<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0121-4772</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Cuadernos de Economía]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Cuad. Econ.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0121-4772</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional de Colombia]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0121-47722013000300007</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[A CHARACTERIZATION OF HEIGHT-BASED EXTENSIONS OF PRINCIPAL FILTRAL OPPORTUNITY RANKINGS]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Vannucci]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Stefano]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="A01"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="A01">
<institution><![CDATA[,University of Siena Department of Economics and Statistics ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2013</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2013</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>32</volume>
<numero>spe61</numero>
<fpage>803</fpage>
<lpage>815</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0121-47722013000300007&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0121-47722013000300007&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0121-47722013000300007&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[A parameterized characterization of height-based total extensions of principal filtral opportunity rankings is provided and shown to include, as a special case, a version of the well-known Pattanaik-Xu characterization of the cardinality-based ranking.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Se presenta una caracterización parametrizada de las extensiones totales basadas en altura, de los ordenamientos de oportunidad de filtro principal, y se demuestra que incluye, como caso especial, una versión de la reconocida caracterización de Pattanaik-Xu sobre el ordenamiento basado en la cardinalidad.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="fr"><p><![CDATA[Est présentée une caractérisation paramétrique des extensions totales, basées sur la hauteur, des ordonnancements d'opportunité de filtre principal, et il est démontré que cela inclut, comme cas spécial, une version de la fameuse caractérisation de Pattanaik-Xu sur l'ordonnancement basé sur la cardinalité]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Opportunity sets]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[height]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[inequality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[conjuntos de oportunidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[altura]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[desigualdad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[ensembles d'opportunité]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[hauteur]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[inégalité.]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><body><![CDATA[  <font face="Verdana" size="3"><b>    <p align="center">A CHARACTERIZATION OF HEIGHT-BASED EXTENSIONS OF PRINCIPAL FILTRAL OPPORTUNITY RANKINGS</p></b></font></p> <font face="Verdana"size="2">    <p align="right"><b>Stefano Vannucci<sup><a name="nrl"><a href="#1">1</a></a></sup></b></p>     <p><a name="1"><a href="#nr1">1</a></a> Professor Stefano Vannucci, Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Siena, Piazza S.Francesco 7, Siena (Italy).</p> <hr/>     <p><b>Abstract</b></p>     <p><i>A parameterized characterization of height-based total extensions of principal filtral opportunity rankings is provided and shown to include, as a special case, a version of the well-known Pattanaik-Xu characterization of the cardinality-based ranking.</i></p>     <p><b>Keywords:</b> Opportunity sets, height, inequality.</p> <b><b>JEL:</b> D71, 025.</b>     <p><b>Abstract</b></p>     <p><i>Se presenta una caracterizaci&oacute;n parametrizada de las extensiones totales basadas en altura, de los ordenamientos de oportunidad de filtro principal, y se demuestra que incluye, como caso especial, una versi&oacute;n de la reconocida caracterizaci&oacute;n de Pattanaik-Xu sobre el ordenamiento basado en la cardinalidad.</i></p>     <p><b>Palabras clave: </b>conjuntos de oportunidad, altura, desigualdad.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><b>JEL:</b> D71, 025.</p>     <p><b>R&eacute;sum&eacute;</b></p>     <p><i>Est pr&eacute;sent&eacute;e une caract&eacute;risation param&eacute;trique des extensions totales, bas&eacute;es sur la hauteur, des ordonnancements d'opportunit&eacute; de filtre principal, et il est d&eacute;montr&eacute; que cela inclut, comme cas sp&eacute;cial, une version de la fameuse caract&eacute;risation de Pattanaik-Xu sur l'ordonnancement bas&eacute; sur la cardinalit&eacute;.</i></p>     <p><b>Mots-cl&eacute;s :</b> ensembles d'opportunit&eacute;, hauteur, in&eacute;galit&eacute;.</p>     <p><b>JEL :</b> D71, 025.</p>     <p>Este art&iacute;culo fue recibido el 6 de junio de 2013, ajustado el 12 de diciembre de 2013 y su publicaci&oacute;n aprobada el 15 de diciembre de 2013.</p> <hr> <font size="3">    <p><b>INTRODUCTION</b></p></font>     <p>In the last two decades, a considerable amount of work has been devoted to the analysis of opportunity inequality and related issues concerning rankings of opportunity sets (see e.g. Alcalde-Unzu & Ballester, 2005; Alcalde-Unzu & Ballester, 2010; Arlegi & Nieto, 1999; Barber&agrave;, Bossert & Pattanaik, 2004; Dutta & Sen, 1996; Herrero, 1997; Herrero, Iturbe-Ormaetxe & Nieto, 1998; Kolm, 2010; Kranich, 1996; Kranich, 1997; Ok, 1997; Ok & Kranich, 1998; Pattanaik & Xu, 1990; Pattanaik & Xu, 2000; Savaglio & Vannucci, 2007; Savaglio & Vannucci, 2009; Sen, 1991; Xu, 2004, among many others). In particular, Savaglio and Vannucci (2007) suggest the introduction of minimal opportunity thresholds, modelling them by <i>set-inclusion filtral preorders</i>.</p>     <p>A <i>set-inclusion filtral preorder</i> on a finite set X of basic opportunities amounts to the standard set-inclusion partial order as augmented with a <i>minimal opportunity threshold</i> which is induced by an <i>order-filter</i> (to be defined below). Under the threshold, opportunity sets are indifferent to each other and to the null opportunity set, whereas, over the <i>threshold the set-inclusion partial order is simply replicated</i>. Therefore, the behaviour of a set-inclusion filtral preorder (henceforth SIFP) over the threshold is arguably <i>non-controversial</i>, at least in the following sense: if over the threshold, plausible preferences on opportunity sets are taken to be monotonic with respect to set-inclusion, SIFPs include their common core. On the other hand, since the threshold itself can be chosen in many different ways, SIFPsâ€”unlike e.g. the cardinality preorderâ€”also accommodate a non-negligible diversity of judgments concerning the most appropriate ranking of opportunity sets. Thus, SIFPs can be regarded as a format for opportunity rankings that, building upon a common and essentially `objective' basis, gives some scope to a modicum of diversity in judgments, and therefore strikes a balance between any such judgment and the former common basis. Distinct choices of the relevant threshold enable an assessment of the extent of opportunity deprivation as seen from different perspectives. Furthermore, SIFPs are amenable to nice <i>and strategy-proof </i>aggregation methods including majority voting (see Savaglio & Vannucci, 2012; Vannucci, 1999). Therefore, even the threshold of any given SIFP may be possibly regarded as the outcome of a fair amalgamation of reliable information on <i>private judgments of experts and/or stakeholders concerning the most appropriate choice of minimal living standards.</i> Indeed, under a judicious selection of the set of basic opportunities, SIFPs arguably embody valuable information that is both reliable and comparatively easy to collect. That information can be deployed to assess several aspects of extant inequality and its social perception e.g. by majorization criteria. The implied assessments of the relevant opportunity distributions in terms of inequality and deprivation may in turn <i>help diagnose those critical situations of severe inequality and polarization that could strain and erode several key social networks, and undermine social cohesion.</i> All in all, carefully constructed SIFPs may arguably provide a key source of reliable <i>and</i> comparatively affordable information to several public and private agencies.</p>     <p>However, when it comes to using SIFPs as a key input for the assessment of opportunity inequality and polarization, one has to reckon with the central role of <i>majorization rankings</i> in the analysis of inequality. Hence, if inequality of opportunity profiles is to be assessed relying on a suitable <i>majorization preorder</i>, the very fact that a SIFP is, in general, a <i>non-total</i> preorder is undoubtedly a rather fastidious inconvenience. Two basic strategies may be devised to escape the foregoing difficulty while sticking to the notion of a majorization preorder, namely &alpha;) reformulating (and generalizing) the majorization construct in order to adapt it to the general case of arbitrary non-total preorders, or &beta;) extending SIFPs to <i>total</i> preorders in a suitably 'natural' manner.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>Strategy (&alpha;) is quite radical a move. Indeed, the main problem here is that majorizationâ€”as it is usually conceivedâ€”relies on comparisons between suitable sequences of pairs of partial <i>numerical sums</i> running over pairs of (&alpha;) <i>equally sized subpopulations</i>, each of which (&beta;) forms a <i>maximal chain</i> with respect to the ranking of population units as induced by their respective individual endowments. Now, if the underlying preorder in endowment space is <i>partial</i> a typical joint effect of requirements (&alpha;) and (&beta;) will consist in singling out <i>distinct numbers of relevant partial sums at different opportunity profiles</i>. But then, which partial sum of one opportunity profile should be compared to which partial sum of another one? It can be shown that, essentially, such a situation demands some special principled tactics to cope with pairs of non-isomorphic lattices of order filters as defined below. Thus, such an approach runs deep to the very foundations of the majorization construct.</p>     <p>By comparison, strategy (&beta;) namely extending SIFPs to <i>total</i> preorders is much more conservative. One way to pursue strategy (&beta;) is implicitly proposed and explored in Savaglio and Vannucci (2007). It consists in relying on the height function of a SIFP in order to extend the latter to a total preorder, resulting in the 'higher than' relation. Now, the height of an element <i>x</i> counts the size of the longest strictly ascending chain having x as its maximum. Does this notion qualify as a 'natural' extension of the underlying SIFP?</p>     <p>In general, the answer is admittedly bound to be disputable. In fact, the main problem here is that, generally speaking, SIFPs admit maximal strictly ascending chains of different sizes having the same minimum and the same maximum, i.e. SIFPs do <i>not</i> satisfy the so called Jordan-Dedekind chain condition, hence are <i>not</i> graded i.e do not have any rank function for their elements (see e.g. Barbut & Monjardet, 1970, for a general review of the foregoing notions as defined below in the text). Thus, reliance on height functions, which provide an instance of rank functions in the graded case, but are well-defined anyway, is a second-best choice of sorts. However, it turns out that in order to remedy that inconvenience, one may select a suitably defined well-behaved class of SIFPs. In the present paper, I focus on <i>principal</i> SIFPs, namely on those SIPFs whose threshold consists of precisely <i>one minimum living standard</i> (as opposed to a set of several mutually non-comparable minimal living standards). The reasons for doing so are the following. First, it is shown below that principal SIFPs are indeed graded and their height functions do amount to rank functions. This implies that in the principal case, heights provide a much more reliable numerical scale to rank the elements of a SIFP, than they do in the general case. Therefore, height-based extensions are arguably more 'natural' and strongly grounded for principal SIFPs than they are for general SIFPs. Second, Savaglio and Vannucci (2007) prove that principal SIFPs do support an opportunity-profile counterpart to the classic characterization theorems of the majorization preorder on real sequences due to Hardy, Littlewood and P&oacute;lya (1952).</p>     <p>Starting from the foregoing background and motivation, a simple characterization of height-based extensions of principal SIFPs is provided below. Our characterization relies on conditions that use the relevant filter as a fixed parameter. Indeed, it is quite clear that over the filtral threshold height-based extensions of principal SIFPs behave, essentially, as the cardinality-based preorder. Therefore, one should expect that a suitable reformulation of standard characterizations of the cardinality-based preorder would also work for height-based extensions of SIFPs. As a matter of fact, we show that SIFPs can indeed be characterized by a suitably adapted version of the axiom set employed by Pattanaik and Xu (1990) to obtain their well-known characterization of the cardinality-based preorder. We also show that in our setting a version of the Pattanaik-Xu characterization mentioned above is essentially recaptured as a special case which arises from a particular choice of the relevant filtral parameter. Arguably, that result highlights the significance of the cardinality-ranking as a benchmark and a limiting case within the larger family of SIFP-rankings, while confirming, at the same time, the remarkable scope and flexibility of SIFPs themselves.</p> <font size="3">    <p><b>MODEL AND RESULTS</b></p></font>     <p>Let (X<img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg">) be a preset (i.e. <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg"> is a preorder, namely a reflexive and transitive binary relation on set <i>X</i>). We shall denote by <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e2.jpg">	 its quotient partially ordered set or <i>quotient</i> poset w.r.t. the symmetric component <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e3.jpg">, namely the antisymmetric preset on the set <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e4.jpg">-equivalence classes as defined by the rule <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e5.jpg"> if and only if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e6.jpg">. If in particular <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg"> is <i>antisymmetric</i> then preset (X<img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg">) itself is a <i>partially ordered set</i> or <i>poset</i>. A (non-empty) <i>antichain</i> of (X<img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg">) is a (non-empty) set <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e7.jpg"> then <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e8.jpg">-comparable. For any (non-empty) antichain <i>Z</i> of a <i>finite</i> non-empty preset (X<img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg">) an order filter of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e9.jpg"> with <i>basis Z</i> is the minimal set <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e10.jpg"> such that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e11.jpg"> and for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e12.jpg"> then <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e13.jpg">.</p>     <p>Thus, whenever <i>X</i> is <i>finite</i>, an order filter <i>F</i> of preset <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e14.jpg"> is uniquely defined by a finite set <i>Z=Z(F)</i> ={z<sub>1</sub>,...,z<sub>l</sub>} such that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e15.jpg"> is also denoted as the basis of <i>F</i>.</p>          <p>In particular, if <i>Z</i> is a singleton i.e. <i>l</i>=1 then <i>F</i> is said to be a <i>principal</i> order filter of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e14.jpg">. It should be remarked that if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e14.jpg"> is a <i>lattice</i> (namely, if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg"> is antisymmetric and for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e16.jpg">  has both a <i>least upper bound</i> w.r.t. <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg">, and a greatest lower bound w.r.t. <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg">, denoted by <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e17.jpg">, respectively) then a principal order fillter of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e14.jpg"> is also &and;-<i>closed</i> or equivalently a <i>latticial</i> filter, namely <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e18.jpg"> whenever both <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e19.jpg"> (it can also be shown that the converse also holds for any finite lattice).</p>     <p>A <i>chain</i> of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e14.jpg"> is a subset <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e20.jpg"> which is <i>totally</i> (pre)ordered by <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg"> and such that for <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e21.jpg">: by definition, the <i>length</i> of chain Y is <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e22.jpg"> is <i>maximal</i> if there is no chain <i>U</i> of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e14.jpg"> such that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e23.jpg">. If <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e14.jpg"> has a<i> minimum</i> or bottom element &perp;, one may define its <i>height function</i> <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e24.jpg"> by declaring the <i>height</i> <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e25.jpg"> of any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e26.jpg"> to be the lowest upper bound of the set of the lenghts of all (maximal) chains <i>Y</i> of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e14.jpg"> having <i>x</i> as their maximum.</p>     <p>A preset <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e14.jpg"> is said to satisfy the J<i>ordan-Dedekind chain condition</i> if for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e27.jpg">,ïƒŽ and any pair of maximal chains <i>Y,Z</i> of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e14.jpg"> having <i>x</i> as their common minimum and <i>y</i> as their common maximum, <i>l(Y)=l(Z)</i> i.e. equivalently <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e28.jpg">. Furthermore, a preset <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e14.jpg"> is <i>graded</i> if it admits a <i>rank function</i> i.e. an integer-valued function <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e29.jpg"> such that for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e30.jpg">:</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>i) if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e32.jpg"> whenever <i>x</i> <i>covers</i> y i.e. <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e32.jpg">.</p>     <p>We are now ready to turn to set-inclusion filtral preorders. We shall confine ourselves to a <i>finite</i> set <i>X</i>, and its power set <i>P(X)</i>. For any order filter <i>F</i> of poset <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e33.jpg"> the <i>F</i>-generated <i>set-inclusion filtral preorder</i> (SIFP) is the binary relation <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e34.jpg"> on <i>P(X)</i> defined as follows: for all <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e35.jpg"> if and only if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e36.jpg">.</p>     <p>Let <i>F</i> be an order filter of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e37.jpg"> and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e34.jpg"> the (set-inclusion) filtral preorder induced by <i>F</i>.</p>     <p>Then, the <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e34.jpg">-<i>induced height function</i> <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e38.jpg"> is defined as follows: for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e39.jpg">,</p>     <p align="center"><img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e40.jpg"></p>     <p>The <i>height-based (total) extension</i> of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e34.jpg"> is the total preorder <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e41.jpg"> defined as follows: for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e42.jpg">.</p>     <p>As mentioned in the Introduction, the main aim of the present paper is to provide a characterization of the height-based total preorder <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e41.jpg"> when the relevant order filter <i>F</i> is <i>principal</i>. Indeed, it turns out that in the latter case the SIFP <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e43.jpg"> is graded, hence the height function <i>h<sub>F</sub></i> is a well-defined rank function which provides an unambiguous criterion to assess the comparative 'status' of opportunity sets according to <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e34.jpg">. This claim is made precise by the following</p>     <p><b>Proposition 1</b>. <i>Let F be a principal order filter of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e37.jpg">. Then, the F -generated SIFP <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e43.jpg"> is a graded preset.</i></p>     <p><b>Proof.</b> It is a well-known fact that a finite posetâ€”hence indeed any finite preset, by definitionâ€”is graded if and only if it satisfies the Jordan-Dedekind condition as defined above (see e.g. Barbut & Monjardet, 1970, chpt. 1, p. 39). Thus, it suffices to show that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e43.jpg"> does satisfy the latter condition. Indeed, suppose it does not. Then, by definition there exist <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e44.jpg"> and maximal chains <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e45.jpg">  construction <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e46.jpg">, a contradiction. Hence, A&ne;B and either <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e47.jpg"> holds. If in fact, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e48.jpg" > hence, by definition of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e34.jpg"> and maximality of chains <b>C,C'</b>, it must be the case that both C<sub>1</sub> and C'<sub>1</sub> belong to the basis of <i>F</i> and for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e49.jpg">, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e50.jpg">, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e51.jpg">. But then, since <i>F</i> is principal, C<sub>1</sub>=C'<sub>1</sub>. It follows that, by construction, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e52.jpg">, a contradiction. Finally, if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e53.jpg"> as well then again, by definition of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e34.jpg"> and maximality of chains <b>C,C'</b> it must be the case that for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e54.jpg"> there exist <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e55.jpg"> whence by the same argument presented above <i>k=k'</i>, a contradiction, and the thesis is established.</p>     <p><b>Remark.</b> Of course, a general SIFP need not be graded. To check this fact, consider the following elementary example: let <i>X</i>={x,y,z}, <i>F</i> the order filter of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e37.jpg"> having {{x},{y,z}} as its basis, and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e43.jpg"> the resulting SIFP. Then consider <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e56.jpg">. Notice that <b>C</b> and <b>C'</b> are two maximal chains of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e58.jpg"> of different size (and length), having <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e59.jpg"> as their common maximum and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e60.jpg"> as their common minimum. Thus, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e43.jpg"> does not satisfy the Jordan-Dedekind chain condition and as a consequence -being finite- is <i>not</i> graded.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>Let us now proceed to the announced characterization of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e61.jpg">. In order to accomplish that task, a few more definitions are needed.</p>     <p>Let <i>F</i> be any (non-empty) principal order filter of the (finite) poset <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e37.jpg">, i.e. equivalently a (non-empty) latticial filter of the (finite) lattice <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e62.jpg">. Then, for an arbitrary binary relation <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg"> on <i>P(X)</i> (with asymmetric and symmetric components denoted as usual by <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e63.jpg"> respectively) the following <i>F</i>-parameterized properties can be defined:</p> <i>    <p>F-Restricted Indifference between Singletons (F-RIS):</p></i>     <p><img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e64.jpg"> satisfies F-RIS if for all <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e65.jpg">.</p>     <p><i>F-Restricted Strict Monotonicity (F-RSM):</i></p>     <p><img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e64.jpg"> satisfies F-RSM if for all <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e66.jpg"> entails <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e67.jpg">.</p> <i>    <p>F-Restricted Independence (F-RIND):</p></i>     <p><img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e64.jpg"> satisfies F-RIND if for all <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e68.jpg"> and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e69.jpg"> if and only if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e70.jpg">.</p>     <p><i>F-Threshold Effect (F-TE):</i></p>     <p><img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e64.jpg"> satisfies F-TE if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e71.jpg">.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>It turns out that, in general, the foregoing properties are <i>not</i> mutually independent. Indeed, we have the following:</p>     <p><b>Proposition 2.</b> <i>Let F be a principal filter of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e37.jpg"> and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e64.jpg"> a preset which satisfies both F-RIS and F-RSM. Then <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e64.jpg"> satisfies F-RIND as well.</i></p>     <p><b>Proof.</b> Let us assume that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e72.jpg">. Since, by definition of <i>F</i>, there exists Y<img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e73.jpg">, it follows that there also exist non-negative integers h,k and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e74.jpg"> such that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e75.jpg">.</p>     <p>Now, suppose <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e76.jpg">. If <i>h &lt; k</i> then <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e77.jpg"> by a repeated application of F-RIS. Therefore, by a repeated application of F-RSM, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e78.jpg"> <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e79.jpg"> A whence, by transitivity of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg">, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e80.jpg">, a contradiction. Let us then assume without loss of generality that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e81.jpg">. Thus, by a repeated application of F-RIS to <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e82.jpg"> follows immediately. Otherwise, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e83.jpg"> follows by a repeated application of F-RSM, and by transitivity of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg">.</p>     <p>Conversely, let us assume that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e84.jpg"> does not hold, then it must be the case that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e85.jpg">. But then, it follows by a repeated application of F-RIS to <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e86.jpg"> that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e87.jpg">. Thus, by a repeated application of F-RSM and by transitivity of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg"> it also follows that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e88.jpg">, a contradiction. Hence <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e76.jpg">, and F-RIND holds.</p>     <p>We are now in a position to state and prove the main characterization result of the present paper.</p>     <p><b>Theorem 3.</b> <i>Let F be a principal filter of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e37.jpg"> and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e64.jpg"> a preset. Then, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e1.jpg"> is the height-based (total) extension <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e89.jpg"> of the set-inclusion principal filtral preorder <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e34.jpg"> if and only if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e64.jpg"> satisfies F-RIS, F-RSM and F-TE.</i></p>     <p><b>Proof.</b> It is straightforward to check that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e43.jpg"> is in fact a totally preordered set that satisfy F -RIS, F -SM, and F -TE. Indeed, let <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e90.jpg"> where <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e91.jpg"> then by definition <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e92.jpg">. Moreover, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e93.jpg"> and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e94.jpg"> and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e95.jpg"> in any case, by definition, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e96.jpg">. Finally, for all <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e97.jpg"> i.e. <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e98.jpg">.</p>     <p>Conversely, let <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e64.jpg"> be a preset that satisfies F-RIS, F-RSM and F-TE (hence in particular F-RIND by Proposition 2. To begin with, we define an auxiliary function <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e99.jpg"> as follows: for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e100.jpg">, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e101.jpg"> otherwise (i.e. <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e102.jpg"> is the so-called<i> length function</i> of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e43.jpg">>. </p>     <p>Next, we show that since <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e64.jpg"> satisfies F-RIS and F-RIND it follows that for any <i>A,B &isin; F</i>:</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p><img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e103.jpg"> entails <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e104.jpg"> (or equivalently <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e105.jpg">).</p>     <p>We proceed by induction on <i>l<sub>F</sub>(A)</i>. The case <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e106.jpg"> is trivial in that it entails - by definition - A=Y= B whence <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e104.jpg">.</p>     <p>Let us now suppose by inductive hypothesis that for any nonnegative integer m not larger than n, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e107.jpg"> entails <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e104.jpg">. Then, take a pair <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e108.jpg"> such that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e109.jpg">. If <i>C=D</i> there is nothing to prove. If <i>C&ne;D</i> then there exist <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e110.jpg">, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e111.jpg">. It follows that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e112.jpg"> hence, by definition, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e113.jpg">, which entails <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e104.jpg">, by the inductive hypothesis. Moreover, if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e114.jpg">, a contradiction since <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e115.jpg"> by a similar argument. Therefore, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e116.jpg"> by F-RIND. Furthermore, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e117.jpg"> i.e. <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e118.jpg">, by transitivity of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e119.jpg">, and the inductive thesis follows.</p>     <p>Now, take any pair <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e44.jpg"> such that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e120.jpg"> or equivalently <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e123.jpg">. Two cases should be distinguished, namely: i) <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e121.jpg">; ii)<img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e124.jpg">. If case 1) obtains, then, by definition of <i>F</i>, A<img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e125.jpg"> hence <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e126.jpg"> by F-TE. Under case 2) both <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e127.jpg">, and there exist <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e128.jpg">. Then, there also exists <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e129.jpg">. We also posit <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e130.jpg"> and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e131.jpg">. Therefore, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e132.jpg"> whence <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e133.jpg"> by the first part of this proof. Since <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e134.jpg">, it follows from F-RSM that Y<img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e135.jpg">. By a repeated application of a similar argument - and by transitivity of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e119.jpg"> - we can eventually establish that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e136.jpg"> whence<img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e137.jpg">.</p>     <p>Thus, we have just shown that for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e138.jpg"> and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e139.jpg">. Hence, in particular, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e140.jpg"> is a <i>total</i> preorder. But notice that if there exist <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e141.jpg"> and not <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e142.jpg">, then -since <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e89.jpg">is also a <i>total</i> preorder by definition - it must be the case that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e143.jpg"> and therefore <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e144.jpg">. Moreover, <i>not</i> <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e145.jpg">, a contradiction. It follows that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e146.jpg"> as well, so that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e147.jpg"> and our thesis is thus established.</p>     <p> The foregoing characterization is tight. To see this, consider the following list of examples.</p>     <p><b>Example 1.</b> Take a principal order filter <i>F</i> of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e37.jpg"> and the corresponding set-inclusion filtral preorder <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e34.jpg">on <i>P(X)</i> defined as follows: for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e148.jpg"> <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e149.jpg"> if and only if  <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e150.jpg">(see Vannucci, 1999; Savaglio & Vannucci, 2007). It is easily checked that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e34.jpg"> is indeed a preorder, and satisfies F-RSM and F-TE. Moreover, let <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e151.jpg">. Thus, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e152.jpg"> which in turn entails <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e153.jpg">. Conversely, since obviously <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e154.jpg"> entails <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e155.jpg">. Then <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e156.jpg"> as well, hence by definition<img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e157.jpg">. It follows that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e34.jpg"> also satisfies F-RIND. However, for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e158.jpg">, such that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e159.jpg"> are not <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e34.jpg">-comparable, hence F-RIS fails.</p>     <p><b>Example 2.</b> Let us consider again a principal order filter <i>F</i> of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e37.jpg">, and the binary relation <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e162.jpg"> defined as follows: for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e160.jpg"><img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e163.jpg"> if and only if &#91;either <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e164.jpg">&#93;. Notice that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e165.jpg">is indeed a preorder: to check this, first observe that reflexivity of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e165.jpg"> follows trivially from the definition, and assume that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e166.jpg">. The following mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cases should be distinguished:</p>     <p>1) <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e167.jpg">: in this case <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e168.jpg"> by the first clause; 2) <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e169.jpg">: in this case <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e170.jpg"> by the second clause; 3) <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e171.jpg">: here again <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e172.jpg"> follows immediately from the second clause. Thus, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e172.jpg"> is transitive. Also, if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e173.jpg"> and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e174.jpg">, then clearly <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e175.jpg"> whence by definition <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e176.jpg"> i.e. F-RIS is satisfied. Similarly, if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e177.jpg"> and <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e178.jpg">. Thus, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e179.jpg"> whence by definition <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e180.jpg">". Conversely, if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e181.jpg"> then, by definition  <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e180.jpg">: it follows that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e182.jpg"> as well hence by definition <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e183.jpg">. Therefore, F-RIND is also satisfied by <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e184.jpg">. Finally, F-TE follows immediately from the definition. However, F-RSM is definitely <i>not</i> satisfied by <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e185.jpg">: indeed, if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e186.jpg">,<img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e187.jpg"> then, by definition, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e188.jpg"> hence F-RSM is violated.</p>     <p><b>Example 3.</b> Fix a principal order filter <i>F</i> of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e37.jpg"> and take the binary relation <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e189.jpg"> defined as follows: for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e190.jpg"> if and only if either <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e191.jpg">. It can be readily checked that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e192.jpg">is a preorder: to see this, observe that reflexivity follows immediately from the definition. As for transitivity, if <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e193.jpg"> then the following two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cases are to be distinguished: i) <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e194.jpg">. In both cases, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e195.jpg"> follows immediately from the definition. Furthermore, F-RIS and F-RSM of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e196.jpg"> are also easily seen to follow trivially from the definition. On the other hand, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e197.jpg"> obviously fails to satisfy F-TE since by definition <i>not</i> <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e193.jpg"> for any <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e198.jpg"> such that <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e199.jpg">.</p>     ]]></body>
<body><![CDATA[<p>It should be emphasized here that the axioms used by Pattanaik and Xu (1990) in their well-known, and seminal, characterization of the cardinality-based preorder -namely Indifference between Singletons, Strict Monotonicity, and Independence- are implied by the corresponding axioms in our list when the reference filter <i>F</i> is taken to be the trivial or maximum filter <i>P(X)</i>. Moreover, it is immediately visible that for <i>F= P(X)</i> the fourth axiom of our list i.e. F-Threshold Effect, which has no counterpart in the Pattanaik-Xu list, is, in fact, trivially satisfied when restricted to the original Pattanaik-Xu domain, which only includes <i>non-empty</i> opportunity sets. The remarkable flexibility and scope of SIFPs is thereby confirmed.</p> <font size="3">    <p><b>CONCLUDING REMARKS</b></p></font>     <p>As mentioned in the Introduction, the characterization of height-based extensions of principal filtral opportunity preorders provided in the present paper does not extend to the general case of arbitrary filtral opportunity preorders. This is due to the fact that when an order filter is <i>not</i> principal, the height function of the corresponding SIFP may exhibit a highly irregular behaviour.</p>     <p>Therefore, the height-based extension of a SIFP does <i>not</i> mimic the behaviour of the cardinality-based preorder over the filtral threshold. A simple example may help clarify this point.</p>     <p><b>Example 4.</b> Let <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e200.jpg"> (notice that Z is indeed an antichain of <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e37.jpg">. Then, consider the height-based extension <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e201.jpg"> of the <i>F</i>-induced SIFP <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e202.jpg"> and take <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e203.jpg">. Clearly, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e204.jpg">. However, <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e205.jpg"> while <img src="img/revistas/ceco/v32nspe61/v32nspe61a07e206.jpg"> and F-RIS fails.</p>     <p>By contrast, our characterization is, in fact, amenable to a simple generalization in another direction. Indeed, a counterpart to Theorem 3 for arbitrary (finite) lattices of sets is readily available provided that the axioms are suitably reformulated by replacing join-irreducibles (elements that cover precisely one element) for singletons/atoms. 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