<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0121-4772</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Cuadernos de Economía]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Cuad. Econ.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0121-4772</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional de Colombia]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0121-47722017000100049</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.15446/cuad.econ.v36n70.48671</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Condición monopsónica de los mercados ilegales: el caso de los cultivos ilícitos de coca]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Monopsonic condition of illegal markets: The case of coca crops]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="fr"><![CDATA[Condition monopsonique des marchés illégaux : le cas des cultures illicites de coca]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[Condição monopsônica dos mercados ilegais: O caso das culturas ilícitas de coca]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Serrano López]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Miguel]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Nacional de Colombia  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Bogotá ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>01</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>01</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>36</volume>
<numero>70</numero>
<fpage>49</fpage>
<lpage>73</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0121-47722017000100049&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0121-47722017000100049&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0121-47722017000100049&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Este artículo analiza las características del mercado ilegal de la producción de cultivos de coca desde la perspectiva de los traficantes. Se identifica que existe un incentivo para que el traficante aspire a tener pleno poder de mercado estableciendo monopsonios en sentido estricto. Se analizan dos casos particulares en ausencia de acción del Estado: en el primero, el traficante opera sin competencia; en el segundo, se presenta competencia entre dos traficantes. La posibilidad de uso indiscriminado de la fuerza hace que en los dos casos, el resultado sea el establecimiento de monopsonios. JEL: K420, D430, D210.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract This article analyzes the characteristics of the illegal market production of coca, This article analyses the characteristics of illegal coca production from a traffickers' perspective. The dealers have an incentive to obtain full market power by establishing a strict monopsony. We analyse two particular cases in the absence of State action. In the first, the dealer operates without competition, and in the second there is competition between two traffickers. Due to the possibility of an indiscriminate use of force, in both cases the final result is that monopsonies are established. JEL: K420, D430, D210.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="fr"><p><![CDATA[Résumé Cet article analyse les caractéristiques du marché illégal de la production de cultures de coca dans la perspective des trafiquants. On constate qu'il existe un stimulant pour que le trafiquant aspire à posséder le plein pouvoir sur le marché par l'établissement de monopsones au sens strict. On analyse deux cas particuliers en l'absence de l'action de l'État ; dans le premier, le trafiquant agit sans concurrence ; dans le second, il existe une concurrence entre deux trafiquants. La possibilité de l'utilisation indiscriminée de la force fait que dans les deux cas le résultat soit l'établissement de monopsones. JEL: K420, D430, D210.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo Este artigo analisa as características do mercado ilegal da produção de culturas de coca desde a perspectiva dos traficantes. Pode-se perceber que existe um incentivo para que o traficante aspire a ter pleno poder de mercado estabelecendo monopsônios em sentido estrito. São analisados dois casos particulares em ausência de ação do Estado; no primeiro, o traficante opera sem concorrência; no segundo, existe concorrência entre dois traficantes. A possibilidade do uso indiscriminado da força faz com que, nos dois casos, o resultado seja o estabelecimento de monopsônios. JEL: K420, D430, D210.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[conducta ilegal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[economía sumergida]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[monopsonio]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[competencia oligopsonística]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[comportamiento de la firma]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Illegal behaviour]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[underground economy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[monopsony]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[oligopsonic competition]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[firm behaviour]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[Conduite illégale]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[économie submergée]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[monopsone]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[concurrence oligopsonique]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="fr"><![CDATA[comportement de l'entreprise]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Conduta ilegal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[economia submersa]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[monopsônio]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[concorrência oligopsonística]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[comportamento da firma]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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