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SUMMARY
Introduction. I. 1970s - Growing export orientation and urban development. - II. 1980s - Increasing rural violence, crisis in the agricultural sector. - Ill. Trade liberalization of the 1990s and agricultural crisis.- IV Competitive national market and export orientation under the Uribe Government.- Final remarks.- Bibliography.
INTRODUCTION
According to the latest available World Development Indicators, in 2015, the Agriculture Sector in Colombia represented 6.827% of the GDP (whereas industry 33.985%, and services 59.188%). The Agriculture Sector has a historically decreasing participation in World GDP. Between 1995 and 2014 world agriculture value added percentage of GDP decreased from 8.028% to 3.909%; between 1995 and 2015 in Colombia, it decreased from 15.284% to 6.827%. The sharpest decline in Colombia has occurred between 1999 and 2000 when value added percentage of GDP decreased from 13.961% to 8.95%. In Latin-America and the Caribbean tendencies were different in the same period, as value added percentage of GDP decreased in a lesser amount from 6.75% in 1995 to 5.478% in 2014.1 2
The Agricultural Census of 2014 clearly demonstrated the concentration of property of land since the 1970s. Agricultural Production Units (APU) [Unidad de Producción Agricola] over 500 hectares (0.4% of total) corresponded to 77.3% of the rural area; on the other hand, the APUs of less than 5 hectares accounted for 70.4% of the total and occupied only 2.0% of the rural area. The proportion of area kept in APUs of more than 1000 hectares almost tripled from the previous censuses (1960, 1970).3
There is a dominant use of land for livestock, but not only limited to bigger size APUs. Of the total area corresponding to agricultural use (43.0 million hectares), 80.0% had uses of pastures and stubble, 19.7% of agricultural activity, and 0.3% of agricultural infrastructure. Of the APUs of less than 5 hectares, 56.8% used the land for livestock, 36.5% for cultivating plants, and 6.8% for natural forests; while the APUs of over 1,000 hectares, 42.2% dedicated to livestock, 29.8% used the land for cultivating plants, and 28.0% for natural forests.4 Furthermore, agro-industrial use dominates cropped areas. 60.9% of the number of the APU and 57.3% of the cropped area corresponded to sowings of agro-industrial crops, tubers, and banana. Caldas, Risaralda, Huila, Santander, and Valle del Cauca were the departments with greater part of the land dedicated to sowings of agro-industrial crops.5
Before the comprehensive Agricultural Census of 2014, the Colombian governments had been implementing agricultural policies without available statistical data for more than 40 years. Once we understand the underlying reasons of the weaknesses of agricultural policy planning in Colombia, the results of the 2014 Census will not surprise us, and not even the lack of an agricultural census. The present article proposes this historical analysis of the Colombian agricultural policies from the 1970s through the Uribe governments applying the theory of the Colombian State paradox.
In my recent publications6 I have argued, based on my doctoral thesis,7 that the Colombian State lacks debate on agricultural policy paradigms, especially with the democratic participation of all actors; therefore, the Colombian State uses international trade policies as well as the peace talks with the FARC [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] in the Havana8 to force internal changes in the sector. I have explained this heterogeneous performance of the State, acting strong and weak, as a result of the Colombian State paradox of a coopted, institutionally weak State.
This weakness of the Colombian State in the agricultural sector is reflected in this article through the analyses of the recurrent and unresolved policy issues from the 1970s through the Uribe governments. The debate is raised about production structure -large scale production versus small farming, production for industrial use and food production; levels of protection of national market versus integration into the international market; and the competitiveness versus lack of technological development and general infrastructure.
To analyze these issues, the present article is divided into the following four parts: 1) first the agricultural policies of the 1970s are discussed considering this period as of growing export orientation and urban development; 2) the second part of this article describes the reasons of the notorious slowdown in agricultural production in the 1980s; 3) the period of the 1990s is analyzed through the deep trade liberalization and the resulting agricultural crisis; 4) finally, the agricultural policies of the two Uribe governments are described as another failed effort to develop a competitive national market based on export orientation, which only resulted in clientelism.
I. 1970S - GROWING EXPORT ORIENTATION AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
The policy instruments, which led Colombia towards export orientation, had already been implemented since 1967.9 The foreign exchange regulation eliminated fixed exchange rates, Plan Vallejo10 was extended to new sectors, foreign investment was regulated, the fiscal instrument of Tax Discount Certificate (Certificado de Abono Tributario, CAT)11 was implemented, and the Export Promotion Fund (PROEXPO) was established. The participation of Colombia in the Andean Community to promote regional integration was also part of these policies.12 Since 1973, the requirement of import licenses was also diminished, especially for intermediate goods.13
In the last National Front government [1958-1974], President Misael Pastrana-Borrero’s (1970-1974) National Development Plan, “The Four Strategies” [Las cuatro estrategias] was based on the political necessity to attend urban popular interests.14 The Pastrana-Borrero government had to mitigate the questions of urban unemployment and lack of urban housing.15 16 The central policy goal was to increase effective demand in the economy.17 In that sense, the agrarian question was formulated as the problem of the small farmers impeding the capitalist development in rural areas, retaining under-paid source of employment. Following the ideas of Lauchlin Currie, employment had to be generated in the urban-industrial sector, which was to result in increasing consumption to enhance, among others, agricultural production. This approach rejected any agrarian reform.18
As opposed to its predecessor, President Alfonso Lopez-Michelsen’s government (1974-1978) National Development Plan titled “To Close the Gap” [Para Cerrar la Brecha] was based on definite export orientation, where market forces must guide economic policies based on efficiency.19 Development had to be generated by agriculture and medium and small businesses. Those economic actors were supposed to be supported by who can participate in international markets. Employment was a central issue to benefit the poorest 50% of the society. Agriculture was important to retain workforce, not to move to urban areas already facing problems of unemployment.20 21
President Lopez-Michelsen recognized the Chicoral Agreement of 197222 and Law 4 of 1973, which excluded from expropriation adequately-exploited portions of land equal to 100 hectares. Law 4 also introduced the presumed income tax amounting to a maximum 10% of the land registry value to motivate productive land use, although without major success.23 Law 5 of 1973 tied financing productive activities to contracting technical assistance.24 Finally, Law 6 of 1975 regulated the relationship between landowners, agribusiness,25 and small farmers. For farmers participating in sharecropping the value of improvements in land was recognized, as well as their right to cultivate crops for self-consumption.26
The economic importance of the agriculture was to produce sufficient food to avoid inflation generated by food prices. These policies further enhanced commercial agriculture.27 In this system, medium size farmers were considered as important actors to generate rural employment. The lack of their productive capacity was also recognized, as well as the need to integrate them into the market. It was one of the most important underlying reasons of the Integral Rural Development (Desarrollo Rural Integrado, DRI) project, which was also linked to the Food and Nutrition Plan (Plan de Alimentación y Nutrición, PAN).28 29 The aim was to enhance production and include small and medium farms into commercial agriculture.30 Between 1977 and 1980 DRI was focused on production enhancement. As a result of these processes, by the 1980s the combined production structure became clearly defined in the Colombian agriculture: on the one hand commercial agriculture, on the other hand small farm economy including small agribusinesses and wage-earners.31
II. 1980S - INCREASING RURAL VIOLENCE, CRISIS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Since the 1970s illegal drug trafficking became a crucial issue in Colombia.32 Drug traffickers were seeking political influence, which further weakened the Colombian State at all levels.33 Drug trafficking also affected the rural property structure, as land acquisition was one of the most widely used forms of money laundering.34 35 In the same period other illegal armed forces also gained important power in Colombia and started controlling considerable extensions of rural areas such as the extreme left guerrilla groups EPL [Ejército Popular de Liberación, Liberation Popular Army] and FARC [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]. The right wing mobilization of paramilitarism was established to counteract the growing power of the guerrilla groups.36 Guerrilla groups as well as the paramilitarism were closely linked to illegal drug trafficking.37
President Julio César Turbay-Ayala (1978-1982) concentrated its National Development Plan titled National Integration Plan [Plan de Integración Nacional, PIN] on generating development in infrastructure and allowing more autonomy for the regions. It had the priority in the energy and mining sectors but also proposed to implement a new social strategy.38 The Turbay government promoted the idea of agribusiness and agroindustry39 through policy measures regarding research, land preparation, modernization of commercial channels, price policy, and foreign commercial policy.40 41 President Turbay implemented the War Councils to fight against the illegal armed forces and drug trafficking.
In economic terms, the period between 1976 and 1982 was described by the “Dutch disease,” based on increasing raw material prices and the coffee bonanza. To mitigate the effects of incoming foreign currency flows and of inflation, the Colombian government partially liberalized import markets, which resulted in diminishing prices of importable crops. The revaluation of the national currency in 1982 plus low prices generated the biggest agricultural crisis of the last decades, which especially affected commercial agriculture.42 From 1980 to 1985 it was also a period of recession in the Colombian economy.43 The government of President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) had to abandon its National Development Plan titled Change with Equity [Cambio con Equidad]. Originally, in the development plan the agricultural sector had a central role to offer large amount of available food at low costs, as well as to participate in increasing exports, which was aimed to generate higher demands for industrial goods and foreign currency incomes. The dramatic economic situation resulted in contractionist economic policies, whereby not only the agricultural budget was cut but also food imports were permitted.44 Notwithstanding, an important agricultural policy development of the time was the National Rehabilitation Plan (Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación, PNR). PNR officially recognized the magnitude of the rural violence caused by the illegal armed forces, especially of the guerrilla groups. The idea was to increase the presence of the State in rural areas.45 46 President Betancur was also searching for peace and declared a bilateral ceasefire with the guerrilla groups through the General Law of Amnesty, which lasted from 1982 to 1986.47
In the core of the National Development Plan of President Virgilio Barco-Vargas (1986-1990), titled Plan of Social Economy, was the idea that development had to have a social function. Policy projects such as PAN, DRI, and PNR of previous governments were reactivated to fight against rural and urban poverty. PNR became a central element of the peace policies and the fight against rural poverty. It included subsidies, technology transfer, and organization of local food trade, which was all based on decentralized policies.48 In the small farm economy productivity increased to levels comparable to those of large scale farming, especially for corn, rice, and coffee.49 50 Another objective of the Barco government was to modernize the agricultural sector promoting private investment through restructuring the price system and subordinating import policies to the protection of internal production. The agricultural sector was identified as a possible engine of economic development.51 52 Law 30 of 1988 was the agrarian reform regulation implemented by the Barco government.53 The regulatory project was prepared with the participation of SAC.54 In general, all interest groups, except for the Federación Colombiana de Ganaderos, Fedegan, accepted the project.55 56 Law 30 of 1988 eliminated the protection against affectation created by the requirement of adequately-exploited land implemented by the Agreement of Chicoral.57 58 By the end of the Barco government a Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social [National Council on Economic and Social Policies], CONPES, was presented regarding the internationalization of the economy and the modernization of production.59 Nevertheless, there was an understanding to maintain protectionist measures for the agricultural sector in the proposed market liberalization scheme.60
III. TRADE LIBERALIZATION OF THE 1990S AND AGRICULTURAL CRISIS
As opposed to the crisis in 1982, between 1986 and 1990 the conditions for the Colombian agriculture were favorable. It was the result of internal sectoral policies, a revaluation around 11.3% (1989-1990), and the increasing international prices resulting from demand in the developed economies. As a result of the above, importable temporary crops showed the major production development, although they would also be the most impacted by the agricultural crisis during the 1990s.61 62
The government of César Gaviria Trujillo (1990-1994) implemented the most comprehensive unilateral market liberalization policies in Colombia. The market liberalization was accompanied by the political democratization process. It was argued that protectionism implemented through the import substitution system resulted in a lack of competitiveness.63 Therefore, market liberalization was necessary to create competition based on the functioning of market forces.64 Economic policies abandoned the sectoral approach and implemented general neutral policy instruments.65 66 It also resulted in a conceptual change of agricultural policies, which were directed towards the interests of agroindustry, expressed in the promotion of agro-industrial production chains.67 The market liberalization implemented by the Gaviria government was the unilateral reduction of customs duties, and the elimination of tariff surcharges and special import licenses.68 69
These market liberalization policies were to be fully implemented in the agricultural sector as well.70 Although average customs tariffs for agricultural products decreased from 31.5% in 1991 to 15% in 1992, a national price band system was also implemented for sensitive products such as milk, wheat, barley, corn, rice, soy, sugar, and sorghum to compensate fluctuation of international prices.71 The agricultural financing was designed to become completely market based,72 yet as a result of important rejection by the agricultural interest groups such as SAC, finally the special credit conditions were maintained.73 74 Additionally, the agricultural crisis between 1991 and 1993 required the implementation of further sectoral agricultural policies.75 The crisis resulted in the expansion of cattle farming as the only profitable agricultural activity to replace the most affected sector of temporary crops.76 It resulted in important investments in the livestock sector with 700% and 200% increases in financing of dairy farming and double purpose farming, especially in coffee growing regions such as Quindío and Caldas.77
Rudolf Hommes Rodríguez, Minister of Finance of the Gaviria government and one of the central figures of the implementation of the market liberalization policies, recognized that the “only sin” that occurred during the Gaviria government was the crisis of the agricultural sector. As argued by Hommes, only when José Antonio Ocampo assumed the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, there were some clearer ideas proposed about the agricultural sector, which in any case could not avoid the crisis.78 The first measures taken in 1992 were the refinancing the most affected producers, accompanied by the restructuring and recapitalization of agricultural funds.79 80 The Reactivation Plan was implemented starting from 1993. It established, among others, guaranteed prices for some of the most affected products, implemented minimum import prices, and revised price bands. It also established the regulation of safeguard measures and suspended temporarily the imports of chicken pieces and milk powder in July, 1993.81 In general, public expenditure on agriculture increased by 8.9% in 1992 and by 24.4% in 1994.82
Law 101 of 1993 (Agrarian Law)83 was enacted in a hostile environment for the Gaviria government. The interest groups requested compensatory customs tariffs and restrictions of international commerce. Nevertheless, the Law managed to reflect the interests of the government and implemented the provisions of the 1991 Constitution84 regarding the agricultural sector.85 Direct subsidies to production were permitted to mitigate temporary market failures (Article 7),86 and the Incentive of Rural Capitalization (ICR) established a direct subsidy up to 40% to finance investment, which was specifically applied for projects of irrigation, processing, storage, and new technologies.87 Regarding international commerce, Law 101 of 1993 repeated the provisions of the 1991 Constitution on equality, reciprocity, and national convenience (Article 2),88 established reference prices, minimum custom value, and other countervailing measures for cases of unfair competition (Article 4),89 as well as safeguard measures for national production (Article 5).90 91 It also established the National Agricultural Commission.92 Law 101 of 1993 implemented the system of parafiscal funds, which privatized certain activities of the State. These parafiscal funds were administered based on contractual terms between the government and the sectoral interest groups, in the case of the National Cattle Fund, Fedegan [Fondo Nacional del Ganado, Fedegan].93 94 95 Furthermore, production chains became the central element of agricultural policies remaining in place through all subsequent governments to this date. Production chains were designed to re-activate the productivity of certain sectors affected by the market liberalization policies.96 97
The situation of small farmers was already considered in the 1991 CONPES Program of Modernization and Diversification of the Agricultural Sector.98 Law 160 of 199499 regulated market-based land restructuring, according to which private actors had to negotiate with the participation of Instituto Colombiano para la Reforma Agraria, INCORA, the land sale and purchase transactions.100 101 Law 160 of 1994, also known as the agrarian reform of the Gaviria government, established the Zones of Farmer Reserves (Zonas de Reserva Campesina). The idea of these reserves was to maintain small land properties limited in size to one or two Agricultural Family Units (Unidad Agrícola Familiar, UAF).102
The agricultural sector grew by 5.2% and 4.4% in 1993 and 1994.103 Agriculture was an important topic of the 1994 presidential campaign. On the other hand, no contra-reform proposals were presented.104 The central argument of the National Development Plan105 of President Ernesto Samper-Pizano (1994-1998) titled “Social Jump” [El Salto Social] was that market liberalization and internationalization had high social costs, which on its own did not secure improvement in poverty. Therefore, a complete revision of economic policies was required, whereas neither import substitution nor market liberal policies resolved the problems.106 107
Regarding agricultural policies, market liberalization and the investment priorities were maintained but two additional policy instruments were implemented. The first was to favor with welfare policies small farmers, the rural poor, and women living in rural areas.108 The second was to manage the profitability crisis through commercial policies including the agreements of absorption and competitiveness between agroindustry and producers.109 110 To mitigate the agricultural crisis during the Samper government agreements of obligatory acquisition of agricultural products were implemented between producers and the agroindustry for wheat, barley, oils, and animal feed. Price bands were also modified111 and in 1995 the Price Stabilization Mechanism of the Andean Price Band System was implemented.112
The Samper government organized the first Rural Social Summit in June 1996 led by the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Cecilia Lopez-Montano. The Rural Social Summit resulted in the signing of the rural social contract between the government and important farmer organizations. The established priorities were access to land, credits, health care, education, social security, security, and natural resources.113 On the other hand, although the rural social contract drew the attention to the rural problem, its implementation was insufficient in terms of funds and institutions.114 One of the most important general problems of the Samper government was the lack of implementation of the announced policies. It was also linked to the governmental crisis in 1995115 and the consequent further weakening of State institutions.116 117 In addition to the governability crisis of the Samper government, the situation of rural violence deteriorated substantially.118 Between 1996 and 1998 the FARC achieved its highest peak of military power, which resulted in numerous attacks and military takeovers.
The government of President Andrés Pastrana-Arango (1998-2002) had to manage the economic crisis of the end of the 1990s.119 Therefore, the central element of his policies was to create macroeconomic stability. The National Development Plan titled Change to Build Peace [Cambio para Construir la Paz] was organized to facilitate the last unsuccessful peace negotiations with the guerrilla group FARC.120 121 A fundamental policy goal for the economy was, in addition to macroeconomic stability, export enhancement, which included general policy tools for all sectors.122 123 In agricultural policies productive alliances were established and incentives for late yield crops such as African palm were implemented.124 Small agricultural producers were treated within the framework of export orientation and financing was designed to promote producer associations.125 The agreements of competitiveness launched by the Samper government were the basis of these policies. The most favored production chain was the dairy chain, which received 41.3% of all ICR resources, followed by African palm (24.4%), fruits and vegetables (12.8%), and poultry and pork (14.3%).126 127 Policies traditionally directed to small farmers such as DRI and PNR were eliminated by the Pastrana government; on the other hand, the elimination of illegal drug production became the central policy goal through the implementation of Plan Colombia.128 Plan Colombia had social, productive, and military elements.129 For small farmers, Plan Colombia implemented the Families in Action project.130
In general terms, after 1994 the agricultural policies mitigated the effects of free trade and resulted in a system of “administered trade”.131 Nevertheless, this system was rather unfair as it provided high protection to some products such as rice, corn, sorghum, and sugar while it lowered protection to milk, palm oil, wheat, and banana; also, it maintained protection levels for coffee, cocoa, cotton, soy, and barley.132 As argued by Kalmanovitz & Lopez- Enciso, the customs duty protection remained relatively high for agricultural products after the unilateral market liberalization of the 1990s. Effective average customs duties were oscillating between 5% and 8%, but the total customs duty, for example, for milk was still around 40%.133 In the same period international trade in agricultural products increased less (4.5%) than global trade (6.1%). On the other hand, agricultural imports grew much more (11.6%) than agricultural exports (1.8%). What was mostly imported by Colombia was food and by the agroindustry products to substitute local raw materials.134 135
IV. COMPETITIVE NATIONAL MARKET AND EXPORT ORIENTATION UNDER THE URIBE GOVERNMENT
The most complete trade related market liberalization in the agricultural sector was finally launched by the two governments of President Álvaro Uribe-Vélez [2002-2006, 2006-2010]. Both National Development Plans were clear about the export orientation of the agricultural sector. They were also relatively clear about favoring large productive projects, while small producers were provided with opportunities to grow in alliance with large producers. As expressed by Andrés Felipe Arias, the rural problem was not related to land tenancy and rural property but to rural income generation; the refore the main policy goal was to generate rural employment. On the other hand, competitiveness was understood almost exclusively in economies of scale.136
Both National Development Plans managed agricultural policies divided between two separate issues: i) promotion of agricultural exports and ii) social management of rural areas. The 2002-2006 National Development Plan titled Towards a Communitarian State [Hacia un Estado Comunitario] enhanced agro-industrial projects such as sugar cane production in production chains of ethanol for biofuels and palm oil production.137 138 These policy lines recognized the existence of unproductive land use, although they were not explicit, especially regarding extensive cattle farming being its main cause.139
The second Uribe government’s National Development Plan titled Communitarian State: development for all [Estado Comunitario: desarrollo para todos] treated the “poverty trap” at rural areas.140 Therefore, policies included relatively more social elements.141 The granting of property titles also became a policy issue. Social policies such as Families in Action and Forest Guard Families were strengthened.142 On the other hand, the rural development policies for small farmers in addition to social welfarism were based on the idea of converting farmers into businessmen.143
The signing of FTAs was the central strategy of trade related market liberalization during the two Uribe governments.144 The 2006 Agricultural Export Plan defined free trade and market expansion of agricultural products as the fundamental tool for sustainable rural development.145 146 Most contemporary trade agreements currently in force or under ratification were negotiated or renegotiated under the two Uribe governments.147
The Uribe governments also recognized, as a result of the negotiations of the Trade Promotion Agreement with the US, that in Colombia it became necessary to provide a set of agricultural subsidies to the sectors considered losers of the negotiations; a project which became later known as Secured Agro Income (Agro Ingreso Seguro, AIS).148 Luis Jorge Garay-Salamanca, Fernando Barberi-Gômez, and Ivan Mauricio Cardona-Landlnez criticized the regulatory project of AIS and found it undefined regarding product groups, producers, projects, and support amounts. They suggested providing direct subsidies only to producers resulting as losers of the implementation of the FTAs with possibility to reconvert production in the short and medium terms.149 150
In its implementation, AIS was open to all agricultural producers regardless of size.151 AIS was organized based on the presentation of productive projects in areas of competitiveness and sectoral economic support. According to PNUD 70% of AIS was distributed between the following main sectors: palm oil (20.3%), cattle farming (15.9%), coffee (15%), fruits (11.3%), and late yield crops (7.8%) (2011, 329). AIS was the central agricultural policy instrument of the two Uribe governments. Within the competitiveness project line issues such as late crop yield plant production; forest production incentives; productive infrastructure; irrigation and land preparation; sanitary system; technical assistance and insurance schemes, were financed by mainly subsidized credit lines and some direct subsidies. The sectoral economic support projects were mainly designed for specific sectors affected by the implementation of the Trade Promotion Agreement with the US.152 Notwithstanding, the AIS scandal153 resulted in a negative experience in connection with this first contemporary comprehensive agricultural subsidy policy in Colombia.154
Aside from the AIS, the Uribe governments’ agricultural policies covered price protection in the form of insurance schemes,155 provided incentives for the storage of agricultural products, a guaranteed minimum price was also established for cotton, and an important support scheme for coffee production was also established.156 The investment in infrastructure included the irrigation projects currently under implementation by the Santos government. For forestry an investment fund was established which had a COP 50 billion capital by 2010.157 Biofuel was one of the most important sectoral focus areas of the Uribe governments.158 The State support was essential in this process providing income tax exemption for 10 years and the possibility to operate establishments in free-trade zones.159 There were also efforts taken in research, technology transfer, and in sanitary issues.160 Nevertheless, in its majority these agricultural policy lines reflected the support to large agribusinesses.
The two Uribe governments gave more attention in their economic policies to agriculture than its predecessors of the 1990s.161 On the other hand, these policies reflected the policy paradigm contradiction between the priorities of a heavily agribusiness oriented export sector and limited welfare policies designed for small farmers.162 As criticized by PNUD,163 the Uribe governments created clientelism between sectoral interest groups competing to obtain State subsidies.164 As the Colombian State was weak, this competition did not result in more efficiency but in the further cooptation of the State.
All the above describes a distorted agricultural market in Colombia.
FINAL REMARKS
In this article we analyzed that the current challenges of agricultural policies had been present in Colombia since the 1970s. President Misael Pastrana-Borrero prioritized the interests of urban-industrial development, whereas backwardness in agriculture was considered as an impediment. President Alfonso Lopez-Michelsen brought definite export orientation, with the idea of generating development by agriculture and medium and small businesses. President Julio César Turbay-Ayala focused on infrastructure, energy, and mining sectors and promoted the idea of agribusiness and agroindustry. President Belisario Betancur had a central role for agriculture to offer available food, as well as to participate in increasing exports, but these policies were not implemented. President Virgilio Barco was the first to identify the fight against rural poverty as central element of the peace policies. As further analyzed, the government of César Gaviria-Trujillo implemented the most comprehensive unilateral market liberalization policies in Colombia with a conceptual change in agricultural policies towards the promotion of agroindustrial production chains. President Ernesto Samper’s agricultural policies favored welfare policies for small farmers and the rural poor, as well as commercial policies for agroindustry. President Andrés Pastrana implemented the productive alliances and incentives for late yield crops. During the government of President Âlvaro Uribe-Vélez agricultural policies were export orientated and favored large productive projects, while policies for small producers were based on alliances with large producers.
In this way, it was demonstrated that the questions of production structure, competitiveness, and in general, the role of agriculture in the economy had remained recurrent and unresolved during all these years. These questions had been treated in slightly different manners depending on the prevailing interests of the time. On the other hand, these policy responses lacked long term planning and rigor in their implementation.
Successful agricultural policies cannot be made through exclusion by a) political and economic elites, b) implementing foreign commercial policies, or c) negotiating peace agreements. I urge in this article again the implementation of a sincere, inclusive and broad policy debate on agriculture in Colombia.
