<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0121-5612</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Colombia Internacional]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[colomb.int.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0121-5612</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Departamento de Ciencia Política y Centro de Estudios Internacionales. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de los Andes]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0121-56122024000400139</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.7440/colombiaint120.2024.06</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Gobierno de partidos y designación de ministros en Uruguay, 1985-2024]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Party Government and Ministerial Appointments in Uruguay, 1985-2024]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[Governo de partidos e nomeação de ministros no Uruguai, 1985-2024]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Chasquetti]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Daniel]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de la República  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Uruguay</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>10</month>
<year>2024</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>10</month>
<year>2024</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>120</numero>
<fpage>139</fpage>
<lpage>162</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0121-56122024000400139&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0121-56122024000400139&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0121-56122024000400139&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN:  Objetivo/contexto:  El artículo analiza la naturaleza partidista de los ministros en Uruguay (96% del total) durante el periodo 1985-2024, a partir de las condicionantes institucionales y políticas de la designación del gabinete. Dado que el presidente cuenta con poderes legislativos moderados, la nominación es utilizada para la construcción de mayorías capaces de aprobar las iniciativas del Gobierno y evitar que la oposición censure a los ministros en el Parlamento. Como el sistema político funciona con base en la lógica del modelo de Gobierno de partido, el artículo explora las consecuencias de su aplicación mediante el análisis del comportamiento de la bancada oficialista en una muestra de interpelaciones ministeriales realizadas en el Parlamento.  Metodología:  La investigación es un estudio de caso basado en el análisis estadístico de datos originales. La hipótesis principal considera cuatro variables independientes (tamaño del contingente legislativo del presidente, cohesión partidaria, tipo de gobierno y evolución del periodo de gobierno) y una serie de variables de control.  Conclusiones:  El estudio confirma que los presidentes uruguayos hacen un uso estratégico de la designación ministerial, a partir del supuesto de que la relación entre los poderes funciona como un típico modelo de gobierno de partido, similar al observado en regímenes parlamentarios. Los presidentes designan ministros partidistas de alto rango cuando cuentan con respaldo en el Parlamento y el partido está fuertemente cohesionado. Designan ministros partidistas de rango medio y bajo, cuando el presidente forma coaliciones y cuando su partido está menos cohesionado. Y, finalmente, prefieren ministros partidistas nuevos o discretos cuando el presidente pierde su coalición o durante los últimos años del mandato.  Originalidad:  Analiza la designación de ministros en Uruguay bajo un sistema presidencial que, a pesar de no tener poderes legislativos excesivos, se asemeja al modelo de gobierno de partido típico de los regímenes parlamentarios.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT:  Objective/Context: The article analyzes the partisan nature of ministers in Uruguay (96% of the total) during the period 1985-2024, based on the institutional and political constraints of cabinet appointments. Given that the president has moderate legislative powers, nominations are used to build majorities capable of approving government initiatives and preventing the opposition from censuring ministers in Parliament. As the political system operates based on the logic of the party government model, the article explores the consequences of its application by analyzing the behavior of the ruling party&#8217;s caucus in a sample of ministerial interpellations conducted in Parliament.  Methodology: The research is a case study based on statistical analysis of original data. The main hypothesis considers four independent variables (size of the president&#8217;s legislative contingent, party cohesion, type of government, and evolution of the government period) and a series of control variables.  Conclusions: The study confirms that Uruguayan presidents make strategic use of ministerial appointments, based on the assumption that the relationship between powers functions as a typical party government model, similar to that observed in parliamentary regimes. Presidents appoint high-ranking partisan ministers when they have support in Parliament and the party is strongly cohesive. They appoint mid- and low-ranking partisan ministers when the president forms coalitions and when the party is less cohesive. Finally, they prefer new or discreet partisan ministers when the president loses his coalition or during the last years of the mandate.  Originality: It analyzes the appointment of ministers in Uruguay under a presidential system that, despite not having excessive legislative powers, resembles the typical party government model of parliamentary regimes.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[RESUMO:  Objetivo/contexto:  O artigo analisa a natureza partidária dos ministros no Uruguai (96% do total) durante o período de 1985-2024, considerando as condicionantes institucionais e políticas da nomeação do gabinete. Dado que o presidente possui poderes legislativos moderados, as nomeações são utilizadas para construir maiorias capazes de aprovar as iniciativas do governo e evitar que a oposição censure os ministros no Parlamento. Como o sistema político opera com base na lógica do modelo de governo de partido, o artigo explora as consequências de sua aplicação por meio da análise do comportamento da bancada governista em uma amostra de interpelações ministeriais realizadas no Parlamento.  Metodologia:  A pesquisa é um estudo de caso baseado na análise estatística de dados originais. A hipótese principal considera quatro variáveis independentes (tamanho do contingente legislativo do presidente, coesão partidária, tipo de governo e evolução do período de governo) e uma série de variáveis de controle.  Conclusões:  O estudo confirma que os presidentes uruguaios fazem uso estratégico das nomeações ministeriais, partindo do pressuposto de que a relação entre os poderes funciona como um típico modelo de governo de partido, similar ao observado em regimes parlamentares. Os presidentes nomeiam ministros partidários de alto escalão quando têm respaldo no Parlamento e o partido está fortemente coeso. Nomeiam ministros partidários de médio e baixo escalão quando o presidente forma coalizões e quando seu partido está menos coeso. E, finalmente, preferem ministros partidários novos ou discretos quando o presidente perde sua coalizão ou durante os últimos anos do mandato.  Originalidade:  Analisa a nomeação de ministros no Uruguai sob um sistema presidencial que, apesar de não ter poderes legislativos excessivos, assemelha-se ao modelo de governo de partido típico dos regimes parlamentares.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[gabinetes ministeriales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[partidos políticos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[presidencialismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Uruguay.]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[ministerial cabinets]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[political parties]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[presidentialism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Uruguay.]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[gabinetes ministeriais]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[partidos políticos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[presidencialismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Uruguai.]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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