<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0121-3628</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Estudios de Filosofía]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Estud.filos]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0121-3628</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad de Antioquia.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0121-36282022000100089</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.17533/udea.ef.345775</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Does autonomous moral reasoning favor consequentialism?]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[¿Favorece el razonamiento moral autónomo el consecuencialismo?]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Turan]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Caner]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Tulane University  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[New Orleans ]]></addr-line>
<country>USA</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>65</numero>
<fpage>89</fpage>
<lpage>111</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0121-36282022000100089&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0121-36282022000100089&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0121-36282022000100089&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract. This paper addresses an important issue that has been commonly debated in moral psychology, namely the normative and metaethical implications of our differing intuitive responses to morally indistinguishable dilemmas. The prominent example of the asymmetry in our responses is that people often intuitively accept pulling a switch and deny pushing as a morally permissible way of sacrificing an innocent person to save more innocent people. Joshua Greene traces our negative responses to actions involving &#8220;up close and personal&#8221; harm back to our evolutionary past and argues that this undermines the normative power of deontological judgments. I reject Greene&#8217;s argument by arguing that our theoretical moral intuitions, as opposed to concrete and mid-level ones, are independent of direct evolutionary influence because they are the product of autonomous (gene-independent) moral reasoning. I then explain how both consequentialist and deontological theoretical intuitions, which enable us to make important moral distinctions and grasp objective moral facts, are produced by the exercise of autonomous moral reasoning and the process of cultural evolution. My conclusion will be that Greene is not justified in his claim that deontology is normatively inferior to consequentialism.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen. Este artículo aborda una cuestión importante que ha sido comúnmente debatida en la psicología moral, a saber, las implicaciones normativas y metaéticas de nuestras diferentes respuestas intuitivas a dilemas moralmente indistintos. El ejemplo más destacado de la asimetría en nuestras respuestas es que la gente suele aceptar in- tuitivamente halar y niega empujar como una forma moralmente permisible de sacrificar a un inocente para salvar a más personas inocentes. Joshua Greene atribuye nuestras respuestas negativas a las acciones que implican un daño &#8220;cercano y personal&#8221; a nuestro pasado evolutivo y argumenta que esto socava el poder normativo de los juicios deontológicos. Rechazo el argumento de Greene argumentando que nuestras intuiciones morales teóricas, a diferencia de las concretas y de nivel medio, son independientes de la influencia evolutiva directa porque son el producto de un razonamiento moral autónomo (independiente de los genes). A continuación, explico cómo las intuiciones teóricas consecuencialistas y deontológicas, que nos permiten hacer importantes dis- tinciones morales y captar hechos morales objetivos, son producidas por el ejercicio del razonamiento moral autónomo y el proceso de evolución cultural. Mi conclusión será que Greene no está justificado en su afirmación de que la deontología es normativamente inferior al consecuencialismo.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[metaethics]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[moral psychology]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[moral intuitions]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[trolley cases]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[moral reasoning]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[cultural evolution]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[metaética]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[psicología moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[intuiciones morales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[dilema del tranvía]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[razonamiento moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[evolución cultural]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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