Resumo

CARDENAS-CASTANEDA, Leonardo. A possible polysemy in naturalized epistemology. Rev. Lasallista Investig. [online]. 2019, vol.16, n.1, pp.214-227. ISSN 1794-4449.  https://doi.org/10.22507/rli.v16n1a8.

In this article I present a possible polysemy that can be observed among the defenders of scientific naturalism, for although philosophers such as Quine, Dennett, and Giere share the original spirit of naturalized epistemology under the definition I will call (D1): the success of epistemology depends on how its problems can be reduced or replaced by science, the treatment that each of these philosophers offers of naturalized epistemology departs from this primitive definition, since each one privileges certain approaches that would not be acceptable to others, nor are those approaches adjusted in the same way to what D1 posits. So, although the three accept the thesis that the new epistemology must exclude the metaphysical discourse that has dominated traditional epistemology and substitute it for purely scientific projects, the treatment that each one separately gives to this thesis has implications that other supporters of naturalism would find it indefensible.

Palavras-chave : naturalized epistemology; behaviorism; computational sciences; cognitivism.

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