy. some suggestions are presented such as to define chicken game and not prisoner’s dilemma game as the main game.

JEL: M00, M10, M15

Palavras-chave : Subsidy reform scheme; Prisoner’s dilemma game; Refusal to give up on subsidy receipt; Lie; Iran.

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