<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0121-3628</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Estudios de Filosofía]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Estud.filos]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0121-3628</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad de Antioquia.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0121-36282019000200159</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.17533/10.17533/udea.ef.n60a08</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Wittgenstein y la justificación de las proposiciones gozne]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Wittgenstein and the justification of hinge propositions]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gómez-Alonso]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Modesto]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca Facultad de Filosofía ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Salamanca ]]></addr-line>
<country>Spain</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>60</numero>
<fpage>159</fpage>
<lpage>182</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0121-36282019000200159&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0121-36282019000200159&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0121-36282019000200159&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen. Las cuestiones acerca de la posibilidad del pensamiento, entendido como una actividad dirigida a la realidad, son más profundas que las referidas a si el conocimiento es posible. El trilema de Agripa, particularmente mediante el tropo de arbitrariedad, expresa dichas cuestiones intuitiva- mente. Este tropo es, además, operativo en lo que se refiere a la epistemología de goznes, princi- palmente en virtud del hecho de que los goznes wittgensteinianos son principios fundacionales de nuestra práctica epistémica. Como tales, carecen necesariamente de aval racional, lo que plantea el problema de si la arbitrariedad de su aseveración es inherente a su carácter fundacional. Para afrontar este reto, los epistemólogos de goznes han propuesto una serie de argumentos prácticos que conciben los goznes bien como postulados que se exigen legítimamente a cualquier agente epistémico o como reglas constitutivas de la práctica ordinaria. El objeto de este trabajo es el de demostrar que tales argumentos son presa de consideraciones escépticas.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract. Questions about the possibility of thought as an activity directed to reality, are deeper than those concerning the possibility of knowledge. These deeper questions have found intuitive expression in the Agrippan Trilemma, particularly in the trope of arbitrary presupposition. This trope can be raised as a criticism of current varieties of hinge epistemology inspired by Wittgenstein, mainly by virtue of the fact that Wittgensteinian hinges are foundational principles governing our epistemic practice. As such, they are necessarily unsupportable, being thus difficult to see how it would be possible to conciliate the hinges&#8217; lack of support with their being not bare, arbitrary assertions. Facing up to this challenge, hinge epistemologists have proposed practical -though not prag- matic- arguments according to which hinges are either postulates legitimately demanded to every epistemic agent or rules constitutive of quotidian practices. It is the aim of this article to show that practical arguments for hinges fall short, necessarily so.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[constitutivismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[epistemología de goznes]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[escepticismo semántico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[justificación racional]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[presuposición arbitraria]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[primacía de la práctica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Wittgenstein]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[arbitrary assumption]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[constitutivism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[hinge epistemology]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[meaning-scepticism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[primacy of the practical]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[rational justification]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Wittgenstein]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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