<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0123-5923</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Estudios Gerenciales]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[estud.gerenc.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0123-5923</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Icesi]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0123-59232020000300272</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18046/j.estger.2020.156.3739</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Composición del consejo de administración y desempeño financiero en mercados emergentes de América Latina: evidencia para Brasil, Chile y México]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Structure of the board of directors and financial performance in emerging markets of Latin American: Evidence from Brazil, Chile, and Mexico]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[Composição do conselho de administração e desempenho financeiro em mercados emergentes na América Latina: evidências para Brasil, Chile e México]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Arévalo-Alegría]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Marcelo]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Acuña-Duarte]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Andrés A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[King-Domínguez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Andrea]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad del Bío-Bío Departamento de Economía y Finanzas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Concepción ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad del Bío-Bío Departamento de Economía y Finanzas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Concepción ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af3">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad del Bío-Bío Departamento de Economía y Finanzas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Concepción ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>36</volume>
<numero>156</numero>
<fpage>272</fpage>
<lpage>287</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0123-59232020000300272&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0123-59232020000300272&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0123-59232020000300272&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Este artículo analiza el impacto de cuatro atributos del consejo de administración sobre el desempeño de 101 empresas no financieras de Brasil, Chile y México, vigentes en el periodo 2011-2017. Además, se innova al explorar el efecto rezagado de tales atributos para abordar la causalidad inversa identificada en la literatura. La estimación de modelos de datos de panel estáticos y dinámicos revela un efecto positivo de la independencia del consejo sobre el desempeño contable de firmas brasileñas y chilenas. La evidencia reportada es mixta en cuanto a la dualidad de cargo, mientras que se identifica una relación positiva, cuadrática y cóncava para el tamaño del consejo. Finalmente, no se encuentra evidencia de que la diversidad de género reditúe en un mejor desempeño presente y futuro. Clasificación JEL: C23; G15; G30.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract This paper analyzes the impact of four attributes of the board of directors on the performance of 101 non-financial companies from Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, during the period 2011-2017. In addition, this research innovates by exploring the lagged effect of the above attributes in order to address the inverse causation that has been highlighted in the literature. The estimation of static and dynamic panel-data models reveals a positive effect of board independence on the accounting performance of the Brazilian and Chilean firms. The evidence reported is mixed in terms of the CEO duality, whereas a positive, quadratic, and concave relationship was found for board size. Finally, no supporting evidence that gender diversity results in a higher current and future performance of Latin American companies was found.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo Este artigo analisa o impacto de quatro atributos do conselho de administração no desempenho de 101 empresas não financeiras do Brasil, Chile e México, em vigor no período 2011-2017. Além disso, inova-se ao explorar o efeito defasado de tais atributos para abordar a causalidade inversa identificada na literatura. A estimação de modelos de dados em painel estáticos e dinâmicos revela um efeito positivo da independência do conselho sobre o desempenho contábil de empresas brasileiras e chilenas. A evidência relatada é mista em termos de dualidade de cargos, enquanto uma relação positiva, quadrática e côncava é identificada para o tamanho do conselho. Finalmente, não há evidências de que a diversidade de gênero compensa em um melhor desempenho presente e futuro.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[gobierno corporativo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[consejo de administración]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[diversidad de género]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[desempeño financiero]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[América Latina]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[corporate governance]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[board of directors]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[gender diversity]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[financial performance]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Latin America]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[governo corporativo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[conselho de administração]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[diversidade de gênero]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[desempenho financeiro]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[América Latina]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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