<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0121-3628</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Estudios de Filosofía]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Estud.filos]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0121-3628</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad de Antioquia.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0121-36282019000100167</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.17533/udea.ef.n59a08</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The priority of propositional justification]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[La prioridad de la justificación proposicional]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Demircioglu]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Erhan]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Koç University Departamento de Filosofía ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Estambul ]]></addr-line>
<country>Turkey</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>59</numero>
<fpage>167</fpage>
<lpage>182</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0121-36282019000100167&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0121-36282019000100167&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0121-36282019000100167&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract. Turri argues against what he calls an &#8220;orthodox&#8221; view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified in believing p that p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of having reason(s) R and S believes p on the basis of R. According to Turri, (Basis) is false and hence the orthodox view is wrong. Turri offers &#8220;an alternative proposal,&#8221; the definitive thesis is that the subject&#8217;s intellectual abilities explain why a given proposition, p, is justified for her, and argues that, contra the orthodoxy, this proposal leads to explaining propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification rather than vice versa. In this paper, I argue for the following claims: (i) There are good reasons to think that Turri misidentifies &#8220;the orthodox view&#8221; and his objection thereby misfires, (ii) even if we assume that Turri&#8217;s identification of the orthodox view is correct, his counter-examples to that view are far from being decisive, and (iii) Turri&#8217;s own proposal is not &#8220;an alternative&#8221; to the orthodox view but can be accommodated by it.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen. Turri argumenta en contra de lo que él llama una visión &#8220;ortodoxa&#8221; de la relación entre la justificación proposicional y doxástica, según la cual (Basis) para que S esté doxásticamente justificado al creer que p es suficiente que p esté justificado proposicionalmente para S en virtud de tener una razón R y que S crea que p sobre la base de R. Según Turri, (Base) es falsa y, por lo tanto, la opinión ortodoxa es errónea. Turri ofrece &#8220;una propuesta alternativa&#8221;, cuya tesis definitiva es que las habilidades intelectuales del sujeto explican por qué una proposición dada, p, está justificada para ella, y argumenta que, en contra de la ortodoxia, esta propuesta lleva a explicar la justificación proposicional en términos de justificación doxástica en lugar de viceversa. En este documento, defiendo las siguientes afirmaciones: (i) Hay buenas razones para pensar que Turri identifica erróneamente &#8220;la visión ortodoxa&#8221; y, por lo tanto, su objeción falla, (ii) incluso si asumimos que la identificación de Turri de la visión ortodoxa es correcta, sus contra-ejemplos de esa visión distan mucho de ser decisivos, y (iii) la propuesta de Turri no es &#8220;una alternativa&#8221; a la visión ortodoxa; esta puede ser acomodada por ella.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[epistemic justification]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[propositional justification]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[doxastic justification]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[the epistemic basing relation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[John Turri]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[justificación epistémica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[justificación proposicional]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[justificación doxástica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[la relación de base epistémica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[John Turri]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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