Abstract

TAJER, Diego Ezequiel. Contra el pluralismo lógico modalista. Eidos [online]. 2016, n.25, pp.286-309. ISSN 1692-8857.  https://doi.org/10.14482/eidos.25.7048.

In this paper, I argue against the modalist logical pluralism of Bueno and Shalkowski (2009). In the first part, I show that it is not well motivated, at least if its motivation comes from the objections they raise against the approach of Beall and Restall (2006). I defend the position of Beall and Restall against these objections, resorting to the requisites of necessity and normativity, which were misunderstood by Bueno and Shalkowski. In the second part, I analyze the modalist position and provide some arguments against it. I show that the examples offered by Bueno and Shalkowski do not justify a logical pluralism, but rather a logical monism based on classical logic where some inferential contexts can be internalized. I show that these internalizations are very plausible for the two examples the authors provide: database management and the analysis of epistemic concepts.

Keywords : Logical pluralism; modality; non-classical logics; paraconsistent logic; intuitionistic logic.

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