<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0124-4639</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista Universidad y Empresa]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[rev.univ.empresa]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0124-4639</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad del Rosario]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0124-46392019000100228</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/empresa/a.6649</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Decisiones de diversificación y spin off. Ciclos de expansión y ciclos de enfoque: Análisis retrospectivo de las evidencias del caso Bavaria]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Diversification Decision and Spin-Off Decision. Expansion Cycles and Focus Cycles: Retrospective Analysis of Evidence in the Bavaria Case]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[Decisão de diversificação e decisão de Spin-off. Ciclos de expansão e ciclos de enfoque: Análise retrospetiva das evidências do caso Bavaria]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Herrera-Echeverri]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Hernán]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad EAFIT Departamento de Finanzas Escuela de Economia y finanzas]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>21</volume>
<numero>36</numero>
<fpage>228</fpage>
<lpage>260</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0124-46392019000100228&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0124-46392019000100228&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0124-46392019000100228&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Esta propuesta utiliza el caso del Antiguo Grupo Empresarial Bavaria para analizar tres aspectos relacionados con la diversificación no relacionada y el proceso de spin off de las firmas. Primero se establece que las empresas con unidades de negocio caracterizadas por excesos de liquidez, se diversifican de manera no relacionada, debido a que la existencia de un mercado interno de capitales les permite derribar sus restricciones de financiación e incrementar la rentabilidad corporativa. Segundo, se demuestra que la decisión de diversificación de un gerente corporativo es inversamente proporcional a la magnitud del costo esperado por la dilución de esfuerzo del gerente de la nueva unidad de negocio. Finalmente, se muestra cómo la diversificación no relacionada presenta un límite en su contribución al incremento de la rentabilidad corporativa, en cuyo caso se puede inducir la decisión de realizar un spin off para delimitar, especializar y mejorar la calidad de las decisiones de asignación de recursos. Se concluye que lo anterior puede explicar por qué en algunos grupos económicos se observan ciclos de diversificación y ciclos de enfoque. Cuando el grupo económico desea incrementar la rentabilidad inicia su proceso de diversificación; una vez llega al umbral que hace que la probabilidad de acierto en sus decisiones de inversión se reduzca, empieza nuevamente su proceso de enfoque, realizando separación de sus unidades no relacionadas. Este ciclo se puede repetir en el desarrollo histórico de un grupo empresarial.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract This proposal uses the case of Grupo Empresarial Bavaria to analyze three aspects of the unrelated diversification and the spin off process. First, it is established that firms with business units characterized by cash excess, start unrelated diversification processes, because internal capital market allows them to bring down their funding constraints and increase corporate profitability. Second, we demonstrate that the diversification decision of a corporate manager is inversely proportional to the magnitude of the expected cost by the effort dilution of the manager of the new business unit. And finally, it is shown that unrelated diversification has a limit on their contribution to increased corporate profitability, in which case it may induce the decision to spin off for delimit, specialize and improve the quality of allocation decisions resources. This explains why some corporative groups present focus cycles and diversification cycles. When the economic group wants to increase the profitability starts a diversification process, once the threshold is overtaken, the probability of success in their investment decisions is reduced, then the focus process begins again by separating unrelated units. This cycle can be repeated in the historical development of a business group.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo Esta proposta utiliza o caso do Antigo Grupo Empresarial Bavaria para analisar três aspetos relacionados com a diversificação não relacionada e o processo de spin off das empresas. Primeiro se estabelece que as empresas com unidades de negócio caracterizadas por excessos de liquidez, se diversificam de maneira não relacionada, devido a que a existência de um mercado interno de capitais, lhes permite derribar suas restrições de financiamento e incrementar a rentabilidade corporativa. Segundo, se demonstra que a decisão de diversificação de um gerente corporativo é inversamente proporcional a magnitude do custo esperado pela diluição de esforço do gerente da nova unidade de negócio. E finalmente, se mostra como a diversificação não relacionada apresenta um limite em sua contribuição ao incremento da rentabilidade corporativa, em cujo caso se pode induzir a decisão de realizar um spin off, para delimitar, especializar e melhorar a qualidade das decisões de assinação de recursos. Conclui-se que o anterior pode explicar porque em alguns grupos econômicos se observam ciclos de diversificação e ciclos de enfoque. Quando o grupo econômico deseja incrementar a rentabilidade inicia seu processo de diversificação, uma vez chega ao umbral que faz que a probabilidade de acerto em suas decisões de investimento se reduza, então começa novamente seu processo de enfoque, realizando separação de suas unidades não relacionadas. Este ciclo se pode repetir no desenvolvimento histórico de um grupo empresarial.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[grupos empresariales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[diversificación no relacionada]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[escisiones]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[mercados internos de capital]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Business groups]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[unrelated diversification]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[scission]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[internal capital markets]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[grupos empresariais]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[diversificação não relacionada]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[cisões]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[mercados internos de capital]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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