<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0121-182X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Prolegómenos]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Prolegómenos]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0121-182X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Militar Nueva Granada]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0121-182X2021000100055</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18359/prole.4722</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Is Consumer Welfare Obsolete? A European Union Competition Perspective]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[¿Es obsoleto el bienestar del consumidor? Una perspectiva de la competencia en la Unión Europea]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[O bem-estar do consumidor se tornou obsoleto? Uma perspectiva de concorrência da União Europeia]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Marty]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Frédéric]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Université Côte d'Azur  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Valbonne ]]></addr-line>
<country>France</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2021</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2021</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>24</volume>
<numero>47</numero>
<fpage>55</fpage>
<lpage>78</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0121-182X2021000100055&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0121-182X2021000100055&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0121-182X2021000100055&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: in 2005, the European Commission advocated for a more economic approach to enforcing competition laws. The sole criterion for assessing the lawfulness of a market practice should be the appraisal of its net effects on consumer welfare. The Court of Justice was reluctant to adopt such an approach until its 2017 Intel Judgment. Its endorsement-which is debatable insofar as the judgment may give rise to different interpretations-may appear paradoxical in that it is concomitant with a sharp challenge to the consumer welfare criterion in the United States. The purpose of this article is to retrace the history of this criterion, particularly its adoption in the context of EU competition law. We aim to show that the criticisms of the effects-based approach can be addressed not by moving away from the consumer welfare criterion but by integrating it into a broader perspective that also takes into account the protection of the competition process itself.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: en 2005, la Comisión Europea abogó por un enfoque más económico de la aplicación de las leyes de competencia. El único criterio para evaluar la legalidad de una práctica de mercado debe ser la evaluación de sus efectos netos sobre el bienestar de los consumidores. El Tribunal de Justicia se mostró reacio a adoptar este enfoque hasta la sentencia de Intel de 2017. Su aprobación -que es discutible en la medida en que la sentencia puede dar lugar a diferentes interpretaciones- puede parecer paradójica en el medida en que es concomitante con un fuerte desafío al criterio del bienestar del consumidor en los Estados Unidos. La finalidad de este artículo es volver sobre la historia de este criterio, en particular en su adopción en el contexto de la ley de competencia de la UE. Nuestro objetivo es demostrar que las críticas al enfoque basado en los efectos pueden abordarse sin alejarse del criterio de bienestar del consumidor, sino integrándolo en una perspectiva más amplia que también tenga en cuenta la protección del propio proceso de competencia.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo: em 2005, a Comissão Europeia advogou por uma abordagem mais econômica da aplicação das leis de concorrência. O único critério para avaliar a legalidade de uma prática de mercado deve ser a avaliação de seus efeitos líquidos sobre o bem-estar dos consumidores. O Tribunal de Justiça se mostrou relutante a adotar essa abordagem até a sentença da Intel de 2017. Sua aprovação, que é discutível na medida em que a sentença pode dar espaço a diferentes interpretações, pode parecer paradoxal, visto que é concomitante com um forte desafio para o critério do bem-estar do consumidor nos Estados Unidos. O objetivo deste artigo é voltar à história desse critério, em particular sua adoção no contexto da lei de concorrência da União Europeia. Além disso, demonstrar que as críticas à abordagem baseada nos efeitos podem ser tratadas ao não nos afastarmos do critério de bem-estar do consumidor, mas sim integrando-o numa perspectiva mais ampla que também considere a proteção do próprio processo de concorrência.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[anti-competitive practices]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[effects-based approach]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[consumer welfare]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[ordoliberalism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[European Union competition law]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[prácticas anticompetitivas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[enfoque basado en los efectos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[bienestar del consumidor]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[ordoliberalismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[derecho de la competencia de la Unión Europea]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[práticas anticoncorrenciais]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[abordagem baseada em efeitos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[bem-estar do consumidor]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[ordoliberalismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[direito da concorrência da União Europeia]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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