<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0122-9893</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista Derecho del Estado]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. Derecho Estado]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0122-9893</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Externado de Colombia]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0122-98932020000200223</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18601/01229893.n46.09</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Estabilidad, profesionalismo y politización en los nombramientos de directivos de agencias reguladoras independientes: lecciones desde la experiencia chilena-]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Stability, Professionalism and Politicization in the Appointment of the Heads of Independent Regulatory Agencies: Lessons from the Chilean Experience]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[PARDOW]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[DIEGO]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[VERDUGO]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[SERGIO]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Chile Facultad de Derecho Departamento de Derecho Económico]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad del Desarrollo Derecho Constitucional ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>08</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>08</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>46</numero>
<fpage>223</fpage>
<lpage>252</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0122-98932020000200223&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0122-98932020000200223&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0122-98932020000200223&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Los autores comparan los nombramientos de los directivos de agencias reguladoras donde participó el Senado chileno con aquellos realizados discrecionalmente por el presidente, o bien a través del sistema de Alta Dirección Pública, i.e., un proceso de nombramiento que busca reconciliar la necesidad de estimular nombramientos de directivos con altas credenciales técnicas, con los intereses políticos del gobierno incumbente. El análisis de 200 nombramientos realizados entre 1990 y 2016 sugiere que los directivos elegidos con participación del Senado tienen niveles similares de afiliación política, pero mejores antecedentes profesionales respecto de las autoridades nombradas bajo los otros modelos institucionales. La evidencia también sugiere que el tiempo de permanencia de los directivos nombrados con participación del Senado es dos veces más largo, mientras que casi tres veces más probable que se mantengan en sus cargos después de la instalación de un nuevo gobierno. Los datos también proporcionan evidencia útil para la discusión sobre el impacto que tienen los modelos de nombramiento sobre la autonomía de dichas instituciones. Existe un grado de correlación significativo entre la independencia formal y material de las agencias reguladoras chilenas, así como también la importancia del Senado en el sistema de frenos y contrapesos para los nombramientos directivos.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract The authors compare the appointments of the heads of regulatory agencies made with the participation of the Senate with those made either discretionally by the President, or through the system of High Public Directorship, i.e., an appointing procedure that seeks to reconcile the need to stimulate appointments of candidates with strong technical credentials, with the political interests of the incumbent government. The analysis of near 200 appointments made in Chile between 1990 and 2016, shows that the heads of regulatory agencies chosen with the involvement of the Senate have similar levels of political affiliation, but better overall professional credentials compared to the results achieved by other institutional models. Our evidence also suggests that the tenure of those officers is two times longer, and it is three times more likely that they remain in office after the installation of a new government. The article provides useful evidence to advance the discussion about the impact of the institutional appointing models on the autonomy of those institutions. There is a significant correlation between formal and material independence of Chilean regulatory agencies, as well as showing the importance of the Senate in the system of check and balances for appointing regulators.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Agencias reguladoras]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[independencia formal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[diseño institucional]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[control parlamentario]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[frenos y contrapesos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Regulatory agencies]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Formal independence]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Institutional design]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Parliament control]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Check and balances]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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