<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0120-4688</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Praxis Filosófica]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Prax. filos.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0120-4688</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad del Valle]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0120-46882017000100013</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[MCDOWELL: PASIVIDAD, CONTENIDO Y PERCEPCIÓN]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Mcdowell: passivity, content and perception]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ordóńez Pinilla]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Camilo Andrés]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad El Bosque Grupo de Investigación Analima ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Bogotá ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>44</numero>
<fpage>13</fpage>
<lpage>36</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0120-46882017000100013&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0120-46882017000100013&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0120-46882017000100013&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En su libro Mind and World, John McDowell propone una caracterización de la percepción como un proceso cognitivo pasivo. En el presente texto quisiera mostrar que tal caracterización tiene un problema fundamental: implicaría que la percepción no tiene contenido, atendiendo al modelo mcdowelliano de la intencionalidad. Dado que tal consecuencia es indeseable en el proyecto filosófico de McDowell, esto mostraría que existe una tensión lógica y conceptual entre la concepción de McDowell de la experiencia como un proceso pasivo y su concepción de las condiciones para el contenido. Para cumplir este objetivo, primero explicaré qué significa sostener que la percepción es pasiva, en el sentido en el que lo afirma McDowell. Segundo, propondré que si uno asume el modelo mcdowelliano de la intencionalidad, el contenido y la pasividad, no parecer ser posible que la percepción sea al mismo tiempo tanto pasiva como un estado con contenido (i.e. un estado intencional).]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract In his book Mind and World, John McDowell proposes a characterization of perception as a passive cognitive process. In this text I want to show that such characterization has a fundamental problem: it would imply that perception has not content, according to McDowell&#8217;s model of intentionality. Since such consequence is undesirable in McDowell&#8217;s philosophical project, this would show that there is a logical tension between McDowell&#8217;s conception of experience as a passive process and his conception of the conditions for content. In order to achieve this goal, first, I will explain what means to sustain that perception is passive, in McDowell&#8217;s sense. Second, I will propose that if McDowell&#8217;s model of intentionality, content and passivity is assumed, it would not be possible that perception be both passive and contentful (i.e. an intentional state).]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[percepción]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[pasividad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contenido]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[intencionalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[perception]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[passivity]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[content]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[intentionality]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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