<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0124-6127</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Discusiones Filosóficas]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[discus.filos]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0124-6127</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Vicerrectoría de Investigaciones y Postgrados, Universidad de Caldas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0124-61272022000200031</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.17151/difil.2022.23.41.3</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[La teoría cognitiva de las proposiciones y metafísica de propiedades]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The cognitive theory of propositions and metaphysics of properties]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Alvarado-Marambio]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[José Tomás]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Santiago ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2022</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>23</volume>
<numero>41</numero>
<fpage>31</fpage>
<lpage>58</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0124-61272022000200031&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0124-61272022000200031&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0124-61272022000200031&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Ha sido uno de los alegatos centrales de la teoría así llamada &#8220;cognitiva&#8221; de las proposiciones que su carácter representacional -y, con ello, sus condiciones de verdad- es derivativo del carácter representacional primitivo de los actos cognitivos concretos por los que un agente predica una propiedad de un objeto. Las proposiciones heredan su carácter representacional porque son &#8216;tipos&#8217; de actos cognitivos particulares que poseen el &#8216;mismo&#8217; contenido representacional. Se argumenta en este trabajo que esta suposición está en conflicto con el hecho de que actos cognitivos concretos son instancias de ciertos tipos. Bajo la mayoría de las concepciones acerca de lo que funda el hecho de que una pluralidad de objetos comparte la &#8216;misma&#8217; naturaleza -i. e., acerca de cómo son algo &#8216;uno&#8217; en lo múltiple- el carácter cualitativo de un objeto está fundado en universales o en alguna otra construcción aceptable para el nominalista.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract One of the central arguments of the so-called &#8216;cognitive&#8217; theory of propositions has been that their representational character -and with it their truth conditions- is derived from the primitive representational character of concrete cognitive acts by which an agent predicates a property of an object. Propositions inherit their representational character because they are &#8216;types&#8217; of particular cognitive acts that have the &#8216;same&#8217; representational content. It is argued in this work that this assumption is in conflict with the fact that concrete cognitive acts are instances of certain types. Under most conceptions of what founds the fact that a plurality of objects shares the &#8216;same&#8217; nature -for example about how they are something &#8216;one&#8217; in the multiple many- the qualitative character of an object is founded in universals or in some other construction acceptable for the nominalist.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Proposiciones]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[universales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[teoría cognitiva de las proposiciones]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[fundación]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[uno en lo múltiple]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Propositions]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[universals]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[cognitive theory of propositions]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[foundation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[one over many]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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