<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0120-0062</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Ideas y Valores]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Ideas y Valores]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0120-0062</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, Departamento de Filosofía.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0120-00622018000400149</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.15446/ideasyvalores.v67n4supl.73374</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[EXPERIENCIA PERCEPTUAL, VAGUEDAD Y REALISMO INGENUO]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE, VAGUENESS, AND NAIVE REALISM]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[AMATO]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[MANUEL ALEJANDRO]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Bogotá ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>67</volume>
<fpage>149</fpage>
<lpage>164</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0120-00622018000400149&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0120-00622018000400149&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0120-00622018000400149&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN Filósofos modernos como Berkeley y Hume desplegaron una argumentación de corte escéptico en contra del llamado realismo ingenuo: la idea de que la experiencia perceptual provee un acceso directo al mundo. Dicha argumentación ha sido criticada por Michael Martin y John Campbell, quienes reclaman justicia por una nueva forma de realismo ingenuo llamado relacionalista. Se argumenta que tanto el realismo ingenuo como el relacionalista son falsos, y se defiende la tesis central de Berkeley y Hume: no hay experiencias perfectamente verídicas de objetos materiales.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT Modern philosophers like Berkeley and Hume deployed skeptical arguments against so-called naive realism: the idea that perceptual experience provides direct access to the world. Michael Martin and John Campbell critique those arguments and champion a new form of naive realism known as relationalism. The article argues that both naive and relational realism are false and defends the main thesis set forth by Berkeley and Hume: there are no perfectly true experiences of material objects.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[G. Berkeley]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[D. Hume]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[percepción]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[realismo ingenuo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[relacionalismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[vaguedad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[G. Berkeley]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[D. Hume]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[perception]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[naive realism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[relationalism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[vagueness]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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