<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0124-6127</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Discusiones Filosóficas]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[discus.filos]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0124-6127</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Vicerrectoría de Investigaciones y Postgrados, Universidad de Caldas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0124-61272019000200061</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.17151/difil.2019.20.35.5</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Strawson y Haack: dos propuestas alternativas y moderadas en la epistemología naturalizada]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Strawson and Haack: two alternative and moderate approaches in naturalized epistemology]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cárdenas-Castañeda]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Leonardo]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Caldas  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Manizales ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>20</volume>
<numero>35</numero>
<fpage>61</fpage>
<lpage>90</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0124-61272019000200061&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0124-61272019000200061&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0124-61272019000200061&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En este artículo me propongo presentar una caracterización de la epistemología naturalizada que se pueda entender como una teoría que no privilegia ni a la epistemología tradicional ni tampoco a la epistemología de corte científico; es decir, pretendo mostrar que resulta posible construir un puente entre la epistemología naturalizada y la tradicional sin necesidad de prescindir de las herramientas conceptuales de la epistemología clásica (como lo son la noción de justificación y el elemento a priori), y a la vez se puede examinar hasta qué punto aquella se distingue de ésta o si debe renegar también de tales herramientas conceptuales. Dicho de otro modo, el objetivo de este trabajo consiste en mostrar una epistemología naturalizada alternativa que no prescinda de los avances científicos ni de las herramientas tradicionales de la epistemología. Aunque, quiero dejarlo en claro desde ahora, a pesar de que me parece interesante esta postura reconciliadora entre la epistemología tradicional y la epistemología naturalizada, no estoy a favor de ninguna de ellas, por lo que en un trabajo independiente podría mostrar mi propio punto de vista sobre este tema. Aquí sólo expondré y analizaré críticamente dos antecedentes sobre el asunto en la filosofía reciente.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract This article aims to present a characterization of the naturalized epistemology that can be understood as a theory that does not favor either traditional epistemology or scientific epistemology. That is to say, the intention is to show that it is possible to build a bridge between naturalized and traditional epistemology without having to get rid of the conceptual tools of classical epistemology (such as the notion of justification and the a priori element) and, at the same time that it is possible to examine the extent to which the former differs from the latterit or whether we should also deny such conceptual tools. In other words, the objective of this work is to show an alternative naturalized epistemology that does not get rid of the traditional tools of epistemology. Although it is important to make it clear from now on that, despite the fact that this reconciling position between traditional epistemology and naturalized epistemology is interesting, the author is not in favor of any of them, so that I could show my own point of view on this subject in an independent work. Here I will limit myself to expose and critically analyze two antecedents on the subject in recent philosophy.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Epistemología naturalizada]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[naturalismo liberal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[naturalismo aposteriorista, reformista y restringido]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Naturalized epistemology]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[liberal naturalism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[aposteriorist, reformist and restricted naturalism]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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