<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1794-192X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista Guillermo de Ockham]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. Guillermo Ockham]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1794-192X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad de San Buenaventura Cali]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1794-192X2020000100019</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21500/22563202.4261</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Objetividad de los juicios morales. Una revisión desde el pragmatismo lingüístico]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Objectivity of moral judgments. A review from linguistic pragmatism]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rodríguez Ortiz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Angélica María]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Autónoma de Manizales  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Manizales ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>18</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<fpage>19</fpage>
<lpage>32</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1794-192X2020000100019&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1794-192X2020000100019&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1794-192X2020000100019&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen El análisis de los juicios morales ha sido un asunto de debate en la filosofía a lo largo de la historia, retomado con mayor ahínco en el siglo XX con los planteamientos de Moore en su Principia Ethica y de Wittgenstein en su Conferencia de ética. Quizás ha sido este último autor el más influyente en las teorías que sustentan la imposibilidad de comparar los enunciados morales con los enunciados de la ciencia, pues no soportan un análisis veritativo, lo que lleva a algunos teóricos a asumir erróneamente que los juicios morales son relativos y están impregnados de subjetividad emotiva. Al hacer un análisis de esta postura, se puede evidenciar que estos planteamientos han llevado a que teóricos posteriores tomen como similares términos que no lo son. En parte de la literatura se evidencian como sinónimos &#8220;objetivo&#8221; y &#8220;absoluto&#8221;, así como &#8220;relativo&#8221; y &#8220;subjetivo&#8221;, incurriendo con ello en una confusión de orden conceptual que no solo aplica para el análisis de los juicios, sino que va más allá y oscila entre lo ontológico y epistemológico a la hora de hablar de moral. Este artículo pretende evidenciar problemas conceptuales con el fin de sustentar que, contrario a lo que Wittgenstein esbozó en su Conferencia de ética, es posible alcanzar la objetividad de los juicios morales sin llegar a afirmar su carácter de absolutos.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract The analysis of moral judgments has been a subject of debate in philosophy throughout history, but it was retaken with greater emphasis in the 20th century with the approaches of Moore in his Principia Ethica and of Wittgenstein in his Lecture on Ethics. Perhaps this last author has been the most influential in the theories that support the impossibility of comparing moral statements with the statements of science, since they do not support a truthful analysis, which leads some theorists to assume erroneously that moral judgments are relative and impregnated with emotional subjectivity. By making an analysis of this position, it can be seen that these approaches have led subsequent theorists to take similar terms that are not similar. In part of the literature, these concepts are evidenced as objective and absolute synonyms; as well as relative and subjective, thereby incurring a confusion of conceptual order, which not only applies to the analysis of judgments, but goes beyond and oscillates between the ontological and epistemological at the time of talking about morality. This article aims to highlight conceptual problems in order to support that, contrary to what Wittgenstein outlined in his Lecture on Ethics, it is possible to achieve the objectivity of moral judgments without actually affirming their absoluteness.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[juicio moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[objetivo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[absoluto]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[relativo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[subjetivo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[significado]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[moral judgment]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[objective]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[absolute]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[relative]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[subjective]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[meaning]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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