<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0123-4366</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista de Derecho Privado]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. Derecho Privado]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0123-4366</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Externado de Colombia]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0123-43662023000100275</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18601/01234366.44.10</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Breakup fees o pagos por terminación en las ofertas públicas de adquisición (OPA): ¿por qué no los asume la compañía objetivo?]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Breakup Fees in Takeover Bids. Why Doesn't the Target Take Them On?]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[CARREÑO MENDOZA]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[SERGIO]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de los Andes  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Bogotá ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2023</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2023</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>44</numero>
<fpage>275</fpage>
<lpage>309</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0123-43662023000100275&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0123-43662023000100275&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0123-43662023000100275&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN. Los breakup fees o pagos por terminación operan como instrumentos distributivos del riesgo que permite el reembolso de lo invertido cuando la operación se frustra por alguna de las causales definidas en el acuerdo. Con todo, han sido objeto de intenso debate cuando el reembolso se establece en favor del comprador por las repercusiones que pueden tener sobre la compañía objetivo, sus accionistas y el bienestar social. En esta línea, el Decreto 2555 de 2010 y la Circular Básica Jurídica de la Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia han optado por una solución restrictiva que proscribe los pagos asumidos por la compañía objetivo. Pese a las nobles intenciones que persigue la norma, ha llegado el momento de modificar la estrategia, pues no existe información que permita establecer de forma concluyente que la prohibición mejora la posición de los accionistas y, por el contrario, puede estar afectando el volumen de operaciones y los precios de venta. Teniendo esto presente, se propone la adopción de un modelo regulatorio que establezca de antemano los requisitos que deberán cumplir los administradores cuando los negocian.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT. Breakup fees function as allocating risk instruments that assurance an investment reimbursement to the first offeror when the operation fails to complete attending to certain causes determined on the contract. However, they turn controversial whether target funded it. In this sense, Decree 2555 of 2010 and Basic Legal Circular of the Financial Superintendency of Colombia forbid target involvement in this kind of arrangement. Despite noble foundations, there is no conclusive evidence that supports the current solution; conversely, it could be affecting deal volumes and deal premiums. Consequently, this paper proposes an alternative approach based on a regulatory solution that establishes precise requirements when the target backs a breakup fee.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[ofertas públicas de adquisición (OPA)]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[pagos por terminación]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[breakup fees]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[compañía objetivo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[administradores]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Takeover bids]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[tender offer]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[breakup fees]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[target]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[managers]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
<ref-list>
<ref id="B1">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Afsharipour]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination Fees]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Vanderbilt Law Review]]></source>
<year>2010</year>
<numero>63-5</numero>
<issue>63-5</issue>
<page-range>1161-240</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B2">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Aghion]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bolton]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Contracts as a Barrier to Entry]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The American Economic Review]]></source>
<year>1987</year>
<numero>77-3</numero>
<issue>77-3</issue>
<page-range>388-401</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B3">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Armour]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Skeel]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The Georgetown Law Journal]]></source>
<year>2007</year>
<numero>95</numero>
<issue>95</issue>
<page-range>1728-94</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B4">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bainbridge]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S. M]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lockups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Minnesota Law Review]]></source>
<year>1990</year>
<numero>75</numero>
<issue>75</issue>
<page-range>239-334</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B5">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bates]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T. W.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[L. Lemmon]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M. L]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Breaking Up Is Hard To Do? An Analysis of Termination Fee Provisions and Merger Outcomes]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Financial Economics]]></source>
<year>2003</year>
<numero>69-3</numero>
<issue>69-3</issue>
<page-range>469-504</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B6">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bebchuk]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L. A]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Last Reply?]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Law, Economics, &amp; Organization]]></source>
<year>1986</year>
<numero>2-2</numero>
<issue>2-2</issue>
<page-range>253-71</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B7">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Burch]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T. R]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Locking Out Rival Bidders: The Use of Lockup Options in Corporate Mergers]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Financial Economics]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<numero>60</numero>
<issue>60</issue>
<page-range>103-41</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B8">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Carreño Mendoza]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Acuerdos de intenciones y gestión de la incertidumbre en las adquisiciones de empresa]]></source>
<year>2022</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Bogotá ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad de los Andes]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B9">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Castillo Mayorga]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Deberes de administradores y socios en el contexto de una adquisición: ¿Qué tan aplicables son algunas instituciones y doctrinas estadounidenses en Colombia?]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Laguado Giraldo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Derecho societario contemporáneo. Artículos]]></source>
<year>2021</year>
<page-range>461-510</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Bogotá ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Ibáñez - BU]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B10">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Coates IV]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J. C]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[M&amp;A Break Fees: U.S. Litigation versus UK Regulation]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kessler]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Regulation vs. Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law]]></source>
<year>2010</year>
<page-range>239-84</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Chicago ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[University of Chicago Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B11">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Coates IV]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J. C]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Managing Disputes through Contract: Evidence from M&amp;A]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Harvard Business Law Review]]></source>
<year>2012</year>
<numero>2</numero>
<issue>2</issue>
<page-range>295-343</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B12">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Coates IV]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J. C]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A Buy-Side Model of M &amp; A Lockups: Theory and Evidence]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Subramanian]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Stanford Law Review]]></source>
<year>2000</year>
<numero>53</numero>
<issue>53</issue>
<page-range>307-96</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B13">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Diamond]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[P. A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Maskin]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The Bell Journal of Economics]]></source>
<year>1979</year>
<numero>10-1</numero>
<issue>10-1</issue>
<page-range>282-316</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B14">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gimeno Bevia]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[V]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Los acuerdos de exclusividad en los procesos de adquisición de empresas]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Revista de Derecho Mercantil]]></source>
<year>2017</year>
<numero>304</numero>
<issue>304</issue>
<page-range>269-94</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B15">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Lehn]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K. M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Zhao]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[CEO Turnover after Acquisitions: Are Bad Bidders Fired?]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[The Journal of Finance]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<numero>LXI-4</numero>
<issue>LXI-4</issue>
<page-range>1759-811</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B16">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<collab>Misión del Mercado de Capitales</collab>
<source><![CDATA[Informe Final]]></source>
<year>2019</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Bogotá ]]></publisher-loc>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B17">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Officer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M. S]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA['Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Financial Economics]]></source>
<year>2003</year>
<numero>69</numero>
<issue>69</issue>
<page-range>431-67</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B18">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Palmieri]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Corporate Argumentation in Takeover Bids]]></source>
<year>2014</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Amsterdam ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[John Benjamins]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B19">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Paredes Galego]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Sobre la admisibilidad en Derecho español de las cláusulas de indemnización por terminación ('break-up fees') en supuestos de ofertas públicas de adquisición"]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Revista de Derecho Mercantil]]></source>
<year>2003</year>
<numero>249</numero>
<issue>249</issue>
<page-range>1101-39</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B20">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Paz-Ares Rodríguez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Anatomía del deber de lealtad]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Actualidad Jurídica Uría &amp; Menéndez]]></source>
<year>2015</year>
<numero>35</numero>
<issue>35</issue>
<page-range>43-65</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B21">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Paz-Ares Rodríguez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Nuñez-Lago]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[La actuación del órgano de administración en la compra y venta de la sociedad: los conflictos de interés]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="editor">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sebastián Quetglas]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Manual de fusiones y adquisiciones de empresas]]></source>
<year>2018</year>
<edition>2</edition>
<page-range>271-304</page-range><publisher-loc><![CDATA[Las Rozas, Madrid ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Wolters Kluwer]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B22">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Restrepo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Subramanian]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA['The Effect of Prohibiting Deal Protection in M&amp;A: Evidence from the United Kingdom]]></source>
<year>2016</year>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B23">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Restrepo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Subramanian]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The New Look of Deal Protection]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Stanford Law Review]]></source>
<year>2017</year>
<numero>69</numero>
<issue>69</issue>
<page-range>1013-74</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B24">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sáez Lacave]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.I]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Reconsiderando los deberes de lealtad de los socios: el caso particular de los socios de control de las sociedades cotizadas]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[InDret]]></source>
<year>2016</year>
<page-range>1-59</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B25">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Saulsbury IV]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.O]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The availability of takeover defenses and deal protection devices for Anglo- American Target Companies]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Delaware Journal of Corporate Law]]></source>
<year>2012</year>
<numero>37</numero>
<issue>37</issue>
<page-range>115-61</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B26">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Schwartz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Law, Economics, &amp; Organization]]></source>
<year>1986</year>
<numero>2-2</numero>
<issue>2-2</issue>
<page-range>229-53</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B27">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Tarbert]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H.P]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Merger Breakup Fees: A Critical Challenge to Anglo-American Corporate Law]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Law &amp; Policy in International Business]]></source>
<year>2003</year>
<numero>34</numero>
<issue>34</issue>
<page-range>628-712</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B28">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<collab>The Takeover Panel</collab>
<source><![CDATA[Consultation Paper Issued by the Code Committee of the Panel Review of Certain Aspects of the Takeover Bids]]></source>
<year>2010</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Londres ]]></publisher-loc>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B29">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Menéndez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Uría]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Guía sobre el nuevo régimen jurídico de las ofertas públicas de adquisición de valores]]></source>
<year>2007</year>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
