Resumen

LOPEZ-ASTORGA, Miguel. Chrysippus' Indemonstrables and the Semantic Mental Models. Eidos [online]. 2017, n.26, pp.302-325. ISSN 1692-8857.

Abstract According to standard logic, only one of the five indemonstrables proposed by Chrysippus of Soli is actually indemonstrable. The other four schemata are demonstra-ble in that logic. The question hence is, if four of them are not really indemonstrable, why Chrysippus considered them to be so. López-Astorga showed that, if we ignore standard propositional calculus and assume that a current cognitive theory, the mental logic theory, truly describes human reasoning, it can be explained why Chrysippus thought that all of his indemonstrables were so basic. However, in this paper, I try to argue that the mental logic theory is not the only framework that can account for that. In particular, I hold that another important reasoning theory at present, the mental models theory, can offer an explanation in that regard as well.

Palabras clave : Chrysippus of Soli; indemonstrables; mental logic; mental models; Stoic logic.

        · resumen en Español     · texto en Inglés     · Inglés ( pdf )