<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0120-4483</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Ensayos sobre POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Ens. polit. econ.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0120-4483</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Banco de la República]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0120-44832017000300222</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1016/j.espe.2017.11.001</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Análisis empírico de los efectos económicos de la colusión: lecciones para Colombia]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[An empirical analysis of price collusion: Lessons for Colombia]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Flórez Acosta]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Jorge]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gómez Portilla]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Karoll]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad del Rosario  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Nacional de Colombia  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>35</volume>
<numero>84</numero>
<fpage>222</fpage>
<lpage>244</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0120-44832017000300222&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0120-44832017000300222&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0120-44832017000300222&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN Este artículo examina empíricamente los efectos económicos del cartel de los pañales en Colombia. Usando datos de ventas y precios unitarios de pañales por región en Colombia entre 2004 y 2016, se llevan a cabo dos ejercicios empíricos: por un lado, siguiendo la línea de análisis de la Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio, se usan métodos de series de tiempo para estudiar el comportamiento de los precios del mercado entre 2004 y 2016. Los resultados arrojan evidencia mixta acerca del impacto de la conducta colusiva en el mercado. Por otro lado, se estima un modelo estructural de oferta y demanda que permite recuperar costos marginales y márgenes precio-costo de las empresas en la industria. Con base en simulación de escenarios hipotéticos que van desde una competencia más intensa a la observada, hasta un caso de colusión perfecta, se muestra que la industria presenta cifras en el período colusivo que se acercan más a un referente competitivo que a uno de coordinación perfecta. Los resultados sugieren una posible falla en la coordinación entre las empresas del cartel. Códigos JEL: L1, L4, L6, C3.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT This paper empirically examines the economic effects of the so-called the baby diapers cartel in Colombia. We use data on quantities sold and unit prices of diapers at the region level in the period 2004-2016, and we carry out two exercises: first, following the line of analysis of the Colombian competition authority, we use time-series methods to analyze market prices between 2004 and 2016. Results suggest mixed evidence on the impact of the collusive behavior on the market. In a second exercise, we estimate a structural model of supply and demand that allows us to regain marginal costs and price-cost margins of the firms in the industry. Based on simulations of counterfactual scenarios ranging from more intense competition to perfect collusion, we show that the industry numbers in the cartel period are closer to a competitive scenario rather than to a collusive one. Our results suggest that a coordination failure between the firms in the cartel may have taken place. JEL classification: L1, L4, L6, C3.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Colusión]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Carteles]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Poder de mercado]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Análisis de series de tiempo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Estimación estructural de demanda]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Collusion]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Cartels]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Market power]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Time series analysis]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Structural estimation of demand]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
<ref-list>
<ref id="B1">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Abrantes-Metz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R. M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Froeb]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L. M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Geweke]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Taylor]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.T]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A variance screen for collusion]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[International Journal of Industrial Organization]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<volume>24</volume>
<page-range>467-86</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B2">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bejger]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Econometric tools for detection of collusion equilibrium in the industry]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Dynamic Econometric Models]]></source>
<year>2010</year>
<volume>10</volume>
<page-range>34-45</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B3">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bejger]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Polish cement industry cartel: preliminary examination of collusion existence]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Business and Economic Horizons]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<volume>4</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>88-107</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B4">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Berry]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The RAND Journal of Economics]]></source>
<year>1994</year>
<volume>25</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>242-62</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B5">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Berry]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Levinsohn]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pakes]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Automobile prices in market equilibrium]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Econometrica]]></source>
<year>1995</year>
<volume>63</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>841-90</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B6">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Blanckenburg]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K. V.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Geist]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[How can a cartel be detected?]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[International Advances in Economic Research]]></source>
<year>2009</year>
<volume>15</volume>
<page-range>421-36</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B7">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bolotova]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Y.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Connor]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J. M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Miller]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.J]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The impact of collusion on price behavior: Empirical results from two recent cases]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[International Journal of Industrial Organization]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<volume>26</volume>
<page-range>1290-307</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B8">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bonnet]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dubois]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[RAND Journal of Economics]]></source>
<year>2010</year>
<volume>41</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>139-64</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B9">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bonnet]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dubois]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Villas-Boas]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Klapper]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Empirica evidence on the role of nonlinear wholesale pricing and vertical restraints on cost pass-through]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The Review of Economics and Statistics]]></source>
<year>2013</year>
<volume>95</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>500-15</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B10">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Carlson]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[McAfee]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Discrete equilibrium price dispersion]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Political Economy]]></source>
<year>1983</year>
<volume>91</volume>
<page-range>480-93</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B11">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Carlton]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.W]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The rigidity of prices]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[American Economic Review]]></source>
<year>1986</year>
<volume>76</volume>
<page-range>637-58</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B12">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Chamberlain]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dubois]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Griffith]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[O'Connell]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The effects of banning advertising in junk food markets]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Review of Economic Studies, próxima aparición]]></source>
<year>2017</year>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B13">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Connor]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J. M]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Collusion and price dispersion]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Applied Economics Letters]]></source>
<year>2005</year>
<volume>12</volume>
<page-range>335-8</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B14">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ellison]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Theories of cartel stability and the joint executive committee]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[RAND Journal of Economics]]></source>
<year>1994</year>
<volume>25</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>37-57</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B15">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Feinstein]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Block]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Nold]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Asymmetric information and collusive behaviour in auction markets]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[America Economic Review]]></source>
<year>1985</year>
<volume>75</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>441-60</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B16">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Genesove]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Mullin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[W]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Rules, communication and collusion: Narrative evidence from the sugar institute case]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[American Economic Review]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<volume>91</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>379-98</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B17">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Goldberg]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hellerstein]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A structural approach to identifying the sources of local currency price stability]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Review of Economic Studies]]></source>
<year>2013</year>
<volume>80</volume>
<page-range>175-210</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B18">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Green]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E. J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Porter]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R. H]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Econometrica]]></source>
<year>1984</year>
<volume>52</volume>
<page-range>87-100</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B19">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Haltinwanger]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Harrington]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J. E]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behaviour]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[RAND Journal of Economics]]></source>
<year>1991</year>
<volume>22</volume>
<page-range>89-106</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B20">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Harrington]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Optimal cartel pricing in the presence of an Antitrust Authority]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[International Economic Review]]></source>
<year>2005</year>
<volume>46</volume>
<page-range>145-69</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B21">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Harrington]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Detecting cartels]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Buccirossi]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Paolo]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Handbook in Antitrust Economics]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[MIT Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B22">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Harrington]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hernan Gonzalez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kujal]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The relative efficacy of price announcements and express communication for collusion: Experimental findings]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization]]></source>
<year>2016</year>
<volume>128</volume>
<page-range>251-64</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B23">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hausman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Valuation of new goods under perfect and imperfect competition]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bresnahan]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gordon]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Economics of New Goods, Studies in Income and Wealth]]></source>
<year>1996</year>
<volume>58</volume>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Chicago ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[National Bureau of Economic Research]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B24">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[LaCasse]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Bid rigging and the threat of government prosecution]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[RAND Journal of Economics]]></source>
<year>1995</year>
<volume>26</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>398-417</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B25">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Maier-Rigaud]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F. P.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Friederiszick]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H. W]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Role of Economics in Cartel Detection in Europe]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Schmidtchen]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Albert]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Voigt]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The More Economic Approach To European Competition Law]]></source>
<year>2007</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Tübingen ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Mohr Siebeck]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B26">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Motta]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Competition Policy Theory and Practice]]></source>
<year>2004</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[New York ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Cambridge University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B27">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Nevo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A practitioner's guide to estimation of random-coefficients Logit models of demand]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Economics and Management Strategy]]></source>
<year>2000</year>
<month>a</month>
<volume>9</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>513-48</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B28">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Nevo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Mergers with differentiated products: The case of the ready-to-eat cereal industry]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[RAND Journal of Economics]]></source>
<year>2000</year>
<month>b</month>
<volume>31</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>395-421</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B29">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Nevo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Measuring market power in the ready-to-eat cereal industry]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Econometrica]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<volume>69</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>307-42</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B30">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Porter]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A study of cartel stability: The joint executive committee, 1880-1886]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The Bell Journal of Economics]]></source>
<year>1983</year>
<volume>14</volume>
<page-range>3001-314</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B31">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rotemberg]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J. J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Saloner]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A supergame-theoretic model of price wars during booms]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[American Economic Review]]></source>
<year>1986</year>
<volume>76</volume>
<page-range>390-407</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B32">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Stigler]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A theory of oligopoly]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Political Economy]]></source>
<year>1964</year>
<volume>72</volume>
<page-range>44-61</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B33">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<collab>Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio</collab>
<source><![CDATA[Informe Motivado 13-266923, «Caso Pañales»]]></source>
<year>2016</year>
<month>a</month>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B34">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<collab>Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio</collab>
<source><![CDATA[Resolución 31739 del 26 de mayo de 2016]]></source>
<year>2016</year>
<month>b</month>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
