<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0120-131X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Cuestiones Teológicas]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Cuest. teol.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0120-131X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0120-131X2021000200207</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18566/cueteo.v48n110.a02</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[THE ROLE OF INTUITIONS ON THE EVIDENTIAL PROBLEM OF EVIL: A MODERATE RATIONALIST PROPOSAL]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[El papel de las intuiciones en el problema probatorio del mal: una propuesta racionalista moderada]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Miranda-Rojas]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Rafael]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Católica del Maule Facultad de Ciencias Religiosas y Filosóficas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2021</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2021</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>48</volume>
<numero>110</numero>
<fpage>207</fpage>
<lpage>229</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0120-131X2021000200207&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0120-131X2021000200207&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0120-131X2021000200207&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract This paper seeks to evaluate the scope of the link between the evidential problem of evil and the role of intuitions as a case of sui generis a priori epistemic access. In order to do this, I will first address the theoretical assumptions present in the understanding of what an intuition is and, consequently, what an intuitive belief as a case of non-inferential and a priori belief is. Following Church et al (2020), one main point of this research would be to highlight the link between intuitions and evidentialism, as it is considered in the evidential problem of evil. This will allow a moderate and empirically informed rationalist analysis of what is understood as evidence regarding the possible (or probable, in some readings) non-existence of God, if it is the case that there is at least one instance of gratuitous evil (pointless evil) in the world. To strengthen this interpretation in favor of an a priori - a posteriori link as a way of responding to the argument of evil and its undercutting defeater role (Oliveira, 2020), two assumptions present in the discussion and their plausibility will be considered: that a priori reasons are not strictly understood as evidence for religious belief of a proposition p; and that the irrationality of religious belief arises from the absence of justification for the occurrence of an event of evil. I maintain that there is a tension between i) and ii), specifically regarding the absence of evidence that allows us to sustain the incompatibility between gratuitous evil and the non-existence of God.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Este artículo pretende evaluar el alcance del vínculo entre el problema evidencial del mal y el papel de las intuiciones como un caso de acceso epistémico sui generis. Para ello, se analizarán en primer lugar los supuestos teóricos presentes en la comprensión de lo que es una intuición y, en consecuencia, lo que es una creencia intuitiva como caso de creencia no inferencial y a priori. Siguiendo a Church et al. (2020), un punto principal de esta investigación es resaltar el vínculo entre las intuiciones y el evidencialismo, tal y como se considera en el problema evidencial del mal. Esto permitirá un análisis racionalista moderado y empíricamente informado de lo que se entiende como evidencia respecto a la posible (o probable en algunas lecturas) no existencia de Dios, si es el caso de que hay al menos una instancia de mal gratuito (mal injustificado) en el mundo. Para fortalecer esta interpretación a favor de un vínculo a priori - a posteriori como una forma de responder al argumento del mal y su papel derrotista (Oliveira, 2019), se considerarán dos supuestos presentes en la discusión, y su plausibilidad: i) que las razones a priori no se entienden estrictamente como pruebas para la creencia religiosa de una proposición p; ii) que la irracionalidad de la creencia religiosa surge de la ausencia de justificación de la ocurrencia de un evento de maldad. Sostengo que existe una tensión entre i) y ii), específicamente en lo que respecta a la ausencia de evidencia que permita sostener la incompatibilidad entre el mal gratuito y la inexistencia de Dios.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Evil]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Irrationality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Rationality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Evidence]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Intuition]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Fallibility]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Skeptical Theism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Atheism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Agnosticism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[A priori]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Mal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Irracionalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Racionalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Evidencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Intuición]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Falibilidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Teísmo escéptico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Ateísmo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Agnosticismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[A priori]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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