<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0120-5323</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Universitas Philosophica]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Univ. philos.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0120-5323</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, D.C., Colombia.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0120-53232017000100017</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.11144/Javeriana.uph34-68.deac</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[DESCARTES Y LAS ESTRATEGIAS ANTIESCÉPTICAS CONTEMPORÁNEAS]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[DESCARTES AND CONTEMPORARY ANTI-SKEPTICAL STRATEGIES]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gómez-Alonso]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Modesto]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Salamanca ]]></addr-line>
<country>Spain</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>34</volume>
<numero>68</numero>
<fpage>17</fpage>
<lpage>37</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0120-53232017000100017&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0120-53232017000100017&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0120-53232017000100017&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN Uno de los cargos habituales contra el proyecto epistemológico cartesiano consiste en señalar que su principal objetivo (la superación de la duda escéptica) y los medios para alcanzarlo (la duda metódica) son incompatibles, de forma que el método bloquea ab initio su propia función. En este artículo argumento que dicha acusación solo es plausible al precio de ignorar tanto la naturaleza terapéutica del método cartesiano como los procedimientos concretos que Descartes emplea para alcanzar una posición epistémica desde la que las hipótesis escépticas radicales dejan de tener sentido. La estrategia antiescéptica cartesiana compite con ventaja con procedimientos rivales contemporáneos, se trate de estrategias externistas de orden revisionista o de estrategias de minimización del escepticismo que acentúen el carácter a-racional de nuestras creencias fundacionales.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT It is usual to claim that Descartes&#8217; epistemological project is such that its main objective (overturning the doubts of the sceptics) and the means to attain it (the method of doubt) are incompatible, so that Descartes necessarily blocks his own project. In this paper I argue that the above opinion comes from a blindness of sorts that prevents us from appreciating both the therapeutical nature of Descartes&#8217; method and the specific procedures that he uses to work himself into a position from which radical sceptical hypotheses no longer make sense. Far from obsolete, Descartes&#8217; strategy fares much better in terms of overcoming radical scepticism than contemporary rival approaches, whether they are overriding strategies or undercutting procedures that, stressing the groundless character of our basic beliefs, fall prey to the bewitchment of scepticism.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[escepticismo radical]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[escepticismo terapéutico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[hacedores de verdad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[norma de la creencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[paradojas escépticas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[norm of belief]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[radical scepticism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[sceptical paradoxes]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[therapeutical scepticism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[truthmakers]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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