<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0120-8942</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Díkaion]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Díkaion]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0120-8942</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad de la Sabana]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0120-89422018000100007</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.5294/dika.2018.27.1.1</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD Y LEGITIMIDAD POLÍTICA]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[JUDICIAL REVIEW AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[CONTROLE DE CONSTITUCIONALIDADE E LEGITIMIDADE POLÍTICA]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Waldron]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Jeremy]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,New York University School of Law ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>USA</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>27</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<fpage>7</fpage>
<lpage>28</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0120-89422018000100007&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0120-89422018000100007&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0120-89422018000100007&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Este artículo analiza la relación entre el control judicial de constitucionalidad y la legitimidad política entendida como la capacidad de un sistema político y jurídico de generar respaldo para la implementación de las leyes y políticas, incluso por parte de aquellos que se opusieron a estas por razones sustanciales. El artículo señala que a pesar de que existen diferentes modalidades de control judicial, así como diversas y respetables clases de legitimidad que se derivan de la función judicial, el control de constitucionalidad no está diseñado para producir legitimidad política. En tal sentido, y ante la imposibilidad de solventar esta dificultad democrática, se propone una serie de mecanismos para mitigarla como es el caso de la exigencia de supermayorías para decidir, la necesidad de contar con una presunción fuerte de constitucionalidad y la obligación de ofrecer razones que aborden explícitamente las preocupaciones democráticas. Finalmente, el artículo hace un llamado a la civilidad en el litigio constitucional, con el fin de evitar la demonización del oponente y abrir espacios de legitimidad política en el control de constitucionalidad.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract This article analyzes the relationship between a judicial review of legislation and the principle of political legitimacy understood as the capacity of a legal and political system to generate support for the implementation of laws and policies, even among those who are opposed to them on their merits. The article claims that, despite the existence of multiple forms of judicial review, as well as diverse and respectable sources of legitimacy, judicial review is not designed to generate political legitimacy. In this sense, given the impossibility of solving this &#8216;democratic difficulty,&#8217; the article proposes different approaches that might help to mitigate it, as is the case of judicial super-majorities to strike down legislation, following a strong presumption of constitutionality or offering explicit reasons for addressing these democratic concerns. Finally, the article calls for civility in constitutional litigation in order to prevent demonization of the opponent and to open the door to political legitimacy in the context of judicial review.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo Este artigo analisa a relação entre o controle judicial de constitucionalidade e a legitimidade política entendida como a capacidade de um sistema político e jurídico de gerar respaldo para a implementação das leis e políticas, inclusive por parte daqueles que se opuseram a elas por razões substanciais. O artigo aponta que, apesar de existirem diferentes modalidades de controle judicial, assim como diversas e respeitáveis classes de legitimidade que derivam da função judicial, o controle de constitucionalidade não foi traçado para produzir legitimidade política. Nesse sentido, e diante da impossibilidade de solucionar essa dificuldade democrática, propõe-se uma série de mecanismos para mitigá-la, como é o caso da exigência de supermaiorias para decidir, a necessidade de contar com uma forte presunção de constitucionalidade e a obrigação de oferecer razões que abordem explicitamente as preocupações democráticas. Finalmente, o artigo faz um chamado à civilidade no litígio constitucional, com o objetivo de evitar a demonização do oponente e abrir espaços de legitimidade política no controle de constitucionalidade.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Control de constitucionalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[legitimidad política]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[democracia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[derecho constitucional]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[cortes constitucionales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Judicial review]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[political legitimacy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[democracy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[constitutional law]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[constitutional courts]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Controle de constitucionalidade]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[cortes constitucionais]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[democracia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[direito constitucional]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[legitimidade política.]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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</back>
</article>
