<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0121-5051</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Innovar]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Innovar]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0121-5051</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidad Nacional de Colombia.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0121-50512018000300085</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.15446/innovar.v28n69.71698</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Relación entre gobierno corporativo, control familiar y desempeño en empresas colombianas]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, FAMILY CONTROL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN COLOMBIAN COMPANIES]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[RELAÇÃO ENTRE GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA, CONTROLE FAMILIAR E DESEMPENHO EM EMPRESAS COLOMBIANAS]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="fr"><![CDATA[LES RAPPORTS ENTRE LA GOUVERNANCE D'ENTREPRISE, LE CONTRÔLE FAMILIAL ET LA PERFORMANCE DANS LES COMPAGNIES COLOMBIENNES]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Lagos Cortés]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Diógenes]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Betancourt Ramírez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Jose]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gómez Betancourt]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Gonzalo]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de La Sabana Chía  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de La Sabana Chía  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af3">
<institution><![CDATA[,Management Consulting Group Bogotá  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>28</volume>
<numero>69</numero>
<fpage>85</fpage>
<lpage>98</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0121-50512018000300085&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0121-50512018000300085&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0121-50512018000300085&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN: El gobierno corporativo como herramienta para minimizar los problemas de agencia parece tener un efecto positivo en el desempeño. Este trabajo analiza la relación entre gobierno corporativo, control familiar y desempeño financiero en empresas colombianas. A través del método generalizado de momentos (GMM), se estimó dicha relación en un panel de datos balanceado para 104 empresas inscritas en el Registro Nacional de Valores y Emisores (RNVE) durante el periodo 2008-2014. Las empresas fueron clasificadas como empresa familiar (EF), cuando se identificó una familia como accionista controlante mayoritario. El desempeño fue aproximado a partir de la rentabilidad del activo (ROA) y la rentabilidad del patrimonio (ROE). Para medir el nivel de gobierno corporativo se usaron las 41 prácticas recomendadas en el Código País. Se encontró que solo las prácticas alusivas a la junta directiva se relacionan con el ROA, mientras que en el caso del ROE no se encontró evidencia de relación con alguna de las prácticas de gobierno corporativo. Respecto al carácter familiar, se encontró que, cuando una familia es el primer accionista controlante, las empresas presentan mayor desempeño. No obstante, cuando los dos primeros accionistas controlantes son familias, se observó que no existe relación con el desempeño. Clasificación JEL: L25, G30, G34.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT: Corporate governance seems to have a positive effect or business performance as a tool to minimize agency problems. This paper studies the relationship between corporate governance, family control and financial performance in Colombian companies. Through the generalized method of moments (GMM), this relationship was estimated in a balanced data panel for 104 companies registered in the National Registry of Securities and Issuers (RNVE, in Spanish) during the 2008-2014 period. Analyzed companies were classified as a family business (FB) when a family was identified as majority controlling shareholder. Performance was measured by the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE). The 41 practices recommended in the Country Code were used in order to measure the corporate governance level. It was found that only those practices referring to the board of directors are related to ROA, while in the case of the ROE no evidence of any of the corporate governance practices was found. Regarding the family character, it was found that when a family is the first controlling shareholder companies show a higher performance. However, no relationship with performance was observed when the first two controlling shareholders are families. Clasificación JEL: L25, G30, G34.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[RESUMO: A governança corporativa como ferramenta para atenuar os problemas de agência parece ter efeito positivo no desempenho. Este trabalho analisa a relação entre governança corporativa, controle familiar e desempenho financeiro em empresas colombianas. Por meio do método generalizado dos momentos, essa relação foi estimada em dados em painel balanceado para 104 empresas cadastradas no Registro Nacional de Valores e Emissores entre 2008 e 2014. As empresas foram classificadas como empresa familiar, quando foi identificada uma família como acionista controlador predominante. O desempenho foi aproximado a partir da rentabilidade do ativo (ROA) e da rentabilidade do patrimônio (ROE). Para medir o nível de governança corporativa, foram usadas as 41 práticas recomendadas no Código País. Constatou-se que somente as práticas alusivas ao conselho diretor se relacionam com o roa, enquanto, no caso do ROE, não foi encontrada prova de relação com alguma das práticas de governança corporativa. A respeito do caráter familiar, constatou-se que, quando uma família é o primeiro acionista controlador, as empresas apresentam maior desempenho. Contudo, quando os dois primeiros acionistas controladores são famílias, observou-se que não existe relação com o desempenho. Clasificación JEL: L25, G30, G34.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="fr"><p><![CDATA[RÉSUMÉ: La gouvernance d'entreprise en tant qu'outil permettant de minimiser les problèmes d'agence semble avoir un effet positif sur la performance. Cet article analyse la relation entre la gouvernance d'entreprise, le contrôle familial et la performance financière dans les compagnies colombiennes. Grâce à la méthode généralisée des moments (MGM), cette relation a été estimée dans un panel de données équilibré pour 104 sociétés inscrites au Registre National des Titres et des Emetteurs (RNVE) au cours de la période 2008-2014. Les compagnies furent classées comme des entreprises familiales (EF), lorsqu'on identifiait une famille comme actionnaire au contrôle majoritaire. La performance a été estimée par le rendement des actifs (ROA) et le rendement des capitaux propres (ROE). Pour mesurer le niveau de gouvernance d'entreprise, on a utilisé les 41 pratiques recommandées dans le Code de Pays. On a constaté que seules les pratiques allusives du conseil d'administration sont liées au roa, tandis que, dans le cas du ROE, on n'a pas trouvé aucune preuve de relation avec les pratiques de gouvernance d'entreprise. En ce qui concerne le caractère familial, on a constaté que, lorsqu'une famille est le premier actionnaire en contrôle, les entreprises présentent des performances supérieures. Cependant, lorsque les deux premiers actionnaires majoritaires sont des familles, on a observé qu'il n'y a pas de relation avec la performance. Clasificación JEL: L25, G30, G34.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[desempeño financiero]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[empresa familiar]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[endogeneidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[GMM]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[gobierno corporativo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[junta directiva]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Financial performance]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[family business]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[endogeneity]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[GMM]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[corporate governance]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[board of directors]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[conselho diretor]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[desempenho financeiro]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[empresa familiar]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[endogeneidade]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Generalized Method of Moments]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[governança corporativa]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[performance financière]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[entreprise familiale]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[endogénéité]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[MGM]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[gouvernance d'entreprise]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[conseil d'administration]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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