<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0120-2596</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Lecturas de Economía]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Lect. Econ.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0120-2596</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad de Antioquia]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0120-25962011000200002</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Do Followers Really Matter in Stackelberg Competition?]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[&iquest;Importan realmente los seguidores en la competencia de Stackelberg?]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="fr"><![CDATA[Les followers ont-ils vraiment de l'importance dans le modèle de Stackelberg?]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Julien]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ludovic]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="A01"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Musy]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Olivier]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="A02"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Saïdi]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Aurélien]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="A03"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="A01">
<institution><![CDATA[,Université de Bourgogne  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
</aff>
<aff id="A02">
<institution><![CDATA[,Université Paris Ouest-Nanterre  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
</aff>
<aff id="A03">
<institution><![CDATA[,ESCP Europe Department of Information & Operations Management ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2011</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2011</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>75</numero>
<fpage>11</fpage>
<lpage>27</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0120-25962011000200002&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0120-25962011000200002&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0120-25962011000200002&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[In this paper, we consider a T-stage linear model of Stackelberg oligopoly. First, we show geometrically and analytically that under the two conditions of linear market demand and identical constant marginal costs, the T-stage Stackelberg model reduces to a model where T oligopolies exploit residual demand sequentially. At any stage, leaders behave as if followers did not matter. Second, we study social welfare and convergence toward competitive equilibrium. Especially, we consider the velocity of convergence as the number of firms increases. The convergence is faster when reallocating firms from the most to the less populated cohort until equalizing the size of all cohorts.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[En este artículo se considera un modelo de oligopolio de Stackelberg lineal en T etapas. En primer lugar, se muestra geométrica y analíticamente que bajo las condiciones de demanda de mercado lineal y costos marginales constantes e idénticos el modelo de Stackelberg en T etapas se reduce a un modelo en el que T firmas explotan la demanda residual secuencialmente. En cualquier etapa, los líderes se comportan como si los seguidores no importaran. En segundo lugar, se estudia el bienestar social y la convergencia hacia el equilibrio competitivo. En particular, se considera la velocidad de convergencia a medida que el número de firmas incrementa. La convergencia es más rápida cuando las firmas se relocalizan desde la cohorte más poblada a la menos poblada hasta que el tamaño de las cohortes se iguala.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="fr"><p><![CDATA[Dans cet article nous considérons un modèle linéaire d'oligopole de Stackelberg avec T cohortes où les entreprises ont des stratégies en quantité. Tout d'abord, nous montrons géométriquement et analytiquement que, si la demande de marché est linéaire et les coûts marginaux sont constants et identiques, le modèle de Stackelberg à T étapes se réduit à un modèle où T oligopoles exploitent la demande résiduelle de manière séquentielle. À n'importe quelle étape, la stratégie des entreprises ne dépend ni du nombre d'entreprises qui jouent après, ni du nombre de cohortes restantes. Les entreprises leaders se comportent "comme si" les entreprises suiveuses n'avaient pas d'importance. Deuxièmement, nous étudions la convergence vers l'équilibre concurrentielle et le bien-être social. Nous considérons notamment la vitesse de convergence lorsque le nombre d'entreprises augmente.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[leader's markup discount ratio]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[linear economy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[follower's output index]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[generalized Stackelberg competition]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[razón de descuento del markup del líder]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[economía lineal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[índice de producto del seguidor]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[competencia de Stackelberg generalizada]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[facteurs d'escompte markup]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[économie linéaire]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[modèle généralisé de Stackelberg]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><body><![CDATA[ <p align="right"><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>ARTICLES</b></font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p align="center"><b><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="4">Do Followers Really Matter in Stackelberg Competition?<a href="#*">*</a><a name="*b"></a></font></b></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p align="center"><b><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3">&iquest;Importan realmente los seguidores en la competencia de Stackelberg?</font></b></p>     <p align="center">&nbsp;</p>     <p align="center"><b><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"> Les followers ont-ils vraiment de l'importance dans le mod&egrave;le de Stackelberg?</font></b></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><b><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Ludovic Julien**; Olivier Musy*** and Aur&eacute;lien Sa&iuml;di</font></b>****</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">** Ludovic Alexandre Julien: Professor at Universit&eacute; de Bourgogne; Associate Professor at Universit&eacute; Paris Ouest-Nanterre; Extramural Fellow at IRES, Universit&eacute; Catholique de Louvain. Email address: <a href="mailto:ludovic.julien@u-paris10.fr">ludovic.julien@u-paris10.fr</a>. Postal address: Universit&eacute; de Bourgogne LEG, Bureau 501 2 boulevard Gabriel BP 26611 Dijon C&eacute;dex France. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">*** Olivier Musy: Researcher at EconomiX,   Universit&eacute; Paris Ouest-Nanterre. Email address: <a href="mailto:omusy@u-paris10.fr">omusy@u-paris10.fr</a>. Postal address: Universit&eacute;   Paris Ouest-Nanterre Bureau G517C 200 Avenue de la R&eacute;publique, 92001 Nanterre C&eacute;dex   France. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">**** Aur&eacute;lien W. Sa&iuml;di: Affiliate Professor at Department of Information &amp; Operations   Management, ESCP Europe. Email address: <a href="mailto:asaidi@escpeurope.eu">asaidi@escpeurope.eu</a>. Postal address: Universit&eacute;   Paris Ouest-Nanterre UFR SEGMI Bureau G517C 200 Avenue de la R&eacute;publique 92001 Nanterre   C&eacute;dex France</font><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p align="center"><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>&#8211;Introduction. &#8211;I. The model. &#8211;II. Stackelberg competition in the linear economy. &#8211;III. Implications for convergence and welfare. &#8211;Conclusion. &#8211;Appendix. &#8211;References.</b></font></p>     <p align="center">&nbsp;</p>     <p align="center"><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <i>Primera versi&oacute;n recibida en abril de 2011; versi&oacute;n final aceptada en octubre de 2011</i></font></p>     <p align="center">&nbsp;</p> <hr noshade size="1">     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b>ABSTRACT</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> In this paper, we consider a T-stage linear model of Stackelberg oligopoly. First, we show   geometrically and analytically that under the two conditions of linear market demand and identical constant   marginal costs, the T-stage Stackelberg model reduces to a model where T oligopolies exploit residual demand   sequentially. At any stage, leaders behave as if followers did not matter. Second, we study social welfare and   convergence toward competitive equilibrium. Especially, we consider the velocity of convergence as the number   of firms increases. The convergence is faster when reallocating firms from the most to the less populated cohort   until equalizing the size of all cohorts.  </font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Key words: </b>leader's markup discount ratio, linear economy, follower's output index, generalized Stackelberg competition. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">JEL classification: L13, L20.</font></p> <hr noshade size="1">     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>RESUMEN</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> En este art&iacute;culo se considera un modelo de oligopolio de Stackelberg lineal en T etapas. En   primer lugar, se muestra geom&eacute;trica y anal&iacute;ticamente que bajo las condiciones de demanda de mercado lineal y   costos marginales constantes e id&eacute;nticos el modelo de Stackelberg en T etapas se reduce a un modelo en el que   T firmas explotan la demanda residual secuencialmente. En cualquier etapa, los l&iacute;deres se comportan como   si los seguidores no importaran. En segundo lugar, se estudia el bienestar social y la convergencia hacia el   equilibrio competitivo. En particular, se considera la velocidad de convergencia a medida que el n&uacute;mero de   firmas incrementa. La convergencia es m&aacute;s r&aacute;pida cuando las firmas se relocalizan desde la cohorte m&aacute;s poblada a la menos poblada hasta que el tama&ntilde;o de las cohortes se iguala.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Palabras clave:</b> raz&oacute;n de descuento del markup del l&iacute;der, econom&iacute;a lineal, &iacute;ndice de producto del   seguidor, competencia de Stackelberg generalizada. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Clasificaci&oacute;n JEL: L13, L20.</font></p> <hr noshade size="1">     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>R&Eacute;SUM&Eacute;</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Dans cet article nous consid&eacute;rons un mod&egrave;le lin&eacute;aire d'oligopole de Stackelberg avec T cohortes   o&ugrave; les entreprises ont des strat&eacute;gies en quantit&eacute;. Tout d'abord, nous montrons g&eacute;om&eacute;triquement et   analytiquement que, si la demande de march&eacute; est lin&eacute;aire et les co&ucirc;ts marginaux sont constants et identiques,   le mod&egrave;le de Stackelberg &agrave; T &eacute;tapes se r&eacute;duit &agrave; un mod&egrave;le o&ugrave; T oligopoles exploitent la demande r&eacute;siduelle de   mani&egrave;re s&eacute;quentielle. &Agrave; n'importe quelle &eacute;tape, la strat&eacute;gie des entreprises ne d&eacute;pend ni du nombre   d'entreprises qui jouent apr&egrave;s, ni du nombre de cohortes restantes. Les entreprises leaders se comportent   &quot;comme si&quot; les entreprises suiveuses n'avaient pas d'importance. Deuxi&egrave;mement, nous &eacute;tudions la   convergence vers l'&eacute;quilibre concurrentielle et le bien-&ecirc;tre social. Nous consid&eacute;rons notamment la vitesse de convergence lorsque le nombre d'entreprises augmente.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Mots-cl&eacute;s :</b> facteurs d'escompte markup, &eacute;conomie lin&eacute;aire, mod&egrave;le g&eacute;n&eacute;ralis&eacute; de Stackelberg. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Classification   JEL : L13, L20.</font></p> <hr noshade size="1">     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>INTRODUCTION</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> In the Von Stackelberg (1934) oligopoly model where firms interact in   quantity, firms sequentially choose the quantities to produce and take into   account the impact of their own decisions on the decisions of firms playing   later. The basic model has notably been extended in order to integrate a larger   number of stages and/or players than in the original model (Boyer and Moreaux,   1986; Sherali, 1984; Watt, 2002). An interest of such a structure, which is called   a <i>hierarchy</i>,<sup><a href="#1">1</a><a name="1b"></a></sup> is to introduce heterogeneity between firms according to their   place in the decision process. Several implications have been derived concerning   welfare (Watt, 2002), merging (Daughety, 1990; Heywood and McGinty, 2007, 2008) and profits (Etro, 2008), among others.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> It has been stated by Boyer and Moreaux (1986), Anderson and Engers   (1992) and Pal and Sarkar (2001) that under the two standard assumptions of   linear market demand and identical constant marginal costs, a T-stage Stackelberg   model reduces to a model where T monopolies exploit residual demand   sequentially. Watt (2002) has extended the framework to integrate multiplayer   cohorts.<sup><a href="#2">2</a><a name="2b"></a></sup> These two assumptions constitute the so-called linear model.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we geometrically derive and   generalize the preceding statements, which are specific properties of the linear   model. By contrast with the relevant literature, we provide an explanation for   such a result by showing that leaders behave<i> as if</i> followers did not matter. The   number of remaining stages and/or followers does not qualitatively modify   the optimization program of a firm. A change in the number of stages and/or   followers is embodied in a scale factor that homothetically discounts the objective   profit function of the leaders, reducing profit without altering optimal strategies.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Second, we study the welfare implications of the linear model. Especially,   we define a simple index of social welfare according to the number of firms   and stages and thereby explore the convergence of the economy toward perfect   competition. When the total number of firms in the economy or the number   of firms in a given cohort becomes arbitrarily large, the <i>T</i>-stage Stackelberg   equilibrium converges toward a competitive equilibrium. Furthermore, the   convergence is faster when an additional firm enlarges the hierarchy rather than   an existing cohort.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Our analysis is based on the existence of two scale factors:<i> the leader's markup   discount ratio</i> and <i>the follower's output index</i>. The former represents the reduction   of a leader's markup associated with the existence of his/her followers in the   hierarchy. Its value differs from one cohort to another, depending negatively on   the number of remaining cohorts and corresponding players. The latter represents   the decrease in optimal quantities for a follower resulting from a contraction of   the residual demand when playing latter in the hierarchy. It is a share of the   first cohort production, whether optimal or not. For any follower, this share   decreases when going further in the sequence. Its value depends negatively on   the number of leading cohorts and on the number of corresponding players   (because residual demand decreases with this parameter). Both factors measure   the profit reduction of a firm within the hierarchy and are useful to analyze   social welfare.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> The paper is presented as follows. In section 1, we present the model.   Section 2 analyzes the behavior of the firms under the Stackelberg structure,   and introduces the two kinds of discount factors. Section 3 derives welfare   implications. In the last section, we conclude.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"> <b>I. The Model</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Consider one homogeneous good produced by <i>n</i> firms which oligopolistically   compete in a hierarchical framework. There are<i> T</i>-stages of decisions indexed   by <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e1.jpg"> Each stage embodies one cohort and is associated with a level of   decision. The whole set of cohorts represents a hierarchy. Cohort<i> t</i> is populated   by firms, with <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e2.jpg">. The distribution of the firms within each cohort is   assumed to be observable and exogenous.<sup><a href="#3">3</a><a name="3b"></a></sup> This latter assumption notably   implies that position of firms and timing of moves are given.<sup><a href="#4">4</a><a name="4b"></a></sup></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> A firm <i>i</i> which belongs to cohort<i> t</i> has to decide strategically (simultaneously   with firms of the same cohort, and sequentially among the hierarchy) its level of   output denoted by <i>x<sup>t</sup><sub>i</sub></i> . The aggregate output of cohort <i>t</i> is denoted <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e3.jpg">   where  <i>x<sup>t</sup><sub>i</sub></i>  stands for firm <i>i</i>'s output within cohort<i> t</i>. In addition, <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e4.jpg"> will denote the production of all firms belonging to cohort <i>t</i> but<i> i</i>.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> We consider a linear Stackelberg model. Hence, the inverse market demand   function, which specifies the market price <i>p</i> as a function of aggregate output   X, with <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e5.jpg">, is assumed to be <i>p(X) = a &minus; bX, a, b</i> &gt; 0. In addition, the   cost function of any firm i which belongs to cohort<i> t</i>, is given by  cx<sup>i</sup><sub>t</sub> , i = 1,...,n<sub>t</sub>  and <i>t </i>=1,...,<i>T</i> . These two assumptions are standard in the literature on oligopoly   analysis (see Daughety, 1990; Carlton and Perloff, 1994; Vives, 1999; among others).</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> The  <i>n<sub>t</sub></i> firms which belong to cohort<i> t</i>, behave as followers with respect to   all firms of cohort <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e6.jpg">, whose strategies are taken as given. However,   they behave as Stackelberg leaders toward all firms of cohort <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e7.jpg"> They   consider the best-response functions of all firms belonging to these cohorts as   functions of their strategies. Therefore the profit of firm <i>i</i> which belongs to cohort <i>t</i> may be written:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e8.jpg"></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3">  <b>II. Stackelberg competition in the linear economy</b></font></p>     <p><b><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <i>A. Graphical interpretation</i></font></b><i></i></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Consider two successive stages, say <i>t</i>-1 and <i>t</i>. Let   <img align="middle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e9.jpg"> be the market   price when cohort t enters the market while each cohort <i>&tau;(&tau; &lt; t)</i> produces a   quantity of output<i> X<sub>&tau;</sub></i>. We assume that any leading cohort<i> &tau; &lt; t </i>expects firms   of cohort<i> t</i> (or more) to act rationally and symmetrically. As in the standard   literature, they maximize their profits for any quantity <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e10.jpg"> produced by their   predecessors. In this case, the rational choice of firms is depicted in <a href="#f1">Figure 1</a>.</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> In this <a href="#f1">Figure</a>, we illustrate the behavior of cohort <i>t</i>. Firms in cohort   , behave as Cournotian oligopolists on the residual demand left by firms   of cohorts <i>&tau; (1&lt;&tau; &lt; t )</i>: it is as if they would not take into consideration firms   playing after. So, the equilibrium strategies of firms in the hierarchical model   coincide with those of a multistage Cournot model. Then, for every cohort,   there is an equivalence between the sequential game and the (successive) static   programs. In this paper, we enrich the meaning and implications of property   2, presented as the equivalence of the profit functions in the two models <i>up   to a linear transformation</i>. This implies the equivalence of the reaction functions   in both models and thereafter of the equilibrium strategies (which is then a   consequence rather than a definition of the Cournotian behavior).</font></p>     <p align="center"><a name="f1"></a><img src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2f1.jpg"></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">  <i><b>B. The equivalence between Stackelberg and Cournot behaviors</b></i></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> We now study formally the equivalence between the Stackelberg game and   the successive Cournot games. It requires to exhibit the link between leaders and   followers' profits.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Lemma 1</b> Let <img align="middle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e13.jpg"> be the leader's markup discount ratio. The markup   earned by a cohort t firm, t &lt; T, in a T-cohort economy is a constant share    &gamma;<sub>t</sub> &lt; 1   of the markup it earns in a t-cohort economy for any given vector of outputs   (<i>X<sub>1</sub>,..., X<sub>t&minus;1</sub></i>) produced by the previous cohorts:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e14.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Proof.</b> See <a href="#a1">Appendix A</a>.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Notice that under conditions on costs, the markup is always equal across   cohorts. The discount factor<i> &gamma;<sub>t</sub></i> measures the dependence of market power on   the number of followers. It represents the reduction of markup of any leader   due to the presence of the additional cohorts t +1 to <i>T</i>. It affects less intensively   the market power of the last cohorts in the sequence since they face a reduced   number of followers. Market power shrinks as <i>t</i> tends to infinity. This case will   be discussed in Section 3.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> The existence of cohort<i> &tau;</i> equally impacts by a coefficient 1/(1 +n<sub>&tau;</sub>) the   markup expected by a leader <i>t (t &lt; &tau; )</i> in a <i>t</i>-stage economy, whatever the   quantities produced by the first t cohorts (this results directly from assumptions   on demand and costs).</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Corollary 1.</b> For any strategy <i>x<sup>i</sup><sub>t</sub></i>, the profit obtained by a cohort-t firm   in the sequential T-stage structure is a constant share of the profit earned in a t-stage economy:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e15.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Proof</b>. This corollary directly results from Lemma 1.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> In other words, each cohort can behave as if there were no following   cohorts behind it since it earns a constant share of the profit realized in an   oligopoly structure market where it represents the last cohort, whatever the   aggregate output <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e16.jpg"> produced by the leaders. Provided that cohort-t firms   maximize their profit for any vector of strategies (<i>X<sub>1</sub>,...,  X<sub>t&minus;1</sub></i>), cohort-<i>&tau;</i> leaders   <i>(&tau; &lt; t</i>) act as oligopolists ignoring the following cohorts. The existence of these   additional cohorts does not distort fundamentally the maximization program,   whose objective function (that is the profit function) is only discounted by a   constant parameter. We have called this parameter the leader's markup discount   ratio.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Lemma 2.</b> Let , <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e17.jpg"> be the follower's output index. In this   economy, the output of a firm i in cohort t &le; T can be expressed as a share of   the output produced by a firm playing previously and belonging to cohort t &minus; h for <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e18.jpg">, that is:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e19.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Proof</b>. See <a href="#a2">Appendix B</a>.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> The follower's output index represents the contraction of output resulting   from playing later in the hierarchy. It indicates the share of cohort t-h's output   which is optimal for cohort t to produce.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> From Lemmas 1 and 2, the following proposition can be stated:</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Proposition 1</b>. When the market demand is linear and marginal costs are   identical and constant, any cohort behaves as if followers did not matter. The   T-stage Stackelberg linear economy reduces to a succession of staggered static   problems in which firms compete oligopolistically on residual demands.</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Proof</b>. The proposition directly ensues from Lemmas 1 and 2.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Maximizing the right-hand side of equation (3) (sequential structure   program) is tantamount to maximize the left-hand side of equation (3) since   &gamma;<sub>t</sub>   is a constant term. In the linear economy, strategies of firms do not depend   on the number of firms playing after, which equally impact the profit associated   to each strategy. As a consequence the optimal strategies and the equilibrium   strategies remain unchanged whatever the number of stages and the number of followers in the sequential structure.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> The literature only covers the similarity of the equilibrium strategies in   both the T-stage Stackelberg linear model and the succession of staggered static   problems but does not provide any explanation for this coincidence (see Boyer   and Moreaux, 1986; Anderson and Engers, 1992; Watt, 2002).</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Corollary 2</b> The equilibrium strategy of cohort 1-firms may thus be   obtained from the profit maximization:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e20.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> where<i> X* = (a &minus; c)/b </i>is equal to the perfect competition aggregate output.   We then deduce the equilibrium strategy of any firm <i>i</i> in cohort <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e21.jpg"></font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e22.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Notice that in the equilibrium, each firm of cohort <i>t</i> produces a share &eta;<sub>t</sub> of   the perfect competition equilibrium output.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Corollary 3</b> The equilibrium price and equilibrium profits are given by:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e23.jpg"></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> De Quinto and Watt (2003) use a similar term to &eta;<sub>t</sub> to analyze welfare   through market power and mergers. In our approach, we investigate the issue   of welfare through a comparison with perfect competition representing the maximizing global surplus benchmark case.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"> <b>III. Implications for convergence and welfare</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Social welfare is maximized under perfect competition, that is when   aggregate output is equal to <i>X</i>*. Let <i>&omega;</i> be the index of social welfare. This index,   included between 0 and 1 (maximum welfare), is measured by the sum of the   shares <i>n<sub>&tau;</sub> &eta;<sub>&tau;</sub></i>:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e24.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> It can be asserted from Corollary 2 that the aggregate equilibrium output in   the model is given by <i>&omega;X</i>*.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Lemma 3</b> When the number of firms becomes arbitrarily large, either   vertically (when T tends to infinity) or horizontally (when n<sub>&tau;</sub> tends to infinity),   the oligopoly equilibrium output converges toward the competitive equilibrium output.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Proof</b>. Immediate from <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e25.jpg"></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Convergence toward perfect competition is then achieved through an   increase in the number of cohorts and/or in the number of firms in any cohort.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">  A specific case of vertical convergence can be found in Boyer and Moreaux (1986) for <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e26.jpg">.</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> From the previous lemma we know that welfare can be improved by   increasing the number of firms. When the number of firms is fixed, welfare   can be modified when firms are displaced in the decision sequence, either by   enlarging the hierarchy or changing the size of existing cohorts.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Lemma 4</b> For any given number of firms, a displacement of any firm results   in a higher welfare gain when enlarging the hierarchy rather than modifying the   size of an existing cohort.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Proof</b>. Assume a move of a cohort-t firm within the hierarchy. Let 1   &omega; be the   social welfare index when this moves enlarges the hierarchy (adding a cohort <i>T+1</i>)   and &omega;<sub>2</sub> be the same index when it modifies the size of an existing cohort (say <i>t</i>').</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e27.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> For a constant number of firms, adding new cohorts is always welfare improving.   Said differently, introducing position-based asymmetries is welfare enhancing. It   echoes and generalizes the result of Daughety (1990), which is restricted to <i>T</i>=2.   </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">When both the number of stages and the number of firms are fixed, the   following lemma shows how to improve welfare.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Lemma 5</b> For a fixed number of firms and cohorts, welfare improves as   long as firms are relocated between cohorts until the difference of sizes between   any two cohorts is at most equal to 1. For each relocation, welfare enhancement   is greater when the firm is moved from the largest to the smallest cohort.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Proof</b>. See <a href="#a3">Appendix C.</a></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> It can now be stressed the assumptions upon which positions of firms do   not matter for social welfare, i.e. are invariant to specific modifications in the   decision process. This property is called hierarchy neutrality.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Lemma 6</b> The linear economy is hierarchy neutral when relocation of firms   consists of switching the whole cohorts within the hierarchy: this relocation   does not affect social welfare.</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">  <b>Proof</b>. Immediate: switching <i>n<sub>t</sub></i> and <i>n<sub>t'</sub></i> backward or forward in <i>&eta;<sub>1,T</sub></i> does not   change the value of <i>&omega;</i>.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> From the preceding lemmas, one can state the following proposition relative   to the link between welfare and the structure of the economy.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Proposition 2</b> In this linear economy, maximizing social welfare can be   achieved through two ways:</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> (<i>i</i>) As a priority, by enlarging the hierarchy.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> (<i>ii</i>) Then, by successively relocating firms from the most to the less populated   cohort until equalizing the size of all cohorts.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b>Proof</b>. Proposition 2 ensues from Lemmas 4 to 7.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> This proposition could also be used to analyze how entry affects welfare. If   new firms enter the economy, the increase in welfare is greater if new cohorts   are created rather than if those firms integrate existing cohorts.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"> <b>Conclusion</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> The paper investigates a hierarchic <i>T</i>-stage oligopoly model. It states that   followers do not matter in the linear case, i.e. under constant identical marginal   costs and linear demand. This means that at any stage each firm behaves as a   Cournotian oligopolist on residual demand. In addition, the two discount factors   presented in this paper enable us to characterize to fully characterize the market   outcome of the linear economy, especially in terms of strategies and welfare.</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> In Julien, Musy and Sa&iuml;di (2011), we show that this property holds in the   linear economy exclusively, provided the marginal cost is strictly positive. Once   one of the linear assumptions is relaxed, the results disappear. However, the   linear economy is a useful benchmark to determine the optimal strategies of   firms in more general and complex economies.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3">  <b>References</b></font></p>     <!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Amir, Rabah and Grilo, Isabel (1999). 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''On hierarchical competition   in oligopoly'', <i>mimeo</i>, Universit&eacute; Paris Ouest - Nanterre La Defense (15p).</font>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=000125&pid=S0120-2596201100020000200010&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">  Matsumura, Toshihiro (1999). ''Quantity-setting oligopoly with endogenous   sequencing'', <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i>, Volume 17, Isuue 2,   pp. 289-296.</font>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=000126&pid=S0120-2596201100020000200011&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Pal, Debashis and Sarkar, Jyotirmoy (2001). ''A Stackelberg oligopoly with   nonidentical firms'',<i> Bulletin of Economic Research</i>, Volume 53, Isuue 2, pp. 127-   135.</font>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=000127&pid=S0120-2596201100020000200012&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Sherali, Hanif (1984). 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Market Structure and Equilibrium, Springer,   Berlin.</font>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=000130&pid=S0120-2596201100020000200015&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --><!-- ref --><p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Watt, Richard (2002), ''A generalized oligopoly model'', <i>Metroeconomica</i>, Volume 53,   pp. 46-55.</font>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[&#160;<a href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="javascript: window.open('/scielo.php?script=sci_nlinks&ref=000131&pid=S0120-2596201100020000200016&lng=','','width=640,height=500,resizable=yes,scrollbars=1,menubar=yes,');">Links</a>&#160;]<!-- end-ref --><p>&nbsp;</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"><b>Appendix</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><b><a name="a1">Appendix A.</a> Proof of Lemma 1</b> </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The proof is by backward induction and structured in three steps. </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><u>Step 1</u>: assume equation (2) is true for cohort<i> t = T&minus;1</i> (with <i>T</i> &gt; 1).   </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">The inverse demand function faced by firms (blue line) is defined by:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e28.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">  where   <img align="middle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e29.jpg"> is the aggregate production of cohort <i>&tau;</i>. For any quantity of   output  X<sub>T &minus; 1</sub> produced by cohort <i>T</i>&minus;1, the resulting residual demand faced by   followers of cohort <i>T</i> is:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e30.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> where <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e31.jpg"> is considered as given by followers. Geometrically, followers must   select a couple (<b><i>X, p</i></b>) on the segment [<i><b>D, A</b></i>].</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> When acting symmetrically, the associated marginal revenue of cohort-T firms (red line) is defined by:<sup><a href="#5">5</a><a name="5b"></a></sup></font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e32.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Considering the following derivatives:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e33.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> it comes that:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e34.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Finally, applying Thales' theorem to triangles <i>ABC</i> and <i>ADF</i> leads to:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e35.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Actually, <i>EF</i> is the markup of a leader after the entrance of the last cohort,   while <i>DF</i> is the markup of a leader before the entrance of cohort <i>T</i>. Equation   (A.1) can be rewritten as:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e36.jpg"></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b><u>Step 2</u>:</b> assume equation (2) is true for any cohort <i>t = T &minus; h (1 &le; h &le; T&minus;2) </i>then it is true for cohort<i> T &#8211; h &#8211; 1</i>.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> If equation (2) holds for cohort<b><i> T &minus; h</i></b> then:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e39.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Thus, maximizing firm<i> i</i>'s profit is tantamount to maximize the<i> T</i>&minus;<i>h</i>-stage   profit defined as follows:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e40.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> When firms of cohort <i>T&minus;h</i> act symmetrically, the corresponding marginal revenue (red line) is defined by:<sup><a href="#6">6</a><a name="6b"></a></sup></font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e41.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">In the same way as in step 1, it can be shown that:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e42.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> By assumption, the following property is satisfied:</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e43.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> We deduce from the two previous equations that:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e44.jpg"></p>     <p align="center">&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">  <u>Step 3</u>: from steps 1 and 2 we conclude by backward induction that equation   (2) is true for any cohort t (with 1 &le;<i> t &le; T</i>&minus;1).</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b><a name="a2">Appendix B.</a> Proof of Lemma 2</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Applying Thales' theorem to triangles <i>ABC</i> and <i>ADF</i> leads to:   </font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e46.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Actually, <i>CF</i> is the optimal output produced by cohort <i>t</i>, that is <i>X<sub>t</sub></i>, while <i>AF</i>  is the maximal quantities cohort<i> t</i> can produce to generate non-negative profit   (equal to the difference between the perfect competition equilibrium supply and   the output already produced by the previous cohorts). The property above can   be rewritten as:</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e47.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Notice that AC is also the maximal quantities cohort t + 1 can produce to   generate non-negative profit. Then, equation (B.1) applied to cohorts t and t +   1 becomes:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e48.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> By backward induction, it turns out that:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e49.jpg"></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <b><a name="a3">Appendix C</a>. Proof of Lemma 6</b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Maximizing the welfare index &omega; is tantamount to maximize:</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e50.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Substituting n<sub>T</sub> by <img align="middle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e51.jpg"> into the objective function, deriving with   respect to <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e52.jpg">, and assuming the <i>n'<sub>&tau;</sub>s</i> are infinitely divisible yields the   following first-order conditions:</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e53.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> or equivalently (in addition with the definition of <i>n<sub>T</sub></i>):</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e54.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> Notice that for this value of n&tau; the omitted constraint <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e55.jpg"> is satisfied for any <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e56.jpg">.</font></p>     <p align="center"><img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e57.jpg"></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> where <b><i>I</i></b> is the identity matrix. The eigenvalues of<img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e58.jpg"> and <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e59.jpg"> (the associated eigenspaces have dimension 1 and <i>T</i>&minus;1 respectively).   Matrix <b>M</b> is then negative definite:</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> &bull; The unique solution to the first-order conditions is a global maximum when     <i>n/T</i> is an integer.   </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">&bull; There are multiple optima when <i>n/T</i> is not an integer. Due to the strict   concavity of the objective function, these optima must be as close as possible   to the hypothetical solution above. In other words they must minimize the   distances <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e60.jpg"> The minimum value of   these distances is 1 and can be obtained as follows.   </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Let <i>m &lt; T</i> be an integer such that (<i>n &minus;m</i>)/<i>T </i>= [n/T]. An optimum is such that   there are <i>T&minus;m</i> cohorts populated by [n/T] firms and the other<i> m</i> cohorts by   [n/T] +1 firms. The number of combinations of <i>m</i> cohorts out of <i>T</i> defines   the number of optima.   </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Notice that the most populated cohorts embody one more firm than the less   populated cohorts.</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> When <b><i>n/T</i></b> is not an integer and for given values of the <i>n<sub>&tau;</sub>'s</i>, the more   efficient way to get closer to the hypothetical optimal as one firm is relocated   consists in reducing the largest distance, e.g. <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e61.jpg"> Without loss of generality,   assume that the difference <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e62.jpg">   is positive. Then, it is not efficient for social   welfare to relocate the firm in a cohort <i>t</i>' with <img align="middle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e67.jpg"> since this move decreases  <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e63.jpg">but increases <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e64.jpg">. The firm must be relocated in a cohort <i>&tau;</i> such that   <img align="middle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e68.jpg">. Within this set of cohorts, the cohort with the largest <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e65.jpg"> will be   selected since the reduction of the distance is the highest.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> The argument is similar when the difference <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e66.jpg">   is negative. As a   conclusion, social welfare is more efficiently improved when relocating a firm from the most to the less populated cohort.</font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="3"> <b>NOTAS </b></font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a href="#*b">*</a><a name="*"></a> We are grateful to C. Bidard for his comments and remarks.      </font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a href="#1b">1</a><a name="1"></a> This denomination comes from Boyer and Moreaux (1986).</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a href="#2b">2</a><a name="2"></a> Julien and Musy (2011) develop Watt (2002) by considering various degrees of competition between the followers.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a href="#3b">3</a><a name="3"></a> The standard Stackelberg duopoly prevails when T = 2 and n<sub>1</sub> n<sub>2</sub> = 1 .</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"> <a href="#4b">4</a><a name="4"></a> We therefore do not question the way a specific firm could or should become a leader   (see Anderson and Engers, 1992; Amir and Grilo, 1999; Matsumura, 1999).</font></p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a href="#5b">5</a><a name="5"></a> This function is derived from the total revenue of a follower i: <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e37.jpg">. The symmetric behavior assumed for followers yields: <i>x<sup>i</sup><sub>T</sub> = x<sub>T</sub></i> for all <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e38.jpg">.</font></p>     <p><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2"><a href="#6b">6</a><a name="6"></a> The associated marginal revenue is: <img align="absmiddle" src="img/revistas/le/n75/n75a2e45.jpg"></font></p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>     <p>&nbsp;</p>      ]]></body><back>
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