DOI: 10.17151/difil.2015.16.27.3.

* orcid.org/0000-0002-1043-043X

El presente artículo intenta investigar el proceso pasivo/activo de constitución de juicios, mostrando las estructuras esenciales de la pasividad en la conciencia (fenomenología estática) y el constituyente activo a través de actos de ego (fenomenología genética). Sin embargo, como propone Husserl, de acuerdo con Anthony Steinbock, este análisis plantea las principales pistas de constitución de sentido en una perspectiva generativa, principalmente en sus obras futuras. A pesar de ser conscientes de esta fenomenología estática/genética/generativa, nos concentraremos principalmente en la posibilidad o no de un juicio verdadero. En consecuencia, este trabajo tendrá algunas preguntas: aunque la pasividad de las estructuras esenciales de la constitución enfrentan algunas modalizaciones, por lo que la experiencia vivida de otra manera surge, ¿qué tipo de garantías nos da para los juicios de cada uno? Y, si el ego tiene su propia forma de lo dado donde se puede intervenir de forma activa o ser atraídos de alguna manera, ¿cómo es posible una certeza judicativa? Estas preguntas serán contestadas a través del propio proceso de constitución. Por tanto, este trabajo analiza la estructura pasiva/activa de la constitución del significado en la experiencia y cómo tales experiencias influyen en el juicio en sí mismo. El análisis se centrará en los escritos de Husserl a partir de 1920 y Husserliana XI, los cuales fueron reunidos en una sola obra por Anthony Steinbock.

juicios, significados, modalizaciones, conciencia del tiempo.

This article intends to research the passive/active process of constitution in a way that shows the essential structures of passivity in consciousness (static phenomenology) and the active constitution through Ego's acts (genetic phenomenology). However, as Husserl intends, according to Anthony Steinbock, this analysis will conduct to leading clues of constitution of meaning in a generative perspective, mainly in his future works. Although one is conscious of this static/genetic/generative phenomenology, I shall mainly concentrate on whether a true judgment is possible. Henceforth, this work will pose some questions: Despite the fact that in passivity the essential structures of constitution face some modalization, whereby the lived-experience of otherwise springs forth, what kind of guarantee does it give for one's judgments? And, if the Ego has its own way of givenness, in which it can actively intervene or be enticed somehow, how is it possibly a judicative certainty? These questions will be answered through the process of constitution itself. Therefore, this work will analyze the passive/active structure of constitution of meaning in experience, and how such experiences influence the judgment itself. The analysis will concentrate on the writings of Husserl from the 1920s and Husserliana XI, which were gathered in a single work by Anthony Steinbock.

Judgments, meaning, modalizations, time-consciousness.

Through modalizations, the normal process of constitution will find a rupture in what is taken for granted. Modalizations, such as disappointment, doubt, possibility, and certainty (pure/impure), have a special role in the noetic/noematic way the meaning is performed. Therefore, despite the fact that Husserl considers the Ego as the endower of meaning (Cf. Junglos), it will be a constant process, a striving between passivity and activity in the very process of constitution itself, whereby the meaning will be challenged by the givenness of conscience.

In the first chapter of the selected work from 1920s and Husserliana XI, organized by Anthony Steinbock in a book entitled Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis: Lectures on transcendental Logic, Husserl begins classifying different kinds of modalizations, which are crucial to understand the process of constitution, mainly in the constitution of judgments.

Husserl starts by saying that despite the unitary courses of perception in which the unity of an object is maintained concordantly, there is, however, an occurrence that runs counter to fulfillment, namely, disappointment (Enttäuschung). Thus, instead of the acquired knowledge being preserved and enriched further, it can be placed in question, annulled. There is a kind of rupture (Bruch) (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §5 64) (Cf. Husserl, Analysen zur §5 26) in the normal chain of the fulfillment of expectations so that the lived-experience of otherwise springs forth. There is also a lived-experience of otherwise without a rupture in such a way, that by its regularity, it can be anticipated, because one has a consciousness of the alteration itself. Husserl brings the example of a ball-shape, which appears, at first, to be red, but upon turning around, one discovers a green side as well. Such kinesthesis movement allows a restoration of the concordance, superimposing (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §5 65) a new expectation in relation to its fulfillment.

Despite the disappointment in relation to fulfillment, a certain unity of sense must be maintained throughout the course of changing appearances. Only in this way does one have the constancy of a single consciousness (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §6 67), a unitary intentionality spanning all phases during the course of lived-experience with its appearances. A general framework (Ibid. §6 68) of sense has been maintained in thoroughgoing fulfillment; only a part of the anticipating intention is affected; now the expectations are otherwise.

The mode of doubt is characterized by a lasting process. In the example of whether it is a wax figure or a man over there, one can resolve it saying, affirmatively, it is a man, or negatively, it is not a man. In contrast with the mode of negation, the mode of doubt is not crossed out during its process, but, as a lasting process, both overlapping apprehensions come into a struggle with its own force and motivation.

Every transformation of consciousness, which remains as its history (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §9 77), to wit, as a consciousness of something, brings the originality of doubt to the very scene of its endeavors. This modalization motivates consciousness into a dynamic process between history of sense (noematic) and the transformation of sense (noetic), whereby consciousness reveals its nature as a lasting process. So to speak, the modalization of negation qualifies consciousness as a crossing out process, and the modalization of doubt qualifies it as a lasting process, being both involved in the noematic/noetic structures of consciousness.

The mode of possibility encompasses so many futures. The open possibility reveals itself as the indeterminate scope of intentional prefiguring. Thus, when one prefigures something, like the backside of an object, presupposing it will have the same pattern color as the front one, one perceives a quasi-determination. Nevertheless, it shows a range of free variability as a general indeterminacy (Ibid. §10 81). Enticing possibility, as another future, which operates as the tendencies to believe within doubt, shows affection issues from the side of the object which produce an enticing demand on the Ego. The sense itself has the propensity to be (Ibid, §11 82). In other words, within possibility one is inclined to have one belief.

Enticing possibilities can be also characterized as impure certainties (unreine Gewissheit) (Ibid. § 12 85) (Cf. Husserl, Analysen zur §12 46). It is impure because one's Ego is drawn to it, so that one rejects all other oppositions against it, by the fact of being inclined to believe. For example, because of some natural phenomena like clouds and humidity, one has the propensity to believe that it is going to rain. Such enticing (Anmutung) from the objects refers to leeways of possibilities (Spielräume von Möglichkeit) (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §12 87) (Cf. Husserl, Analysen zur §12 47), marking out all sort of things. In case of certainties that refer to leeways of open possibilities, one speaks of empirical, primitive certainties. Each perception implicates a leeway of specifications at every moment within the certainty of a general prefiguring; all possibilities are equally possible, implying that nothing speaks in favor of the one possibility if it speaks against the other.

It is enough to say that certainty is impure insofar as it has the mode of making a decision for an enticement, a subjectively secure decision for an enticement, even though opposing enticements are there, and against which the Ego decides despite their weight (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §13 90). A pure certainty occurs when the opposing enticements completely lose their weight; they are experienced as straightforward nullities (Ibid. §13 91).

Husserl calls one's attention to a passive and an active sense in the process of constitution. The passive structure remains in the background field that is not carried out thematically (nevertheless, it can be thematically already constituted), like in the question: Is that a wax figure? The Ego has a unitary field of problematic possibilities in the passive sphere. To bring it forth thematically, the question would be: Is that a wax figure or a human being? Now the Ego is displaced actively. Thus, one can say that a unitary field of problematic possibilities in the passive sphere precedes questioning and doubting (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §15 99). In the process of decision-making, one's Ego strives to find unity again to its constitution, trying to not lapse again into embarrassing modalizations, which causes a disjunction in what was considered objectively certain. Now, what is retained from the very process of constitution is passively taken for granted, until moralizations come into play again, bringing new possibilities to the process. According to Nicolas de Warren (282), the movement from passive and active modalizations does not have a form of rendering explicit what is implicit, but because the act of deciding is an appropriation and a self-realization of the Ego itself; it is constituted itself as the history of its decisions. The question now arises: How does such a process, permeated by modalizations, take place in perception, whereby a synthesis is done?

Perception is a process of streaming from phase to phase (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §16 107), harmonized in the unity of a synthesis, having primordial impression, retention, and protention. The unity arises in this progression by the protention of each phase, being fulfilled through the primordial impression. In other words, the perceptual lived-experience is continuously being fulfilled, being a unity of continual concordance. When this concordance is ruptured, which is altogether possible, modalization occurs, and one has no longer a perception in the normal sense, namely, one is no longer continually conscious of the one perceptual object as something existing in a straightforward manner. According to the above argumentation, does such a primordial impression, made through perceptions, have its own way of givenness? Does it have an independent way to display itself?

Husserl demonstrates the passive side of perceptions, which reviews its own way of givenness. In order to have a fulfillment in perception, any active decision making is not necessary, because the perception, by its primordial impressions, elaborates a passive synthesis – an evident fulfilment. The perception, originally, can fulfill empty intentions without the intervention of an active Ego. Horizons are permeated of empty intention, which makes the fulfillment possible (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §16 108), and it is the very core of the constitution of consciousness itself.

The present, past and future have a passive side, making it horizontally co-conscious of the past and future (Ibid. §17 112) in the moment of perception. According to Husserl, one is conscious of it emptily, so that it will be necessary confirmation of its presentation. Indeed, in perception, the temporality has an intertwined structure, only when one understands it in their structural interrelatedness can one understands also how it functions in synthetic interrelatedness. It is possible to see this interrelatedness of temporality in the following passage of Husserl:

With respect to the doctrine of this primordial genesis, we have not only had to speak of retentions, but also of protentions. In our analysis of perception, which was in this regard an analysis of temporal modes of givenness, we have already observed and touched upon the essentially new role of protentions over against the role of retentions. The rubric, protention, designates the second aspect of genetic primordial lawfulness that strictly governs the life of consciousness as the time-constituting unitary stream. Just as a retentional horizon of the past is invariably connected to each impressional present, a protentional horizon of the future is no less invariably connected to an impressional present. Just as one can disclose the retentional horizon, so too can one expose the protentional horizon. Just as the past is first clearly exposed as such through intuitive remembering, namely, as just-having-been, so too is the constitutive accomplishment of protention exposed as the just-about-to-arrive, as becoming originally conscious of the future. Mindful perceiving follows the protentional continuity. The directedness-ahead, which already lies in passive perception itself, becomes patent in the mindful perceiving. (Analyses concerning §18 115)

It is necessary to make a distinction between what is awakening and what is awakened in its temporal mode of givenness, between the directedness-toward and what is taken up in the directedness (Ibid. §20 127). In this way, one can say that the intention is that lived-experience that is a merely aiming-at, a having-in-sight; its fulfillment lies in the lived-experience of being-at-the-goal-itself. Thus, the intention has a sense of self-giving and a sense of an incomplete self-giving. The intention is permeated by contrast between satisfaction and not satisfaction. Thus, one can draw the conclusion by saying that every consciousness is a meaning-something, but also often as a mere intending that has not reached the goal of truth. As Dieter Lohmar would say: "Objects of sense perceptions are there for us in one step of constitution in which they are intended and also given." (62) For Lohmar, the perception is in a constant striving for fulfillment, because both perception and the object perceived have their own way of givenness. Therefore, as one can have only a phenomenological perception, one is capable only to have phenomenological judgments of things in general. It presupposes a temporality, a time that involves the process of constitution itself.

When the protentional striving or tending is directed toward what is futural, it is of course not actually a striving whose fulfillment realizes or makes actual what is futural. It can take place now as deliberate, as active, or it can take place now non-deliberately in passivity. An example is one pulls one's hand back involuntarily because of an insect bite, while being perhaps quite occupied with something else entirely (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §20 131).

This analysis leads to the strict concept of a passive intention as a special shape that a consciousness of something must assume in order for it to be able to function in syntheses of fulfillment. First, a consciousness of something does not need necessarily, in itself, to have the distinguishing trait of directedness toward this something. Only when an associative ray, when wakening (Weckung) (Ibid. §21 134) (Cf. Husserl, Analysen zur §21 90) radiates in this consciousness from elsewhere, from another presentation, and directs this consciousness toward its object, does it have in itself precisely a directedness. Secondly, the birth of 'intending' is due to structure of a passive as a continual synthesis of fulfillment that is self-giving. It is entirely correct if all involvement of Ego activity is actually left out of play in such continual synthesis (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §21 135).

The intention running through the empty expectant consciousness is fulfilled in the transition to self-giving, to perception; it is a satisfied intention, so to speak, in the self-giving intuition, being characterized here as a confirmed intention (Ibid. §22 137). Perception, in its turn, is that mode of consciousness that sees and has its object itself in the flesh. To put it negatively, the object is not given like a mere sign or a likeness, it is not grasped mediate form if the object were merely indicated by signs or appearing in a reproduced copy, etc. Rather, it is given as itself just like it is meant. One can say also that perception is characterized as an original acquisition of the object, and remembering as going back in thought to what is already acquired, as originally having it once again at one's disposal.

Modalization belongs to the intention and is carried out in intentions (Ibid. §22 145); it is, however, not carried out in an isolated manner in elementary intentions, but rather in the intentions that are integrated concretely into the synthetic intentions as a whole. Special forms of this, then, are the self-giving intentions which, by constituting a self, are able to fulfill and to confirm non-self-giving intentions.

Husserl conceives all particular syntheses, through which things in perception, in memory, etc., are given, are surrounded by a general milieu of empty intentions being ever newly awakened; and they do not float there in an isolated manner, but rather, are themselves synthetically intertwined with one another (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §23 146). In that way, one captivates a universal belief-certainty which is harmonized with the world, and even if disbeliefs can emerge by breaks here and there, it carries with it a new belief, a new unity which is necessary in order to avoid chaos. Despite of such considerations, the world is still there, the enduring world (Ibid. §23 146-7)¹, which is intertwined with the immanent stream of consciousness.

The immanent time-consciousness, together with the transcendental stream, intertwined with the spacial-temporal world, all present a self-givenness, whereby the Ego is implicated actively and passively in a strive for unity. This presupposes that belief is not directed just with the present, but also toward the anticipated future and toward the memorial past; manifold memory-beliefs and expectant-beliefs emerge that can be verified or rejected (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §23 148). Husserl draws an innovating conclusion, the definiteness objective synthesis of consciousness cannot be done, yet confirming certainties are brought by the lived-experience all the time passively or actively. Although such definiteness objectively or subjectively would not be possible, the living present, which is structured immanently, is not capable of being crossed out so long as it unfolds in constitution; doubt is not possible here. This also concerns, therefore, the span of the living retention proper to it. Thus, each progressing retention, that continues to exist in a living fading away, cannot be modalized.

Husserl makes a distinction between close memories and distant memories, (i) between remembering that are awakened through the retention that is still primordially living, still articulated in them and found in constitutive flux, and (ii) between remembering that reach into the distant horizon of retention, like with those of an entire piece of music (Ibid. §25 157). In spite of all that, we certainly do not grasp the self and the identity of the self in such a repeated coinciding of the self without incompleteness and degrees of completeness. Remembering can essentially waver in its clarity, such that the different moments of content are more or less veiled, as it were, as if by a fog of unclarity (Ibid. §25 158).² The clarity can be modalized, but not the remembering process, the awakening that takes place in the constitutive flux; it never can be crossed out.

The doctrine of original time constitution is characterized as a form and a lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general, and is not determined by laws of causalities (Ibid. §26 164). Husserl starts to analyze reproductive association as pure phenomenological occurrence. The phenomenon gives itself as a genesis, with the one term as awakening and the other as awakened. The reproduction of the latter gives itself as aroused through the awakening (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §26 166). In order to understand it, the entire past-consciousness is co-awakened; it is from this that the particular thing, which is especially awakened and reproduced, becomes prominent. A present enters into a universal synthesis with another past present; correlatively a full consciousness of the present enters into a universal synthesis with another submerged consciousness of the present, a synthesis which serves as the framework for special syntheses of awakening and for special reproductions (Ibid. §26 168).

Such genesis, produced by an awakening in the immanent time consciousness, makes possible the constitution of the spatial world, which is conceived by virtue of certain syntheses carried out in immanence (Ibid. §27 171). What is given to consciousness originally, as existing simultaneously and sequentially, is thus constituted from an originally synthetic unity that exists simultaneously and successively. In other words, the immanent time consciousness gives a temporal unity through connections of homogeneity/heterogeneity. This means that there is a kind of kinship (Verwandtschaft) (Ibid. §28 175) (Cf. Husserl, Analysen zur §28 129) unified in the immanence of consciousness, whereby the objects are contrasted (heterogeneity) or coincided (homogeneity).

Everything in a present that is prominent and at the same time homogeneous is connected. According to Husserl, every sense-field (Sinnesfeldern) (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §29 184) (Cf. Husserl, Analysen zur §29 136) is a unitary field for itself: Everything visual is connected through visual homogeneity, everything tactile through tactile homogeneity, everything acoustic through acoustic homogeneity, and so forth. They are heterogeneous but are only united by the temporality of the living present. It is possible to say that something constituted as an existing datum and as prominent for itself is constituted as enduring, possibly beginning now, lasting awhile, and ceasing (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §29 186). In the sense-field, there is, passively, a growing together (concretions) which brings with it a fusion in the form of order (Verschmelzung in der Ordnungsform) (Ibid. §29 187) (Cf. Husserl, Analysen zur §29 140), that is, as the fusion of something that is ordered temporally.

It is important to recognize a temporal shape which is displayed successively, ordered temporally, having its own individuality through which it is an element of universal time itself, as a local system built up out of single temporal loci. Speaking in terms of locality, Husserl says that "Locality is what orders the coexistences peculiar to a homogeneous region (of course, not necessarily each one of them), and it is locality that can individuate something uniform and simultaneous within a homogeneous region." (Analyses concerning §30 190) The immanent conscious of time is individualized inside its uniformity by having a succession done in a spatial concretion, bringing the originality of its constituting. Thus, one can draw the conclusion that there is no temporality without a locality, whereby the sense-field is produced by such immanent temporal order. Truly, it is unified, but, at same time, it is individualized originally.

This individualized originality that takes place in constitution transcends itself despite the unity that is done passively and actively. Writes Toine Kortooms: "Just as the flowing present transcends itself in constitution of the immanent temporal stream of consciousness in turn transcends itself in form of the experiencing constitution of the objective world." (235) Such intertwined transcendence is essential to understand the givenness process of constitution that cannot be seen through an objectlike determination from psychology or logic, but a unity emerges as directness, whereby the Ego can have its field of perception.

The affection produces an allure given to consciousness, as Husserl writes: "[Affection] the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the Ego." (Ibid. §32 196) Thus, affection can be understood as function of contrast and concrescence. Nevertheless, those functions are founded purely in the impressional sphere (Ibid. §32 198), whereby, in the process of constitution, local systems that constantly function to individualize and their fillings, the principles according to which contrasts and inner fusions (concrescence) take place, are constantly operative, transforming affections into awakenings (Ibid. §33 201).

Husserl affirms that is the accomplishment of passivity, and as the lowest level within passivity, the accomplishment of hyletic passivity, that fashions a constant field of pregiven objectlike formations for the Ego (Ibid. §34 210). The constituted is constituted for the Ego, such that an environing-world that is actual, in which the Ego lives, acts, motivates constantly the Ego. Thus, consciousness exists for the Ego only insofar as it affects the Ego. Any kind of constituted sense is pregiven insofar as it exercises an affective allure, it is given insofar as the Ego complies with the allure and has turned toward it attentively, whereby it forma a way in which something becomes an object.

From now on, Husserl makes a distinction under the rubric of affection (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §35 214) between: (i) Affection as that varying vivacity of a lived experience, of a datum of consciousness; whether the datum is salient in the special sense and then perhaps actually noticed and grasped depends upon the datum's relative intensity; and (ii) this salience itself. Here, affection has the special sense of a specific affection on the Ego, and in doing so meets the Ego, excites it, calls it to action, so to speak, awakens and, possibly, actually rouses it. As an example, Husserl says that a soft noise becoming louder and louder takes on a growing affectivity in this materially relevant transformation; the vivacity of it in consciousness increases, exercising a growing pull on the Ego. Husserl draws the conclusion that primordial source of all affection lies in primordial impression (Ibid. §35 217) and its own greater or lesser affectivity.

By awakening, we understand and distinguish two things: Awakening something that is already given to consciousness for itself and the awakening of something that is concealed (Ibid. §36 221). Nonetheless, awakening plays a special role in the original constitution, because an ever-new source of an affective force can spread over the nexuses in an awakening manner, which can make possible syntheses of fusion, of connection, of contrast in every coexistence. In this manner, a retention cannot be analyzed, disassembled like a fixed thing (Ibid. §36 222); it is awakened from its fog into the flux of living present.

Husserl says that future does not fashion the unities of experience in the original sense, it presupposes them (Ibid. §41 235). There is an expectation of fulfillment that can happen through a motivational causality as a necessity. One can say it happens in evidence all the time, and is ratified in experience, it has the habitus to happen like that or it stands in conscience as a lack of such evidence; the expectation is disappointed; the present temporal field, that is, the sense-field is filled out, but filled out otherwise. Such disappointment becomes conscious of the lack of the habitual connection (Ibid. §41 240).

According to Husserl, the living force of awakening, which radiates out from the impressionable present, flows over into the retentional sedimentations of memory in accordance with the principle of similarity? The objectlike will be possible by this essential law, which are constituted in memory. Memories emerge as awakenings of components of the subsoil of memory, whereby they are awakened through similarities and connections. So one can say that every disclosure of an illusion is carried out in the transition to higher levels of clarity, just as every disclosure of a reproduced intuition through continual confirmation takes place in the progressive clarification of what is less clear. The illusion that is not disclosed is only possible in a self-giving consciousness of a relatively lower level of clarity. Every confirmation is a process of bringing something concealed to light, a process of bringing it to the clarity of self-giving.

There is a consciousness of graduation of clarity that is continually progressing in the process of self-giving, carrying with it anticipatory motivated limes (the idea of the absolute clarity). All self-giving are full of such gradations, being potentially operative in such gradations, and by this, it also means that it concerns a universal law of consciousness in general (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §44 254). The Ego will have the contact with such gradations attaining to it through confirmation, being it positive or negative.

The entire past of consciousness is given in a transcendent manner in the respective present. In this way, lived-experiences of remembering arise in the immanence of the primordial present, becoming available through transcendence. The stream of consciousness lives with streaming, and simultaneously becomes objectlike, objective for its Ego; the stream of consciousness becomes an object as the transcendent self that comes to incomplete and approximate self-giving in remembering and in syntheses of remembering of a particular present (Ibid. §45 256). For the Ego, it corresponds to the idea of a true self, to the idea of the true past of consciousness, as the idea of complete self-giving. According to Husserl, this idea is two-fold: The one concerns the orientation toward clarity and its limes (Objectlike), the other toward expansion (constancy of possibilities), insofar as the entire self of the stream of consciousness is in question.

The streaming consciousness constantly projects a protentional horizon ahead of itself (Ibid. §46 263). What I have experienced actually was, even if I have momentarily forgotten it, and it remains for me a true reality; progressing from remembering to remembering, I am able to awake it once more and to legitimate it in pure immanence: Here, the norm is contained securely within me, but now about for the future? The future is the realm of the unfamiliar (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §46 264). It is initially not a realm of the in-itself, not a realm of true objectlike formations that are pre-given to the Ego in their truth, but rather a realm of indeterminacy that the Ego occupies with objectlike formations only insofar as it is sure that determining fulfillment will later constitute an objectlike formation.

The Ego can bear its activity because it is intertwined with the passivity of consciousness. A stream of lived-experiences of spatio-material experience runs throughout the stream of the lived experiences such that all things experienced in the course of the steady sequence of perception are referred to one's own lived-body. The psychical lived-experiences that are bound to the lived-body are regulated as psychophysical (Ibid. §47 265) lived-experiences. This world is also a psychophysical world, but also a personal, communal world, and a cultural world with manifold special types of objectivities that are there for the Ego who experiences them, constituted in the Ego, in the immanence of its stream of consciousness (Ibid. §47 267). Consciousness is not just a mere flux, but also constituting objectivities in an incessant progressus of graduated levels. It is a never ending history (Ibid. §48 270).

The constituted sense (the accomplishment of the Ego) is done by the activity of the Ego and, such egoics acts, do not come without any previous background on passivity (Ibid. §49 275). It is said that when the Ego becomes attentive to the constituting consciousness it affects the Ego in a precise manner. Consequently, the consciousness of something (an object) is given through to very diverse lived-experiences. Husserl will call this process as the sphere of presentation (Ibid. §50 277), which objectified consciousness in the specific sense.

The correlation between passivity and activity grasped as identical, whereby it can affect the Ego as pleasurable or not, as agreeable or disagreeable, varies according to the context in which the respective consciousness of the object occurs. Husserl will name this novel consciousness as the consciousness of the intentionality of feeling (Ibid. §50 27). In this sense, the intentionality of feeling can provide predicates values, wherewith the objectivating consciousness is affected by it and generates a new consciousness. The intentionality of feeling enters as a specific mode of consciousness (Ibid. §50 280), different from a pure presentation, which is characterized as a pure objectification. Nonetheless, this mode (intentionality of feeling), becomes active as pleasure or not, identifying and determining it as an object.

As the objectivating consciousness has its own mode of synthesis, so does the intentionality of feeling. Both have their fulfillment: The objectivating consciousness, actively, through the accomplishments of the Ego, while the intentionality of feeling, actively, through the accomplishments of the Ego in terms of pleasure or not. The volition is not a property of desire of objectivating whatsoever, but the will is a higher form of activity that can appear everywhere under certain essential conditions that lie in presupposed objectifications and intentionality of feelings (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §50 282-3). This active objectification, in the constitution of consciousness or through feeling, and even in fantasy, refers back to realms of already pre-constituted objects that are contained in the potentiality of the background (Ibid. §52 287). No object can be given to developed consciousness without a prefiguring, so that what exercises an affection must already be a unity of constitutive manifolds; the Ego intervenes continuously with new formation and does not allow the objectifications already formed to be abandoned in the passive background, decaying into rule (Ibid. §52 288).

The background of the environment-world is done in perception such as the conscious of existence, that is the living awareness, a living belief. Despite this firm directedness toward the object, in the continuity of its experiencing, there is an intention that intends beyond what is given and beyond its momentary mode of givenness toward a progressing plus ultra (Ibid. §52 289). This interest can be characterized as a positive feeling, but not necessarily will it give a sense of well-being, instead, it can even stir feelings. Nonetheless, there is also a cognitive interest (Ibid. §52 290) that strives more and more to enrich the Ego in order to increase knowledge, finding a joy in this striving, which gives the Ego a constant open horizon related to possibilities and expectations for every new enrichment of this sort.

In the process of enriching knowledge, one finds an objectivating process that corresponds to the entire synthetic deed of the Ego in a self-contained noema, a self-contained objective sense with a mode of being. Considering that noema is S as a theme, S is determined by partial self-identification as a, B, y, and so forth. In this sense, the theme S brings with passive conditions and the connection made actively by the Ego to form a process of judgin (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §55 299). This process contains in it an objective sense (noema) and a mode of being, whereby this mode can assume new possibilities of determinations. According to Husserl, in determinative judging, the S is objectlike; in the progression of the determination it is altered noematically (Ibid. §55 300). For Husserl, this form of judgment, as content, is called the syntactic form, and what is maintained in the different synthetic forms is called syntactic matter or judicative core, and what is formed syntactically as the unity of matter and form is called the syntagma (Ibid. §55 301-2).

For Husserl, the process of judging, formed in the unity of becoming, involves a passivity unity whereby the judging process can flow as a process. Although, it is a process of becoming and it emerges in the Omni-temporality (Ibid. §56 303-4) (in the flow of time as a whole), it assumes the characterization of an objectlike now, forming a judgment, having its temporal locus in time. According to Husserl, two things can happen: (i) One can follow the process of determination through the passive/active development of constitution, or (ii) one can interrupt such process. This interruption is done by its end (the process find its limit) or by the open horizon found in the very process. Husserl writes: "Every articulated intellectual movement progressing in a uniform style brings with it such an open horizon: an open one; for it is not the next term as a single one that is prefigured, but the progression of the process." (Ibid. §57 307) It is not the case that one becomes independent on the substratum (Ibid. §57 306), but on the very determination itself (Ibid. §57 309). One thing is important to be distinguished here, despite the fact that one is able to interrupt determinations, it does not mean they cannot form substrates. In other words, the original determination-objects can form original substrate-objects (Ibid. §58 313) in its process of constitution. Therefore, even if interest passes over, the original substrate-objects are essential to new themes.

In order to explain judicative operations, one needs to distinguish between wholes and parts. According to Husserl: "The whole is determined in that grasping that grasps each part." (Ibid. §59 319). That means that wholes and parts are implicated together and, in order to explain an object, we need to resort to all complexities that involves the synthesis. In this sense, one is able to say that even though S is p, it is also implicit that p has (contains) S.

Husserl notes that judgment is not formed solely by a process of judicative operations. There is also categorical objectlike formation found in the judgment itself. Such categories make the distinctions between wholes and parts, which involves the theme in question. The theme (S) and the categorical objectlike formation remain the same in the judicative activity, but the logical sense (Cf. Husserl, Analyses concerning §61 330) is varied according with the active synthesis of the Ego. It is possible to draw the conclusion that in intending, thinking, positing, and so on, one has already intended thought, and posited themes that are correlated. In other words, the judgment has a noetic/noematic constitution in a correlation of unities in the experience itself. As Husserl points it: "Every conceptual intending has its intended object, every synthetically relating and connecting [act of] intending has its synthetic intended meaning." (Ibid. §62 335) Such relations established between wholes and parts, forming themes through judgment process are called states-of-affairs (Ibid. §62 333-7); they are unity of significance itself.

Husserl brings the example of the tone to illustrate the gradation's levels of objectification (Ibid. §63 339). According to Husserl, the first level is the level of intuition that examines S prior to all explication, which would be characterized by the flowing What-content of the tone (the thematic object, the one enduring tone, thematic content). The second level is that of the examination that delves into and the examination that extends beyond. They do not have any essentially prefigured order. Husserl draws the conclusion that the progressive objectification consists only in the fact that what was previously merely a thematic content now becomes a thematic object in a particular way. In this way, the process of gradation has an active and a passive side. It is active in the process of making the object thematic and passive in the occurrence of partial coinciding and the enrichment of the thematic object (Ibid. §65 340).

Formal logic helps to establish several relations between parts and wholes, building the highest possibilities of determinations through judgments. If one delves into examination through relations of comparisons, associations and similarities, one performs a kind of universal of repetition (Ibid. §65 351), but if one has an object in front of him/herself (a table) and one judges it as such, it is a different kind, because it loses its actuality. Now one has a law-giving knowledge that goes beyond the mere comparison, association and similarities (Ibid. §65 353-5). According to Donn Welton: "[Judgments] if their genuine sense is brought out, the intentionality of predicative judgments leads back ultimately to the intentionality of experience." (305) Despite the progressive possibilities of logic, in terms of judgments, it cannot encompass just association of ideas, but bring about the very possibilities in experience. Therefore, Judgments is constitutive of experience as a whole; it is not separated from the flux of the living psychophysical mode of existence. That means that in judgment, one has the experience of constitution of true, a never-ending history.

¹ Husserl also writes: "The one world is constantly there, only it is determined more closely and occasionally determined somewhat differently." (Analyses concerning §23 152)
² Such fog does not blacken out objects, although it renders the self-giving incomplete.

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Como citar:
Junglos, M. "The Constitution of Judgments in Husserl's Phenomenology." Discusiones Filosóficas. Jun.-Dic. 2015: 31-47. DOI: 10.17151/difil.2015.16.27.3.