<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0122-9893</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista Derecho del Estado]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. Derecho Estado]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0122-9893</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Externado de Colombia]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0122-98932017000100003</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18601/01229893.n38.01</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Rule of Law y discrecionalidad judicial: compatibilidad y recíproca limitación *]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Rule of Law and judicial discretion: Compatibility and reciprocal limitation]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Etcheverry]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Juan Bautista]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Austral Filosofía del Derecho ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Argentina</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>38</numero>
<fpage>3</fpage>
<lpage>21</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0122-98932017000100003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0122-98932017000100003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0122-98932017000100003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN Con este trabajo se busca clarificar la compatibilidad entre las exigencias del rule of law y el fenómeno de la discrecionalidad judicial. Para llevar a cabo este objetivo será necesario, en primer lugar, establecer qué entendemos por rule of law y por discrecionalidad judicial. Así, por un lado, se propondrá una concepción de la discrecionalidad judicial en parte originada por la inevitable y, en algunos casos, hasta deseable indeterminación parcial del derecho y cuya característica principal está vinculada con un cierto margen de decisión libre del que gozan en algunos casos los jueces entre, al menos, dos posibilidades justificadas de actuación. Además, se propondrá una noción de las exigencias del rule of law como ideales orientados a servir fines valiosos, que admiten grados en su cumplimiento, que resulta imposible cumplir completamente con ellos e, incluso, indeseable en algunos casos hacerlo en la mayor medida posible. A partir de estas nociones se buscará mostrar que, si entendemos a las exigencias del rule of law de modo tal que no siempre deban ser cumplidas completamente, e incluso que en algunos casos no deban ser cumplidas en la mayor medida posible, ellas podrán ser conciliables con el fenómeno de la discrecionalidad judicial.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT The aim of this work is to throw some light upon the compatibility between the rule of law desiderata and the phenomenon of judicial discretion. In order to achieve this, it is first necessary to determine what we understand by the terms "rule of law" and "judicial discretion". In this sense, the conception of judicial discretion that is offered in this work is linked with a certain margin of freedom that judges have when deciding cases that have at least two justified possible courses of action. In addition to this, this work puts forward a notion of the rule of law desiderata and characterizes the latter as ideals that: (i) aim at serving valuable ends, (ii) admit degrees of accomplishment, as it is impossible -and, in some cases, even undesirable- to fulfill them either completely or to the highest possible degree. Based on these notions, this work intends to demonstrate that if the rule of law desiderata are understood as requirements that are not always meant to be accomplished completely, and that even in some cases should not be fulfilled to their highest possible degree, then they can be compatible with the phenomenon of judicial discretion.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Rule of law]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[discrecionalidad judicial]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[indeterminación jurídica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[única respuesta correcta]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[decisión judicial]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Rule of law]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[judicial discretion]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[legal indeterminacy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[right answers thesis]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[judicial decision]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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